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Abstract 
 
This project originates from the necessity to explain an uncanny fusion detected between 
cosmopolitan characteristics which Antonio Gramsci ascribed to Italian intellectual 
culture and the anti-humanistic connotations displayed by Italian Thought. Traditional 
cosmopolitan discourses inheriting the legacy of the Enlightenment generally align with 
humanistic perspectives whereas, as Roberto Esposito observes, Italian Theory has 
endorsed anti-humanistic viewpoints ever since the age of the Renaissance. How does 
one explain such a connection? Also, how are we to justify the ascetic categories of 
mysticism, weakness, slowness, bareness, etc. which proliferated among Italian thinkers 
starting from the late 1970s? 
 In response to these questions, this work attempts to define the position that 
contemporary Italian philosophy defends with respect to the current debate on 
cosmopolitan theory. Neo-Kantian solutions proposed by authors such as Jϋrgen 
Habermas, Daniele Archibugi and David Held, will certainly be given some 
consideration. Importantly, these discourses acknowledge the necessity to rethink the role 
of both the state and international relations in view of the brutalities perpetrated by 20th 
century totalitarianisms and the present globalized geopolitical scenario. Advocating a 
reinforcement of global powers and counting faithfully on the authority of law, these 
theories nonetheless elicit some perplexities. On one hand, they presuppose a disbelief 
within people’s self-emancipating capacities and, on the other, are not sufficiently critical 
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of the neoliberal agenda. This is even more evident when considering that most of the 
said authors do not express skepticism with respect to the promotion of human rights. 
While human rights are certainly needed now more than ever, in several cases they align 
with both a profit-oriented and imperialistic mentality. 
 It is relieving to discover that cosmopolitanism was initially founded by the Greek 
Cynics as a non-humanistic discourse and that several authors, including Peter Sloterdijck 
and William Desmond, highlighted similarities connecting Greek Cynicism with 
contemporary European modes of thinking. The Cynic perspective can help one solve 
many of the aforementioned doubts, because it rejects conventional societal values such 
as wealth, fame, and power, while promoting moral ideals of liberty, equality, self-
sufficiency, and ascetic practices.  In view of these premises, this study will pursue the 
hypothesis that, beginning with the publication of Massimo Cacciari’s Krisis (1976), 
Italian Philosophy and Literature have embraced a critical rhetoric which partially moves 
away from Marxian views and gradually retrieves cynic ideas. More specifically, the 
inquiry will unfold along two different paths: the historical-cultural analysis will be 
utilized as a material support for reaching theoretical-philosophical targets.   
Regarding the historical-cultural aspect, I will clarify to what extent contemporary 
Italian philosophy and literature retrieve Greek Cynic contents. This part of the theory 
will develop according to three fundamental factors which separate the sphere of the 
“human” from the domain of the “non-human”. The first two factors, “reason” and 
“language”, will be discussed within chapter 2 by exploring the work of Massimo 
Cacciari, Gianni Vattimo, and literature from the 1977 movement. “History” will 
represent the third pivotal discriminating factor in chapter 3, focusing on Franco 
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Cassano’s Southern Thought and Giorgio Agamben’s post-humanism. The ultimate 
intention, which is philosophical, is to extrapolate from Italian Cynicism a critical 
cosmopolitan discourse that destabilizes neoliberal ideological structures and dissociates 
principles of local autonomy from cultural protectionism and anti-immigration claims.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The time for cosmopolitan ideals as an extravagance restricted to a privileged minority is 
rapidly withering away.  
 The current Syrian crisis is but the last of an infinite series of dramatic events which, 
ever since World War I, in different ways repeatedly perpetuated statelessness, 
homelessness, Diasporas, migration, and displacement of all kinds. Aggravating this 
scenario, the increasing expansion of the markets, the persistent and often inconsiderate 
action carried out by multinational corporations, and the subsequent internationalization 
of labor during the last fifty years progressively destabilized national sovereignties and 
local communities, thus forcing myriads of individuals to flee their homeland. The rise of 
the post-modern era gave birth to a plethora of new forms of global interconnectedness. 
These can hardly be considered as abstract and high-minded conjectures or historical 
anomalies, inasmuch as they proliferate as concrete states of affairs that common people 
inescapably experience on a daily basis. Isn’t one sufficiently conscious of this scenario, 
to separate the primary importance intercultural dialogue and moral exchange have now 
acquired from a class of paternalistic feelings that only well-off travelers typically have 
the luxury to enjoy? Isn’t one attentive enough for acknowledging, in addition to the 
educated voyager fluent in multiple languages and wealthy entrepreneurs residing in the 
comfort of sumptuous hotels, that a new and more awaken cosmopolitan spirit has come 
into being?  
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 Moving one’s focus towards the margins of peripheral vision, one can occasionally 
see this spirit escaping political persecutions, bloody conflicts, starvation, being dragged 
by the ocean towards the most unpredictable shores, or even crawling tenaciously across 
a desert. This spirit’s whisper can be heard while roaming around forgotten 
neighborhoods of large western cities, where idiomatic translation, cultural hybridization, 
and ethical negotiation do not serve as intellectual distractions but rather represent 
mandatory ways to survive. It is this same shade that animates on a daily basis thousands 
of employment offices, wherein long lines of unwaged youths attempt to adapt again and 
again to different working obligations and environments, which inexorably uproot them 
from their families and motherlands. The spirit to which I am alluding must not be 
mistaken with the mere craving for a soothing experience of cultural diversity, because it 
originates from an anxiety of the uncertain, from one’s own total exposure to the whole. 
Far from seeing the world as a welcoming home, the new cosmopolitan hope unfolds by 
learning how to look at its own home as precarious, evanescent.  
 The reader will soon find out that the view defended here has little to do with the 
promotion of mere compassionate emotions; quite the opposite. The cosmopolitan 
hypothesis is posited here with the intention to find a potential escape out of the states of 
dislocation and extraneousness that relentlessly afflict our time. This inquiry will attempt 
to look at the world through the eyes of those wanderers whose feet are forced to walk on 
an unstable ground, drifters who have never had the chance to sail under a regular breeze 
and who, nonetheless, do not seek for comfort within the illusory myth of an idyllic past, 
but strive to transform their shipwreck into an opportunity for spiritual redemption. The 
nomadic souls to whom this study is addressed do not perceive themselves as victims; in 
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all circumstances they look at their struggle as a way to accomplish self-liberation and 
political emancipation. For this reason, and differently from what numerous discourses 
preach in our time, ‘exclusion’ will not be feared or demonized, but embraced as a 
blessing.  
 In view of these premises, the analysis that will be illustrated here cannot exclusively 
rely on institutional or legal maneuvers. Cosmopolitan theories that follow this path 
generally inherit the humanistic legacy of the Enlightenment, which in recent times has 
exposed numerous flaws.  Solutions proposed by Jϋrgen Habermas, Daniele Archibugi 
and David Held, who insist on a necessity to reinforce global powers in order to defend 
democratic practices, certainly deserve some degree of consideration. In addition to 
claims pertaining to wealth redistribution and principles of self-determination, what these 
discourses importantly acknowledge is that the shift from a Westphalian geopolitical 
framework to a post-national scenario required political discourse to rethink the role of 
the state and of international relations in defense of the individual dignity that 20th 
century totalitarianisms had brutally violated. 
 Nevertheless, a blind reliance on the authority of law elicits some perplexities. In fact, 
this presupposes a disbelief in people’s self-emancipating capacities and, in some 
circumstances, can result in philosophical perspectives which are not sufficiently critical 
of the western hegemonic influence and the neo-liberal agenda. Counting devotedly on 
the Kantian utopia, most of the abovementioned efforts conceive of “humanity” as able to 
capture an alleged common essence shared by all peoples, and utilize the notion of 
“human rights” as a conceptual platform for the development of a constitutional language 
that is called to support global equality and justice. Nevertheless, since the end of World 
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War II the western promotion of human rights has operated hand-in-hand with an 
interventionist logic purporting to alleviate “suffering” and endorse “inclusion”, which in 
some cases also pursued economic profit and political control. In particular, beginning in 
1990, financial aid from the North to the South has significantly diminished while states 
of emergency have multiplied, thus transforming humanitarian interventionism into large-
scale business. As a consequence, global poverty has not declined over the last decades, 
while in several circumstances humanitarian action has been misdirected toward the aims 
of profit seeking. 
 The elaboration of a cosmopolitanism that truly represents displaced sociopolitical 
conditions, therefore, needs to base itself on a model that recovers pre-humanistic ideals 
such as the ones developed in ancient times by the Greek Cynics. Scholars rarely remark 
that ancient cosmopolitan thought was founded in defense of political “exclusion” by 
Diogenes from Sinope (404-323 BC) and his disciples, whose notion of universal identity 
was attained through the repudiation of all types of community, the opposition to 
authority of any sort, as well as the rejection of ordinary societal values such as wealth, 
fame, and power. Cynic cosmopolitanism could not rely on humanistic presuppositions, 
because Greek thought and language did not own a term denoting an ideal of mankind 
that would correspond to the Roman humanitas. As the Greek cosmos “is not a human 
construct, but exists beyond human control and even conception”1, cosmopolitanism 
originated as a type of thinking that posits an affinity between all forms of life by means 
of a critical distrust vis-à-vis cerebral abstractions and comprehensive types of 
philosophical systems.  
                                                 
1 Desmond (2008), p. 204.  
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 Owing to the numerous historical similarities that connect contemporary Europe and 
Greek Hellenism, when cynic doctrines proliferated, the present-day western milieu 
offers an ideal background for cynic cosmopolitanism to reemerge in its whole. In 
addition to the comparative accounts elaborated by authors such as Peter Sloterdijk, who 
has highlighted discursive similarities linking contemporary post-modernism and ancient 
cynicism, such a hypothesis appears to be furthermore confirmed by the recent 
emergence of the so called “post-human” doctrines. In this regard, the fusions of 
biological elements and technological devices that several trans-humanists advocate 
reappear to a degree within the class of power collisions that, from Nietzsche to Foucault 
and Agamben, anti-humanist philosophers have identified for describing the history of 
western knowledge. Following a similar path, the deconstructive attacks on gender, race, 
and class supremacies carried out by post-colonial theorists have also contributed 
significantly to removing ‘man’ from the center of the narrative space, which is now 
arguably more inclined to harbor pre-humanistic cynic perspectives.  
 All this is particularly true in the case of contemporary Italy where, starting from the 
end of the 1970s, the synchronized combination of economic growth, urbanization 
processes and immigration phenomena, characterizing also the Hellenistic epoch, 
facilitated the reappearance of cynic elements, which resurfaced in Italy more visibly 
than in any other cultural context. In this regard, this study pursues the hypothesis that, 
beginning with the publication of Massimo Cacciari’s Krisis (1976), Italian Philosophy 
has embraced a critical rhetoric that partly moved away from Marxian views and 
retrieved cynic values. Specifically, it will be explained why the nihilistic concepts 
elaborated by Italian thinkers in recent years can hardly find a satisfactory justification if 
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not considered through the cynic categories of asceticism, self-sufficiency, and 
dispossession. 
 Bearing these postulates in mind, the inquiry will unfold along two different paths, 
utilizing the historical-cultural analysis as a material support for accomplishing 
theoretical-philosophical purposes.  As regards the former, it will be clarified to what 
extent and in what forms contemporary Italian philosophy and literature retrieve Greek 
Cynic contents. This aspect of the theory will develop in proportion to the three 
fundamental factors that are commonly credited as what separates the sphere of the 
“human” from the domain of the “non-human”: “reason” and “language” will be 
discussed within chapter 2, while “history” will represent the third pivotal discriminating 
element in chapter 3. The ultimate intention, which is narrowly philosophical, will be to 
dig out from Italian Cynicism a critical cosmopolitan discourse that avoids 
authoritarianism, destabilizes neo-liberal ideological structures, while also discouraging 
bigoted and parochial mentalities.   
 The first chapter, mainly aiming at historical targets, will firstly distance itself from 
traditional humanistic discourses and also explain why most of them betray the original 
Cynic spirit. Subsequently, the analysis will rely on William Desmond’s studies on 
ancient Cynicism, Peter Sloterdijk’s account of post-modernism and Roberto 
Marchesini’s post-human conjectures so as to highlight discursive superimpositions 
linking Diogenes’ philosophical school and contemporary western modes of thinking. A 
more narrow examination comparing Paul Ginsborg’s historical description of Italy with 
the dominant interpretations of Italian Theory will then reveal why cynic elements have 
reemerged in this area more prominently than in any other sociopolitical environment. A 
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cynic reading of Roberto Esposito’s Living Thought: the Origins and Actuality of Italian 
Philosophy (2010), in particular, proves that the characteristics that the author ascribes to 
the Italian philosophical debate also apply to the movement founded by Diogenes in 
ancient times. 
 Moving forward, the second chapter will evaluate how post-human conceptions of 
“truth” and “language” affect cosmopolitan political discourse, so as to provide our 
theory with solid epistemological foundations. Following a critique of the notions of 
“internationalism” and “resistance” in relation to the contemporary geopolitical 
dynamics, the analysis will focus on the transition between the strikes on western reason 
that were fired in Italy during the late 1970s and the vocal quietness of the 1980s. Far 
from signifying political resignation, this shift is interpreted as an evolution connecting 
two cynic rhetorical strategies, which switched from a loud parrhesia - i.e. frank and 
open discourse - to a taciturn diatribe. Specifically, the inquiry will compare Massimo 
Cacciari’s negative thought against the philosophical antecedents of the Frankfurt School, 
the social atmosphere that animated the end of the 1970s and the literary texts 
representing the 1977 protest. This analysis will reveal that the mystical posited by 
Cacciari needs be considered in correlation to both the parrhesiatic atmosphere 
characterizing that time and a cynic conception of knowledge. From Cacciari’s 
viewpoint, truth can be asserted but remains in all circumstances inconsistent. Thus, 
moral principles, cultural practices, and collective identities, depending upon specific 
historical events and processes, cannot be labeled as merely arbitrary. However, as they 
are ultimately rooted within an ontologically incoherent substratum, they materialize and 
acquire self-awareness by referring at all times to their conceptual opposites.  
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 Such a “multiculturalism of friction” risks endorsing excessively assertive tones, but 
can be to a degree alleviated if one reclaims some of the hermeneutical views that Italian 
Theory elaborated in the beginning of the 1980s. Particular attention will be paid to 
Gianni Vattimo’s Weak Thought, which should be looked at as a diatribic strategy of 
resistance that relies on ontological impurities and contaminations as ideal ways to carry 
out social change. Locating “truth” within the intersection of philosophy, rhetoric and art, 
Vattimo associates a fading humanism with the rise of a plethora of mimetic and 
hybridized forms of expression which combine global influences with local traditions 
and, thus, have the potential to oppose exploitative and homologating pressures.   
 This view will be discussed in correlation to the exotic atmospheres of Italo Calvino’s 
last narrative so as to explain why the current globalized era requires democratic 
principles and practices to be rethought in view of the post-colonial experience.  With the 
assistance provided by Habermas’ theory of communicative action, Appiah’s reflections 
on cosmopolitanism, and the empirical case-study of post-colonial India, a conflation of 
parrhesiatic and diatribic elements will be identified. This will be considered as the most 
fertile terrain wherein an idea of “truth” that disregards universalistic Euro-centric claims 
and discloses itself as self-expression can potentially come into being. This conception of 
human communication leads one to envision a desirable polycentric cosmo-political 
scenario whose constitutive molecules do not rely on regressive identitarian views, but 
rather on social syncretism and cultural interaction. 
 The third chapter, pursuing more narrowly political purposes, will delve deeply into 
the abovementioned cosmo-local perspective by evaluating the evolution of Italian 
Thought following 1990 in relation to post-colonial theories such as Boaventura De 
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Sousa Santos’ Subaltern Cosmopolitanism, Homi Bhabha and Sheldon Pollock’s notion 
of the cosmopolitan vernacular and Walter Mignolo’s idea of diversality. All these 
discourses insist on the primary necessity to reform cosmopolitanism by deconstructing 
humanistic and linear conceptions of history. For this reason, Italian Theory can give a 
relevant contribution to this debate. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, although alternative 
theories of time were surfacing within other western philosophical contexts, this critical 
inclination resounded at full volume in Italy, likely due to the revolutionary climate that 
characterized the country in the early 1990s. Arguably, three post-human conceptions of 
temporality materialized out of the aforesaid sociopolitical crisis, unfolding as delay, 
suspension, and rebirth. Each of these alternative portraits of history exhibits cynic 
connotations, inasmuch as they all dismiss humanistic representations of temporality 
through dispossessing maneuvers. Recalling Heidegger’s description of man as ‘full in 
world’, it will be metaphorically maintained that each of these three lines of thought 
qualifies the post-human as ‘poor in time’.  
 This analysis will first take into account the cynic aspects characterizing Franco 
Cassano’s reflections on southern thought. Positing ‘slowness’ as an indispensable value 
to endorse in order to counter capitalistic ideological structures, Cassano looks at the 
Mediterranean as an independent area wherein new and more desirable forms of 
solidarity can potentially take shape. A discussion assessing this viewpoint in relation to 
both Edward Said’s discourse on orientalism and Albert Camus’ antagonistic neo-
humanism will unbury the pivotal role played by the cynic values of poverty and self-
sufficiency. In this theoretical context, these stand for ways to engage with the temporal 
flow and acquire counter-hegemonic significances. Further considerations relying on 
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Nancy Fraser’s theory of recognition, however, will detect a mismatch between the 
transformative purposes that Cassano pursues and the affirmative temporal framework 
that he postulates. What’s missing in Southern Thought is the effort to extrapolate from 
marginalized conceptual domains some deconstructive viewpoints that rise above the 
mere demand of respect for existing identities, while reshaping relations of recognition 
and destabilizing group separation. Cassano’s communitarian perspective will therefore 
be rectified by referring to a theoretical archetype identified as quiet maverick. This 
phrase, which denotes the capacity to convert isolated states of being into an opportunity 
for accomplishing beneficial impacts on society, will serve as a paradigmatic model for 
elaborating more efficient counter-hegemonic cosmo-political strategies. 
 This paradigm can be defined more clearly by engaging with Agamben’s post-1990 
philosophical production. Debatably, this represents the most nihilistic peak reached by 
contemporary Italian Cynicism, as well as what poses the conditions for the development 
of more affirmative conceptions of the ‘political’. Differently from the dominant 
interpretation of the Homo Sacer project, which is commonly associated with 
catastrophic prophecies, our analysis will look at the notion of bare life as a 
transformative factor that Agamben employs in order to destabilize humanistic 
ontological frameworks. These narrative interferences are obtained by conceptualizing an 
alternative understanding of history, which The Coming Community (1993), The Open 
(2004), and also The Time that Remains (2013) describe as a suspended coincidence of 
temporal openings and closures. From Agamben’s views on ‘poverty in time’ a 
Franciscan discourse takes shape which cannot be placed exclusively within a 
metaphysical domain and, for this reason, will be discussed in narrowly cynic terms. 
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From this perspective, one becomes more aware of how the Homo Sacer hypothesis 
radicalizes Hannah Arendt’s extralegal conception of the political, while also giving birth 
to de-territorialized forms of dissent that challenge established authorities and juridical 
apparatuses.  
 An assessment of these philosophical efforts in relation to Derrida’s critique of 
history will suggest the notion of perpetual rebirth as the most powerful tool to employ 
for the theorization of a post-human conception of time. Dismissing the humanistic 
portrait of cumulative and linear time flow, the cynic perspective perceives a fluctuation 
of continual dissolving and resurrecting patterns which escape pathological attachments 
to past and future, and also prioritizes the evanescence of the moment as the only existing 
dimension. An argumentative line that relies on perpetual rebirth overcomes Kant’s idea 
of Perpetual Peace, according to which the accomplishment of a stable global order 
would be made possible by both the expansion of the markets and the authority of 
international law. Ultimately this generates a cosmopolitan theoretical framework which 
dissociates ideals of local self-sufficiency from cultural protectionism and anti-
immigration claims. It also advocates the necessity to carry out extralegal maneuvers in 
order to rectify effectively the damages produced by post-1990 neo-liberalism.   
 More concretely, this mode of thinking points to two different directions. On one 
hand, it can be employed as a theoretical support for non-institutional cosmo-political 
voices which oppose the neo-liberal agenda and also defend values of political and 
economic independence. In this regard, the analysis will identify within the Global 
Justice Movement a complementary intersection between the isolationist wing and the 
alternative orientation.  Aligning with the former as far as the priority to reclaim a self-
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sufficient type of economy is concerned, while also valuing the international demeanor 
exhibited by the latter, this unorthodox “quiet maverick” dismisses excessively forceful 
tones. In their place, it pursues silent forms of dissent that substitute self-assertive 
strategies with ideals of creativity, uniqueness and exceptionality.  
 On the other hand, the transition between established juridical structures and 
extralegal modes of cooperation can hardly be obtained abruptly without also causing 
useless and destructive outcomes. For this reason, this shift must be carried out through a 
series of normative alterations which will gradually lead juridical apparatuses to a final 
dismantlement. The dissolution-rebirth fluctuation previously hypothesized, therefore, 
needs to be applied to the domain of law so as to make evolutionary social changes 
possible in a way that prevents violent repercussions. On this subject, a discussion of 
Roberto Esposito’s bio-politics, Seyla Benhabib’s jurisgenerativity and Gilbert 
Simondon’s normative meta-stability will provide legal structures with self-dissolving 
cosmopolitan devices. As a concrete exemplification of this unusual conception of the 
juridical, the inquiry will finally focus on secessionist constitutional regulations. It will 
also take into account European separatist groups which currently strive to obtain a 
stronger political autonomy while also defending their continental membership. Whether 
this “separatism in integration” wave can be viewed as a symptom of the rising cosmo-
local subjectivities that are conceptualized here is a debatable hypothesis that 
optimistically will produce desirable outcomes. One only hopes that these sorts of 
phenomena will ultimately assist the promotion of self-determination views which 
reinforce ideals of liberty, hospitality and respect, and disregard narrow-minded biases. 
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The most desirable outcome would be a cosmopolitan awakening that overflows the 
European horizons. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
“For the happiness of the animal, that thorough kynic, 
 is the living proof of the truth of cynicism.” 
Nietzsche, Untimely Observations, 2, sec.1 
 
 
Cosmopolitanism and Humanism:  the Suffering Other 
 
1. 
The association between suffering and exclusion has never been as powerful as it is in 
our time.  
 No matter where we turn our attention, it would seem to be common opinion that 
whoever happens to live at the borders of a certain social or political space is the one that 
experiences the most excruciating agony. Borderline individuals – the immigrant, the 
poor, the person of color - are in most cases stigmatized as healthy carriers of misery, 
whereas the term ‘minority’ has by now become synonymous with wretchedness. Such 
an assumption is often posited both by conservative and progressive political voices: the 
former turn pale at the idea that the suffering conveyed by the excluded ones might be 
contagious; the latter reinforce their self-esteem by preaching inclusion for reducing other 
people’s despair. According to majority consciousness, where exclusion is happening 
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some kind of suffering has to be alleviated; anywhere suffering is occurring, some sort of 
inclusive action needs to be carried out as soon as possible. 
 One might come up with several conjectures regarding why such a semantic 
correlation appears to be reiterated far and wide. The common belief that the growth of 
the economy gave birth to some sort of global community certainly plays an important 
role. Many people take for granted that during the last few decades the relentless 
expansion of the market and persistent investments carried out by multinational 
corporations brought about a closer connection among societies, thus destroying a 
plethora of political barriers.  It is a widespread belief that ‘globalization’ has taken place, 
which means that events happening in one part of the planet can still strongly affect 
sociopolitical environments that are quite far away.  Migrations, international terrorism 
and environmental issues are but a few problems that connect the countries with one 
another. These have become indispensable points of reference for the elaboration of 
ethical values, also affecting people’s self-perception. All these factors are leading 
individuals from different countries to feel part of the same geopolitical space. 
Considering these details, the hypothesis that globalizing processes are not necessarily 
‘inclusive’ and that, on the contrary, are producing spaces of universal segregation is 
perceived as even more dreadful.  
 It is well known that at the moment global inequalities are still enormous. Fifteen 
percent of the world’s population living in industrialized countries has an income of over 
$30,000 per year. The powers the rule this demographic control about eighty percent of 
the global product, whereas the United Nations Development Programme has recently 
affirmed that about 850 million human beings are undernourished, 1,037 million do not 
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have any access to safe drinking water, and 2,600 million are not supplied with efficient 
health care. Moreover, no essential drugs are available for some 2,000 million human 
beings, no suitable shelters are accessible for 1,000 and no electricity is offered for 2,000 
million.2 Notice that these data acquire an even more frightening significance when 
considered from the privileged perspective that overviews the extraordinary “inclusive” 
level reached in the west.  Given the increasing connection among western peoples, the 
anxiety of being left out or abandoned in a condition of isolation is extremely fearsome. 
This might further explain why the most intolerant attacks on globalization have been 
expressed in developed countries, whereas in developing areas people’s opinions appear 
to be more positive.3  
 As discriminatory as this economic expansion has been, it has nonetheless brought 
about a considerable degree of homogeny. Largely due to the internationalization of the 
media, people around the world share passions for similar hobbies, leisure activities, 
music genres, and also look up to the same sport celebrities. The cultural hegemony 
exercised by the Hollywood has also contributed to standardizing fashion as well as 
moral values and behavioral manners. All this has been implemented through the 
proliferation of the English language, which has ‘offered’ itself as a planetary tool of 
communication. For the sake of precision it must be observed that such a process is only 
apparently globalizing, especially if we consider that less than five percent of humanity 
has access to the Internet and that, for instance, in 1999 half of all American households 
did4. However, if we perceive this through the lens of the homologized – namely, the side 
of the included - we should not be surprised that the incapability to conform appears as a 
                                                 
2 See the data provided by Pogge (2007), Why Inequality Matters, in Held & Kaya (2007), p. 133. 
3 See David Dollar (2007), Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality since 1980, in Held and Kaya (2007), p. 99. 
4 Borradori (2003), p. 122. 
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weakness, and the subsequent consequence of being excluded as a terrifying possibility. 
Why should we blame those who give up their uniqueness for the sake of avoiding a 
miserable isolation? We should not judge them. After all, the desire to avoid exclusion 
and to be accepted within a community is often postulated as one of the most essential 
qualities defining humanity. It is perfectly natural for a human being – one often hears – 
to want ‘to be part of’, to want to belong.    
 Considering these observations, it is not a coincidence that some scholars have 
explained the reiterated association between exclusion and suffering as closely related to 
the evolution of capitalism. Among all studies on humanism and capitalism – including 
Gramsci’s Marxian account, Foucault’s post-structuralist doctrine, and recent bio-
political theories - Thomas Haskell5’s analysis offers the most enlightening 
considerations for our purposes. Haskell points out that, starting from 1750, the 
increasing circulation of humanistic feelings paralleled two main factors characterizing 
western capitalism: the acquisition of a new technological empowerment and the 
development of an efficient contractual ethics. What is enlightening here is the example 
of the ‘starving stranger’, through which Haskell shows how the responsibility for 
suffering experienced by foreigners is felt more intensively in modern times mostly due 
to western countries having at their disposal the means to cover long distances and rescue 
people. In this sense, humanitarian feelings are closely related to the idea of a 
technological intervention which, even when it does not take place, is still perceived as 
possible:  
“Curiously, our feeling of responsibility for the stranger’s plight, though nowhere 
near strong enough to move us to action, is probably stronger today than it would 
have been before the airplane. If William Wilberforce had faced this question in 
                                                 
5 Haskell (1985). 
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1800, he at least could have begged off on the grounds that the sea voyage to 
India was long and costly and he might die en route. This suggests that new 
technology – using that word broadly to refer to all means of accomplishing our 
ends, including new institutions and political organizations that enable us to attain 
ends otherwise out of reach – can change the moral universe in which we live.”6  
  
In addition to more powerful technological devices, the empathy for the ‘starving 
stranger’ is perceived more strongly in modern times because of new contractual 
principles that were adopted by western traders starting in the 18th century. Following 
Weber, Haskell notices how contemporary capitalism could not have thrived without the 
support of the innovative disciplinary ethics through which western markets traded and 
optimized their profits. Two moral principles identified by Haskell state that if dealers 
had not been able to ‘maintain their promises’ or ‘to attend to the remote consequences of 
their actions’, western business would not have reproduced itself by constantly seeking 
greater incomes.  Such a pragmatic morality was progressively incorporated within the 
western juridical codes which carried out a gradual separation between contract law and 
property law, providing the value of liability with more importance. The new 
humanitarian sensibility was generated as a consequence of this slow transition:  
 “Those who learned these lessons well and who could take for granted the 
existence of many others imbued with the same lessons were the first to cross the 
threshold into a new moral universe, one in which the horizons of causal 
perception were sufficiently wide, and the techniques routinely employed in 
everyday tasks sufficiently complex and future oriented, that failing to go to the 
aid of a suffering stranger might become an unconscionable act.”7   
 
By combining the previous observations with Haskell’s analysis, one realizes that the 
association between exclusion and suffering posited by contemporary western discourses 
does not tell us much about either the ‘excluded ones’ or the ‘sufferers’. After all, we 
                                                 
6 Ibid. p. 356. 
7 Ibid. p. 551. 
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continue to know nothing about the starving person, who is still a ‘stranger’ just like he 
was in the beginning of Haskell’s thought experiment. All we know is that, considering 
the high level of interconnection reached by a well homologated, technologically 
powerful and ‘morally’ efficient world, it would be irresponsible not to empathize with 
that ghostly presence. The concern for the suffering other, then, goes way beyond 
sermons preaching altruism and benevolence, and rather reveals all the fears and vanity 
of a mentality that labels exclusion as shameful and struggle as pointless. 
 
  
2.   
The rebirth of cosmopolitan thought that took place during the 1970s certainly facilitated 
the fortification of the suffering-exclusion rhetoric previously described. Many of the 
philosophers who participated in the cosmo-theory debate during the last few decades 
have elaborated notions of universal belonging by relying on humanistic views, while 
often prioritizing values of inclusion. These scholars grounded their discourse on the 
presumably unifying effects that globalization brought about and which allegedly 
represent a considerable step forward toward Kant’s perpetual peace among all peoples. 
Either through the promotion of a universal rationality (Habermas), the idea of a 
supranational type of democracy (Archibugi), the classification of human needs and 
capabilities (Nussbaum), or the insistence on global constitutionalism (Held), traditional 
cosmopolitan thought aspires to formulate a normative language that is able to safeguard 
all human beings. This type of terminology should offer the basis for the reinforcement of 
international institutions. For the same reason, most of these philosophers build up their 
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systems by embracing human rights vocabulary that has been developed after World War 
II. Nonetheless, considering our previous analysis, a cosmopolitan thought endorsing 
humanistic values might presuppose an interventionist logic that is also profit-oriented. 
Promoting inclusive principles, this philosophical perspective also risks perpetuating the 
western hegemony over both domestic subaltern realities and outer underdeveloped 
societies. 
 As a matter of fact, discourses advocating human rights and the corroboration of 
global institutions have been recently elaborated in relation to the necessity of regulating 
different types of intervention; from development promotion to humanitarian aid and 
relief delivery. In this regard, it is common opinion that as long as these efforts are 
discussed at the interstate level there will often be a risk for single governments to exploit 
them for pursuing their own economic and political interest. Thus, some suggest creating 
a world parliament by relying on non-governmental organizations, which should be 
provided with the unquestionable authority to evaluate human demands and to classify 
cases of rights violations. For instance, according to Daniele Archibugi’s theory of 
cosmopolitan democracy governments should continue to supply the necessary 
technological means for enhancing economic growth and facing emergencies, while 
interventions should be coordinated by a more authoritative Security Council. This idea 
presupposes the belief that in a planet where a plethora of societies intersect one another 
and where bodies such as NGOs and INGOs express a global demotic voice, self 
determination principles cannot be respected as long as nation states keep all their power 
and influence. Following this line of reasoning, some neo-Kantians prescribe replacing 
sovereignty with constitutionalization, and structuring the geopolitical space according to 
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different layers of governance. From the local level to the global dimension, people’s 
self-determination would be transferred through the creation of specific political organs 
supplied with a popular legitimacy. Archibugi’s cosmopolitan order, in particular, is 
shaped in a frame that is less centralized than a federation and more solid than a 
confederation. This would hinder the establishment of a universal government, while 
allowing global institutions to intervene within the states in defense of human rights8. 
 Theoretical efforts pursuing this institutional direction should be welcomed with 
gratitude. After all, violence, social abuses and political oppression still occur on a 
regular basis in the world and, therefore, the sacredness of the persona needs to be 
reasserted at all costs. Nonetheless, it is difficult to disregard that traditional 
cosmopolitan viewpoints considering the notion of ‘human rights’ as universally 
applicable do not acknowledge that 1) ‘human rights’ rhetoric is the consequence of a 
historical concentration of power, and constitutes the core of a normative language which 
has generated in some circumstances the very suffering it aims to alleviate, while in other 
occasions has proven to be inefficient; 2) the growing superimposition between 
interventionist logic and utilitarian morality has gradually turned humanitarian action into 
a business, while non governmental organizations, which are still strongly influenced by 
state policies, have lost a considerable portion of their global demotic content. 
 In contemporary history, a considerable concentration of power was carried out at the 
end of World War II, when the limitations of the League of Nations became evident to all 
                                                 
8A confederation is an association of sovereign states that underwrite a treaty with the main purposes of preventing 
war and guaranteeing peace. Two representative examples of confederations are the previously described League of 
Nations and United Nations neither of which, according to Archibugi, is sufficiently authoritarian for implementing 
democracy within the states. On the opposite side of the spectrum are federations of states such as the United States 
and Switzerland. These have the power to intervene everywhere in defense of human rights but are extremely 
centralized. A cosmopolitan system constructed on the federalist model would in the long run be incapable of 
safeguarding social minorities and local cultures, see Archibugi (2006), chapter 4. 
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political leaders. Woodrow Wilson’s project was a weak association of sovereign states 
that would give up part of their freedom in a few exceptional circumstances. For this 
reason, the League could do nothing to stop the horrifying events related to the Holocaust 
of the Jews or to prevent the axis Rome-Berlin-Tokyo from pursuing its goals. Habermas, 
however, acknowledges that the United Nations definitely went beyond the Wilsonian 
project and over the years progressively increased their authority. This is particularly 
evident considering that the Council of the League of Nations was only able to provide its 
members with advice regarding coercive procedures, while the Security Council is able to 
carry out the military actions it considers indispensable. Article 43, which allows the 
Council to be in charge of the contingents and logistical support that member states are 
required to supply, is crucial in this regard.9 In spite of this considerable empowerment, 
the post World War II age was a long moment of paralysis for the United Nations, whose 
normative progress did not bring about anticipated outcomes on the political scenario. 
The elaborated humanistic ideals reflected a political landscape where global poverty did 
not diminish and where rights were still dramatically desecrated. It is enough to consider 
the Vietnam War for understanding how the prohibition of violence established by the 
UN Charter resulted in the death of millions of innocents. During the period of the Cold 
War the normative language developed was largely impotent with respect to the political 
reality.  
 One might reasonably argue that such helplessness became both evident and 
unsustainable only at the very end of that epoch, when the victory of neo-liberalism10 
                                                 
9 Habermas (2006), p. 163. 
10 With this term I will refer to the ensemble of economic doctrines, relying primarily on the work of theorists such 
as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, which posit a deregulated form of liberalism as the ideal mode of social 
development. Some of these discourses were largely implemented across numerous western areas starting from the 
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over socialist ideologies paralleled the sickening massacres that occurred in Bosnia and 
Rwanda. The immobility that paralyzed the UN forces in those occasions made the entire 
world wonder whether what had succeeded was the humanistic principle of inclusion or 
rather a hidden profit-oriented morality. If judging the human rights rhetoric as “the latest 
example of European perfidy”11 sounds too pessimistic, certainly one should recognize 
the misleading essence it embodies.  
 That such an ambiguous intention has been unveiled after the fall of the Berlin wall, 
as some optimistic liberal thinkers would claim, is furthermore quite questionable. 
Starting from 1990 the humanistic interconnection between interventionist logic and 
profit-oriented morality has grown subtler, thus reaching a stage wherein they have 
become barely distinguishable. The accelerating growth of globalization corresponded 
with a considerable reduction of financial aid from rich to poor countries12 and with a 
multiplication of states of emergency, which progressively transformed ‘interventionism’ 
into a business. Alleviating the suffering of the starving stranger has become an aspect of 
governance, so that global powers in several circumstances brought relief where they had 
previously generated instability. The 1999 NATO’s controversial bombing of Kosovo 
was likely a turning point in this sense. In that circumstance, NATO’s unauthorized 
airstrikes led Serbian leader Milosevic to force nearly a half million Kosovars to leave 
their land, thus causing the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. 
In so doing, NATO forces provoked the very humanitarian emergency that they were 
aiming to prevent. What was new in that occasion was that NATO carried out the relief 
                                                                                                                                                             
early 1990s. Particularly due to the new rules established by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, a 
series of policies were approved which aimed at enhancing competitiveness through liberalization of prices, 
deregulation of trade, austerity measures, and reduction of social expenditures.  
11 Coustas-Douzinas (2013), The metaphysics of cosmopolitanism, in Braidotti, Hanafin, and Blagaard (2013) p. 58. 
12 Archibugi (2004), p.18. 
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operations, while humanitarian agencies aligned with it, thus sacrificing their autonomy 
from western governments which had been preserved in previous times. Both the UNHR 
and most NGOs requested NATO’s support for accomplishing their duties, thus siding 
indirectly with the armed invasion: “the same agencies that had strenuously guarded their 
humanitarian space (their independence, impartiality, and neutrality) in places such as 
Congo and Sudan were now working alongside, getting assistance from, and being 
directed by a combatant – and doing so with relative ease.”13 Humanitarianism finally 
revealed its double face and uncovered the role that it plays as an ally of western 
dominance, which occasionally spreads sickness in order to enforce its own healing 
therapies. From this perspective, humanistic values could be seen as simple modalities of 
globalization; that is, as commodities that the western economy sells and utilizes for 
restoring “linearity and predictable functioning”14wherever it finds obstacles.  
 It is not unreasonable to consider the transition carried out during those years from 
the notion of “humanitarian intervention” to the one of “responsibility to protect”15 as a 
juridical legitimacy of such a commodified humanism which, at the moment, represents a 
10 billion dollar business divided into branches and sectors. Some NGOs focus on 
emergency relief or specialize on long-term development activities; others concentrate on 
human rights advocacy or combine humanitarian aid with an explicit religious program. 
Most of them are supplied by a fair trade that was inaugurated in the Arab Gulf state of 
Dubai and that provides them with the items they need, hires MBAs and logistic 
                                                 
13 Barnett and Snyder (2008), The Grand Strategies of Humanitarianism, in Barnett and Weiss ed. by (2008) p. 162. 
14 Craig Calhoun (2008), The Imperative to Reduce Suffering, in Barnett and Weiss ed. by (2008) p. 86. 
15The “responsibility to protect” is a norm that has been discussed by the United Nations starting from 2000 and that 
aims at regulating humanitarian interventions in order to make them more effective. Both “humanitarian 
intervention” and “responsibility to protect” presume that nation-states forfeit their sovereignty whenever they don’t 
respect human rights, but the latter moves the focus from state-centered motivations to the protection of the 
populations at risk. 
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consultants, and offers professional roles and careers16.  However much de-territorialized 
and cosmopolitan this industry appears to be, it remains largely supported by state funds, 
which are delivered directly or through multilateral organizations such as the European 
Humanitarian Aid Office and various UN agencies17.   
 Let me pause for a moment and spell out the intentions that accompany all these 
considerations. This is not to create a distrustful atmosphere around the hope that one day 
all peoples will be able to coexist together in the name of freedom, justice and equality. 
From this perspective, it would be unconscionable not to endorse the humanistic ideal 
and, therefore, traditional cosmopolitan discourses should be certainly greeted with 
gratitude. The ambiguities and counter-effects that a humanistic type of cosmopolitanism 
potentially implies are nonetheless too evident not to be noticed. Whenever our 
enlightened values and our concern for the ‘suffering other’ conceal self-absorbed 
hegemonic objectives, the cosmopolitan faith looses its genuineness. This partly happens 
as a consequence of the humanistic rhetoric itself, which places suffering outside the 
human domain, thus banning struggle as purposeless and converting the principle of 
antagonism into a moribund agony. A cosmopolitanism that claims authenticity should 
then ally with post-human theory and reconsider the positive significance of ‘exclusion’ 
that characterized it at its origins. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Craig Calhoun (2008), The Imperative to Reduce Suffering, in Barnett and Weiss ed. by (2008) p.89.  
17 Ibid. 
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      Back to the Origins: Exclusion as a Blessing  
 
1. 
Would it be possible to develop a cosmopolitan thought that does not demonize 
‘exclusion’ and rejects humanistic overtones? If so, what type of subjectivity would such 
a mode of thinking presuppose? Before dismissing cosmopolitan ideas in toto it is worthy 
to venture down this path for a short while. A convenient historical account and a 
discussion of contemporary Italian post-humanism will help us disentangle these knots.   
 Etienne Balibar has recently worked in this direction, advocating a deconstruction of 
cosmopolitanism which moves from within the western philosophical tradition. Balibar 
reasonably points out that a cosmopolitan theory dismissing imperialistic meanings 
cannot be formulated through a mere refusal of Eurocentrism, but only through “a 
critique which dissolves and transforms it from the inside, in order to produce a self-
understanding of its premises and functions.”18 For this purpose, Balibar suggests to 
replace cosmopolitanism with the notion of cosmo-politics, which he characterizes 
essentially in two ways: on one hand, as the attempt to turn theory into practice, and to 
convert the cosmopolitan utopia into the actual programs, actions, and objectives of 
subjects that are politically connected at the global level. On the other hand, as the 
acknowledgment that globalization has resuscitated old universal struggles - for instance, 
between religious and secular groups - and reproduced recent ones, thus widening the 
geopolitical space where conflicts take place. One might say that this antagonistic 
cosmopolitan view converts ‘suffering’ into political struggle and so partially rectifies the 
humanistic perspective previously scrutinized.  
                                                 
18 Balibar (2014), p. 84. 
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 My purpose now is to expand on this deconstructive maneuver by considering the 
concept of cosmopolitanism from a narrowly genealogical viewpoint. The appeal to 
antagonistic factors that Balibar makes is certainly valuable, but it does not give us a 
sufficiently strong motivation for maintaining in our philosophical vocabulary the 
western association between ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’, which common sense normally 
regards as an inseparable ally of humanism. A valid ground for such a choice can be 
provided only if one is able to show that humanistic connotations are not inherent in the 
very notion of ‘cosmopolitanism’, but are rather due to a distorted evolution of it. Any 
deconstructive effort will then be incomplete without the will to purge ‘cosmopolitanism’ 
from its illegitimate attributes and to recover the original purity of the term. If such an 
excavation leads to nothing, one should appeal to Ockham’s razor and let the couplet 
‘cosmos-polis’ evaporate once and for all. Nonetheless I am confident that recovering the 
authenticity of this semantic association will help us grasp in a deeper manner the essence 
of the contemporary epoch and develop a more genuine sense of universal belonging.   
 Despite the vast literature concerning this topic, it is hardly ever recalled that 
cosmopolitanism was born in the name of exclusion and that over the centuries lost its 
original character. The first thinkers that considered themselves kosmopolitês - i.e. as 
citizens of the world – lived in Greece and Minor Asia approximately during the 
Hellenistic epoch stretching from Alexander the Great’s death (323 BC) to the rise of the 
Roman Empire and the diffusion of Christianity. It was when the Greek Cynics 
elaborated the very first idea of a global community by presupposing the demolition of all 
social conventions and the opposition to authority of any sort. It is not a coincidence that 
Diogenes from Sinope (404-323 BC), who is commonly regarded as the most 
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representative exponent of the school, was exiled from his hometown and lived most of 
his life devoid of the privilege of citizenship. As a political outsider, Diogenes perfectly 
embodied the kynical19 idea of virtue which, according to this philosophical orientation, 
can be achieved solely by confining oneself within areas of exclusion. Because of this 
ethical principle kynical adepts were prohibited to marry, to ask for membership in their 
native or adopted cities, to hold political office, and also to vote.  
 Desmond observes that these anarchic characteristics did not necessarily go against 
the democratic spirit of the epoch20. In fact, kynical doctrines proliferated in the more 
democratic areas of Greece, particularly in cities such as Sinope, Athens, Syracuse and 
Thebes, which all had strong democratic traditions, partly explaining the egalitarian and 
libertarian aspects that characterize Cynicism. Moreover, democracy at that time was 
often associated with poverty, recalling not only the value of frugality that was embraced 
by Diogenes’ disciples, but also the kynical rejection of aristocratic philosophical 
principles. Both democrats and Cynics had the tendency to disregard contemplative 
conceptions of philosophy, while sharing the appreciation for political praxis. This 
pragmatic component is one of the reasons why the kynical school, which spoke through 
a plurality of different voices, can hardly be categorized as a unitary philosophical 
orientation. Kynical ideals were also closely compatible with the democratic value of 
equality. Cynics believed that virtue could be learned and this is why their speeches were 
made available to all people, including women, who in those times were never allowed to 
participate in philosophical discussions. This unbiased demeanor furthermore mirrored 
                                                 
19 I will utilize this adjective in order to distinguish the philosophical meaning of the term ‘Cynicism’ from the way 
in which contemporary common sense conceives of it. Although the two concepts occasionally overlap, they differ 
from one another in many respects.  
20 See Desmond (2008), Chapter 5. 
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the Hellenistic philosophical inclination to appeal to groups beyond the restricted elites of 
classical schools.21  
  Despite the similarities that connect Cynicism to democracy, it must be remembered 
that kynical ideas were in any case delivered from ‘exclusion’ and that the kynical notion 
of virtue was irreconcilable with belonging to any sort of demos. Freedom was defined 
by the Cynics mostly in unconstructive terms, as freedom from nation and from social 
conventions, while the kynical ‘state’ required the readiness to live at the margins of the 
existing communities. Nonetheless, such a proscription of ‘belonging’ allowed Cynicism 
to embrace positive philanthropic values which democrats normally dismissed: the ideal 
man for the Cynics had to be just, lawful, prudent, temperate, brave, magnanimous, 
gentle, mild, and kindly, not only to his friends but to all mankind. It is a shame that none 
of these positive attributes is ever associated to the contemporary adjective ‘cynical’ 
which, for some reasons, has preserved only the nihilistic essence distinguishing its 
Greek ancestor.    
 The aforementioned qualities constitute the essence of the kynical cosmopolitan ideal, 
which does not contemplate inclusive connotations, but rather negative meanings. From a 
kynical perspective, identification with the cosmos presupposes the exclusion from all 
communities, and can be achieved only by maintaining oneself in the space of an 
honorable isolation. It is what Crates meant when, by saying that his homeland was “not 
one tower, nor one roof, but the citadel and home of the whole world”, he emphasized his 
uprooted political condition. On the same ideological line followed Diogenes’ conviction 
                                                 
21 Kennedy (1999), p. 26.  
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that “The only true commonwealth is the one in the cosmos”22 as well as Epictetus’ 
negative equivalence between dispossession of membership and deprivation of wealth: 
“I am without a city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I 
sleep on the ground, I have no wife, no children, no little mansion, but only the 
earth and heavens, and one little cloak. And what do I lack?”23 
 
 
In some circumstances this mentality appeared to be the symptom of a distrust in politics 
and a desire to escape society, which was a common tendency during the Hellenistic 
epoch. However, in some other cases Cynicism displayed strong political connotations. 
Cosmopolitan arguments were employed as forms of resistance with respect to the ruling 
authorities, while the rhetorical techniques of the parrhesia (frank, open speech) and 
diatribe were used for denouncing the immoral behaviors and the inequalities perpetuated 
in the community. The parrhesia, which in the context of the polis had represented the 
democratic ‘freedom of speech’, was converted by the Cynics into a language of protest 
when political liberties were revoked under the expansion of the Hellenistic empires.  The 
diatribe represented a way of sabotaging the communicative codes imposed by the ruling 
classes and was often employed by the Cynics in the forms of disturbing noise or silence.   
 Importantly, because Greek thought and language did not own a term denoting a 
universal mankind that would correspond to the Roman humanitas, kynical 
cosmopolitanism could not rely on humanistic presuppositions. Scholars point out that 
the Greek word anthropos denoted in all cases an individual creature exhibiting 
teriomorphic characteristics24. Therefore, it could be used as a conceptual substrate 
                                                 
22 Desmond (2008), p. 200. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Nybakken is explicit in this regard: “From Homer down through the classical Greek writers the word anthropos 
remained a generic term for individuals. It signified a creature that, although having some characteristics of the 
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neither for the elaboration of comprehensive ethical systems such as human rights, nor 
for theorizing an ontological separation between humans and other living forms. This 
means that cosmopolitanism originated as a mode of thinking that posits an affinity 
between all living beings by means of a critical distrust vis-à-vis cerebral abstractions and 
universalistic types of philosophical systems:  
“Diogenes does not say that he is a ‘cosmopolitan’ or a ‘citizen of the world’, that 
is, the human world. Rather, he says that he is a ‘citizen of the cosmos’. The 
cosmos is not a human construct, but exists beyond human control and even 
conception.”25 (italics mine)  
 
Such a non-humanistic essence is furthermore fully portrayed in the term ‘Cynicism’, 
recalling Diogenes’ nickname kynos (= dog) as well as the wild modes of living that the 
adepts of this philosophical school embraced. The dog-philosophers defined ethical 
excellence in terms of simplicity, frugality, and self-sufficiency, and believed that 
indifference to fortune and rejection of ordinary societal values such as wealth, fame and 
power, were the only ways in which virtue could be attained. Far from labeling 
‘suffering’ as disgraceful, the Greek Cynics conceived of it as the core of every authentic 
life experience as well as a fundamental moral step toward the achievement of the 
cosmopolitan ideal. For this reason, kynical routines refused all superfluous comforts, 
while rigorous physical training, meditation and ascetic rituals were practiced on a daily 
basis by the Cynics. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
lower animals, nevertheless possessed faculties and powers above them…The Greeks were familiar with this two-
fold nature of man, and yet their word anthropos seldom, if ever, signified the ‘noble’ or ‘humane’ aspect of man; it 
was not used to mean ideal mankind.” (1937), pp.397-98. 
25 Desmond (2008), p. 204. 
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       2.  
Can kynical cosmopolitanism help us grasp in a deeper way the inner essence of the 
present epoch? Can it tell us something valuable regarding contemporary European 
modes of thinking, while also assisting our attempt to deconstruct Euro-centrism from 
within the western philosophical tradition? And finally, in what sense could it offer the 
presuppositions for the development of a cosmopolitan thought that dismisses humanistic 
connotations? Provided that Machiavelli’s conception of history as essentially cyclical is 
trustworthy, I believe that those questions can be positively fulfilled. My reader is about 
to find out how many uncanny similarities contemporary western realities share with the 
age when kynical doctrines proliferated. These historical correspondences are fertile 
terrain for a revival of kynical ideas which - if my thesis is true - Italian thought has 
retrieved more than any other tradition starting from the end of the 1970s. In spite of the 
nihilistic aspects characterizing this philosophical demeanor, I believe that it represents a 
necessary presupposition for the construction of a cosmopolitan thought that offers 
critical instruments which effectively counter neo-liberal strategies.     
 If we think, for a moment, of the contemporary globalized western world as a modern 
Hellenism, a plethora of comparisons will effortlessly appear before our eyes. For 
instance, the increasing weakness characterizing modern nation-states, whose autonomy 
has been in recent times jeopardized by the growth of capitalism, seems to recall the 
condition of the Greek poleis between the 4th and the 1st century BC. During this period, 
they lost a considerable portion of their political independence. In earlier times, the Greek 
city-states had been politically self-sufficient but, because of the rise of the Macedonian 
empire and the expansionist policies implemented by Philip II and his son Alexander, 
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they gradually transformed into administrative centers. Alexander, in particular, 
continued the war against Persia that his father had initiated and broadened the 
Macedonian hegemony over Egypt and Minor Asia. While formally granting democratic 
autonomy to the poleis that he conquered, Alexander also imposed them heavy taxes and 
prohibited them to interfere with his imperialistic plans, thus limiting considerably their 
freedom.26 This lack of independence became evident in numerous circumstances, 
especially when the King proclaimed laws and decrees that explicitly disrespected the 
city-states’ self-government. 
 Also, by accomplishing a substantial concentration of power the Macedonian dynasty 
brought about a cultural uniformity which partially resounds in the contemporary 
homologating phenomena that were previously described. Alexander understood that the 
most efficient way to consolidate his authority over a vast empire was by conflating the 
Greco-Macedonian culture with the Persian customs. For this purpose, Alexander 
welcomed to his court oriental rites such as the proskynesis – i.e. the Persian kneeling 
before the king – or the submission of divine honors to the sovereign, which were 
unknown to the Greeks. It was for this same reason that in 324 BC Alexander proclaimed 
the Susa weddings, through which he married the Persian King’s daughter and niece, also 
allowing thousands of Greek-Macedonian soldiers to marry Persian women. These 
political moves contributed to create a multiethnic environment that for centuries 
constituted the core of the Hellenistic. This provides us with a significant antecedent to 
take into account for a better understanding of the contemporary cosmopolitan milieu.  
 Even more so Alexander’s empire, ultimately encompassing the vast territories 
located between Greece and Pakistan, led to a considerable economic expansion. As an 
                                                 
26 Bettalli, D’Agata, Magnetto ed.by (2013), p.258. 
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outcome of Alexander’s military campaigns, old trading connections between the West 
and the Far East were rediscovered, while the circulation of coin that was stimulated by 
his policies facilitated the rising of new commercial routes. All these financial flows led 
the ‘city’ to lose its political value and, at once, to acquire a new economic importance. 
The growth of urban population that took place during that time paralleled the increasing 
request of primary goods, thus stimulating the circulation of commodities and favoring 
the intensification of trade.27 This is one of the reasons why Alexander, who knew how 
important the Greek poleis were for monitoring the immense territory that he was 
governing, founded a plethora of new centers and converted the existing ones into 
bureaucratic apparatuses. 
  Peter Sloterdijk has recently highlighted some relevant correspondences between 
ancient Cynicism and contemporary western cultures. According to his analysis, the 
urbanization procedures implemented in Europe during the last decades represent a 
fundamental sociological precondition for the potential rebirth of the kynical mentality. 
From Sloterdijk’s perspective, Cynicism unfolds mostly as a refusal of the city and a 
condemnation of the injustices and inequalities that the city welcomes. The cosmopolitan 
demeanor then becomes a spontaneous act of protest against both the urban community 
and the individualistic values of wealth and opulence that it nourishes:  
“Socially he (Diogenes) is an urban figure who maintains his cutting edge in the 
goings-on of the ancient metropolises. He could be characterized as the earliest 
example of declassed or plebeian intelligence. His “cynical” turn against the 
arrogance and the moral trade secrets of higher civilization presupposes the city, 
together with its successes and shadows. Only in the city, as its negative profile, 
can the figure of the cynic crystallize in its full sharpness, under the pressure of 
public gossip and universal love-hate. And only the city can assimilate the cynic, 
                                                 
27 Ibid. p.302. 
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who ostentatiously turns his back on it, into the group of its outstanding 
individuals, on whom, its liking for unique, urbane personalities depends.”28  
 
 
Considering the high level of ‘individualism’ endorsed in contemporary metropolitan 
environments, where ‘virtue’ is portrayed in terms of ‘personal success’ and competition 
among people is maximized, globalization sets up an ideal sociological ground for the 
reemergence of kynical cosmopolitanism. Even more so globalizing processes, often 
uprooting low-class individuals from their native realities, often lead them to live in the 
peripheries of foreign big cities, thus forcing them to experience segregation, 
discrimination and poverty.  Notice that in past times cosmopolitan ideologies were 
mostly associated with the lifestyles of the wealthy high-class educated citizens who had 
opportunities to travel the world, speak different languages, and learn of a diversity of 
cultures. Meanwhile, in the current post-Fordist epoch this correlation is progressively 
changing its face, thus bringing the cosmopolitan spirit more closely to the plebeian 
social strata mentioned by Sloterdijk. In recent years, the option to remain in one’s own 
native country is perceived more and more as an opportunity that only privileged people 
are offered. On the other hand, cultural clashes, communication challenges, and 
adaptation issues, which cosmopolitan discourses typically value as the noblest human 
experiences, are in fact the existential spaces wherein immigrants and refugees live their 
daily life. In this scenario, the “city” becomes the frontline wherein “cynicism” is often 
the only psychological resource assisting displaced people who have escaped the violence 
and indigence perpetrated in their native countries. Unfortunately, in numerous cases 
outsiders receive a similar disgraceful treatment from the same people that are allegedly 
there to provide support.    
                                                 
28 Sloterdijk (1983), p.4. 
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      Cynicism and Post-Humanism   
 
1. 
The attentive reader will find a further significant correlation between Greek Hellenism 
and contemporary western realities when considering that during the last decades an 
increasing contamination between technology and humans has progressively converted 
‘individualism’ into ‘singularity’. This concept denotes a form of life whose unique 
specificity, at least according to some philosophers, can no longer be considered as fully 
human. Some theorists of the Post-Human thought argue that the impressive 
technologization of life experimented in the areas of bio-medical engineering, bio-
genetics, artificial intelligence and cybernetics have brought the human species to end. It 
is the viewpoint expressed, among many others, by Rosi Braidotti and Roberto 
Marchesini, whose ample accounts of Post-Humanism involve epistemological, 
historical, biological and anthropological observations. I will consider these as points of 
reference for many of my considerations29. A discussion of their analysis is needed here 
in order to understand in what sense contemporary post-human doctrines partly 
resuscitate the pre-humanistic cosmo-naturalism that was sustained by the Greek Cynics.       
 For instance, Diogenes would hardly endorse the claims advanced by the trans-
humanists, who advocate an immoderate manipulation of the human body with the 
purpose of overcoming on all levels the limits of human life. Trans-humanism is mostly 
based on the idea that physical limitations should not be considered as constitutive 
aspects of human nature, but rather as imperfections that can be rectified through 
technological adjustments. Accordingly, trans-humanists support the development of 
                                                 
29 Marchesini (2002) , Braidotti (2013). 
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scientific strategies that either maximize human control over biological elements – i.e.  
cloning, biogenetic modifications, biotechnologies of any sort etc. – or that aim at 
transferring the latter into mechanical devices. Examples of these devices include hybrid 
systems, nanotechnologies, and bio-puters30. Proving to be a positive resource in the 
medical field, where technology is often beneficial for correcting inabilities, in other 
contexts the trans-human project leads to outcomes that are certainly fascinating but also 
chilling. In particular I am alluding to the crusade that trans-humanists wage against the 
idea of mortality as inevitable for all human beings. Trans-humanists perceive of aging 
and death as conditions that humans could supersede through the refinement and 
utilization of appropriate technological methods. Some of these strategies are quite 
bizarre: from traditional hibernation to ‘avatars’, which are virtual reproductions of 
existing people; from ‘mind uploading’ techniques, through which the entire psychical 
content of an individual’s brain is first scanned and then transferred into inorganic 
structures, to the so called “posthumous sons”, obtained by taking spermatic liquid from 
human cadavers.  
 These ideas do not sound grotesque simply because they have been primarily 
represented in fantasy books and movies. What is confusing is rather the trans-human 
fanaticism which proclaims the end of humanism, while also revealing overgenerous 
idolatry for the entity ‘human’. What they glorify is in fact the list of qualities – youth, 
beauty, physical and mental efficiency, invulnerability, etc. - defining the ‘human being’ 
in his highest Vitruvian purity. This idea of post-human life, after all, does not differ 
considerably from the artificial prototypes that commercials portray on a daily basis as 
                                                 
30 Nanotechnologies are micro-systems that are able to control and modify the reality at the molecular level, while 
bio-puters are hybrid devices made of organic components. 
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models of attractiveness and which may inspire practices such as plastic surgery or body 
building. Rather than healing the dissociation that has occurred between human and non-
human universes, trans-humanists elaborate the post-human as an entity that 
progressively discharges all its non-human biological aspects. Marchesini is then right in 
saying that there is “una buona dose di sciovinismo umano nel progetto di abbandonare 
sotto forma di carcassa gran parte dei propri attributi organici per fondersi con la 
tecnologia”31 (“in the project of merging oneself with technology a good amount of 
human chauvinism is needed in order to abandon the carcasses of one’s own organic 
attributes”). Accordingly, a trans-human cosmopolis would likely be incompatible with 
Diogenes’ doctrines because it would be founded on a flattering glorification of a 
‘civilized’ society, while also banning most of the values representing Cynicism. The 
obsession for control over life would replace the kynical ‘indifference to fortune’, while 
the idea of human nature as incomplete without technological support would leave no 
room for the value of ‘self-sufficiency’. Most of all, it’s the trans-humanistic repudiation 
of suffering, which from a kynical perspective represents an indispensable requirement 
for the pursuit of virtue, that would be fully irreconcilable with the pre-humanism of the 
Cynics.  
 A kynical mind would express similar reservations regarding the neo-humanistic 
claims advanced by thinkers who propose to extend humanistic categories to non-human 
contexts. Martha Nussbaum, whose Frontiers of Justice (2006) should probably be 
considered the manifesto of this line of thinking, has opened an original philosophical 
trail by elaborating the ‘capability approach’. Nussbaum’s intention is to rectify the 
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Rawlsian social contract theory32, which postulates equality of “reason” and “power” 
among the contractual parties and proves unable to address three social problems: justice 
for physically and mentally impaired individuals, justice for non-human animals, and 
global justice. In particular, Nussbaum points out that the notion of ‘right’, characterizing 
‘freedom’ mostly as a form of protection, can do very little for enhancing the life of 
socially disadvantaged subjects. For this reason, she replaces it with the term ‘capability’, 
which portrays the ‘human being’ as a constellation of capacities - including the capacity 
to live, to be healthy, to reproduce, to own property, to ‘work as a human being’, and to 
use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason in a truly human way33 - that need to be 
nurtured and expressed.  
 Following this line of reason, Nussbaum labels as defective all ethical theories that 
measure well-being in terms of GNP per capita or define equality as a mere redistribution 
of wealth and opportunities. The limits of these models rest in that they are not able to 
provide underprivileged individuals with the necessary means they need for exercising 
their natural skills. Nussbaum concludes that both national and international political 
institutions cannot restrict their responsibilities to the defense of the citizens’ immunity; 
as a further duty, they should aim at distributing as many capabilities as possible to all 
citizens of the world. People’s prosperity, in fact, depends upon the level of “humanity” 
that everyone is given, as revealed by Nussbaum’s comments regarding the case of a 
mentally impaired girl named Sesha: “… if we could cure her condition and bring her up 
                                                 
32 The philosophical view endorsed by authors such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls, who all describe 
society as a contract signed by human beings in order to avoid the violent inconveniences that a state of nature 
would involve. Rawls, in particular, insisted on the principle of equality of ‘power’ and ‘reason’ among the 
contractual parties which, accordingly, do not encompass categories such as mentally impaired individuals and non-
human animals.  
33 Nussbaum (2006), p.76. 
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to the capability threshold, that is what we would do, because it is good, indeed 
important, for a human being to be able to function in these ways”34. 
 I encourage my reader to appreciate the sensible attention that Nussbaum pays to 
problems concerning socially disadvantaged subjects, whose life conditions she 
thoughtfully and admirably tries to enhance. One should also acknowledge that 
Nussbaum has highlighted earlier and more explicitly than others the importance of non-
human life for issues of global justice. The conflation of Marxian elements and 
Aristotelian components that the capability approach encompasses, furthermore, allows 
Nussbaum to relocate “human rationality” within the animal domain. In so doing, her 
discourse partly overcomes the culture-nature separation that western philosophies have 
often taken for granted. However, if one looks at these philosophical efforts from a 
kynical stance, they do not seem to fully reach their target. 
 Despite the aforementioned benefits, Nussbaum’s attempt to establish continuity 
between the ‘human’ and other forms of life still leans excessively toward the former 
which, in turn, is characterized as the ‘universal norm’ through hypostatical and not 
completely justified connotations. Some have plausibly wondered why one should list 
among the fundamental traits defining human flourishing the “capacity to work” and not, 
for instance, the “right to hunt” or the “right to procreate to the point of 
overpopulation”.35 Considering the evolutionary connotations that the human species 
exhibits, it could be additionally asked why the “capacity to adapt” is not encompassed 
within Nussbaum’s conception of prosperity. Nussbaum strives to lift up all individuals 
to the “capability threshold”, without convincingly validating the completeness of her 
                                                 
34 Ibid. p.193. 
35 I am referring to Cary Wolfe (2008), p. 12. 
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model and without asking why and how western systems leave numerous individuals – 
i.e. animals, people and countries – behind. As an alternative, the kynical path that is 
unfolding here will suggest looking at marginalized modes of existence not necessarily as 
anomalies, but rather as symptoms that bring to light malfunctioning societal dynamics. 
From this perspective, ostracized forms of life also serve as paradigmatic points of 
reference to take into account for restructuring the system at its foundations. A few 
examples might make this criticism more tangible.  
 In view of the mass consumption of antidepressants that proliferate across American 
schools and universities, western educational apparatuses appear to be inefficient not only 
with respect to serious cases of mental impairment, but also as far as milder 
psychological discomforts are concerned. The extremely high expectations that students 
are required to fulfill by curricula, institutions and families, often elicit in young boys and 
girls feelings of inadequacy and defectiveness. This frequently leads them to experience 
daily anxiety, apprehension, and sense of hopelessness, in some unfortunate cases also 
triggering suicidal desires. The question is now whether it would make more sense to 
provide as many students as possible with emotional assistance and therapeutic support in 
order to help them achieve mental stability - as the capability approach would prescribe - 
or rather to modify their environment so as to prevent those symptoms from surfacing. It 
is reasonable to think, for instance, that the adoption of evaluation strategies which don’t 
rely on quantitative values or numeric classifications would most likely attenuate 
competitive tensions and hierarchical dynamics among the students. In taking these steps, 
their frustrations and stress would be minimized. For the same reason, it is imaginable 
that the curriculum implemented within several Swedish primary schools, wherein 
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traditional grades and marks are not employed, turns out to be less traumatic for students 
with learning issues such as dyslexia or Attention Deficit Disorder. 
 This line of reasoning does not apply exclusively to the domain of education, but 
extends to other areas of the society as well. It is no accident that Rawls’s philosophical 
theory, which Nussbaum refers to as a steady point of reference, conceives of “severe 
depression” as a serious mental impairment36 and locates individuals affected by it out of 
the political domain. From a sociopolitical viewpoint, in fact, the rigid healthy-sick 
dichotomy encompassed by Rawlsian contractarianism presupposes the culture-nature 
division, thus aligning with modes of thinking that perceive “illness” as a subhuman 
deviance from the societal “norm”. This perspective labels as incurable everything that 
does not fit properly within the productive machinery. The capability approach, partly 
dismantling this stereotypical mentality, would nonetheless prescribe to supply severely 
depressed people with ad hoc assistance, psychological support and pharmacological aid, 
so as to “humanize” them as much as possible. Despite the honorable intentions, this 
would hardly uproot the core of the problem. Our criticism, by contrast, moves from the 
awareness that states of depression proliferate more frequently within advanced 
capitalistic societies. In these environments the level of efficiency that is needed in order 
to partake in the productive chain has become extremely demanding, thus amplifying the 
gap between those who remain hooked and those who fall off. In view of this 
presupposition, the kynical thinker would conclude that a cutback in working goals, 
responsibilities and duties, as well as a reduction in the amount of working-hours would 
most likely restore many sick people to health, while also facilitating the reintegration of 
unoccupied individuals within the job market.  
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 For similar reasons, it is true - as Nussbaum points out - that physically impaired 
individuals are able to thrive like everybody else whenever their societies guarantee them 
access to all infrastructures and provide them with suitable technological support. One 
nonetheless wonders whether such an emphasis on technological remedies would 
eventually risk converting human communities into excessively complex systems, 
wherein the overabundance of machines and bureaucratic regulations ultimately lead to 
increased alienation and disease. It is legitimate to hypothesize, on the contrary, that in 
numerous circumstances people with disabilities could benefit from a simplification of 
the surrounding environment. As an example, if the 2015 Norwegian decree allowing 
exclusively bicycles and pedestrians to circulate in downtown Oslo was imitated and 
recovered in other urban centers, many wheel-chaired people would probably not feel as 
penalized and frustrated as they do on a regular basis. Such a maneuver would 
furthermore benefit the entire western community, which is nowadays far and wide 
afflicted by ecological issues.  
 Distant from endorsing purely technophobic biases, the kynical position that is 
defended here rejects nonetheless the interpretation according to which modernization is 
beneficial regardless. At the same time, it sanctions the idea that in many cases human 
relationships and psychophysical wellbeing should be given priority over technical 
progress in order to obtain a healthier society. To use an allegory, nobody would deny a 
group of hikers climbing a mountain the necessary equipment that is needed for their 
safety and which is also compatible with their physical features. The question is whether 
they would decide to carry extra instruments, allowing the weakest elements in the group 
to walk faster, or would rather invite the head of the crew to slow down whenever 
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somebody is delayed. Considering that an unreasonable amount of tools would most 
likely render the entire journey uncomfortable for everybody, post-human cynicism 
would welcome the second solution. In few words, Nussbaum’s perspective looks at the 
‘norm’ as a parameter to pursue and imitate, also striving to rectify all flaws and 
anomalies. A modern Diogenes, by contrast, refers to the ‘excluded’ as a privileged 
model and evaluates whether or not the ‘norm’ should be modified accordingly. 
 Despite the honorable purposes, Nussbaum’s efforts to overcome traditional 
humanism are undermined at their core by the theoretical presuppositions of her 
discourse which: 1) does not include “adaptation” within the list of the fundamental 
human capabilities, thus characterizing “flourishing” as an autarchic stationary condition; 
2) describes human life through a list of fixed ontological properties which, on the 
contrary, need to be conceived of as necessarily provisional. Let us digress on these two 
points before moving forward.  
 Nussbaum clarifies that the capability approach, though universally applicable to all 
domains, should be case by case modified according to the characteristics of the species 
in question, which solely is able to provide humans and animals with the appropriate 
background they need for prospering: “The relevance of the species norm is that it 
defines the context, the political and social community, in which people either flourish or 
do not.”37 Through this claim, Nussbaum minimizes the plethora of ontological 
interconnections that species establish reciprocally in order to survive. Anthropologists 
mention these interspecies dynamics with a particular regard to the human race, which 
has always exhibited the evolutionary tendency to hybridize with non-human objects and 
animals. Marchesini, for instance, points out that in addition to the parental cares that 
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people offer to members of different species, human knowledge has developed for 
centuries by means of a partnership with non-human animals and, therefore, is 
teriomorphic by essence. Animals have always provided humans with valuable epistemic, 
behavioral and also technological models. It is sufficient to think about the messages and 
information that birds indirectly convey: an abrupt interruption of their whistling 
transmits states of alert, the configuration of their nest points at geographical coordinates, 
whereas their migrations indicate seasonal variations38.  
 Moreover, scientists have always examined the anatomic characteristics of animals 
and tried to reproduce their most impressive skills, so as to acquire a deeper 
understanding of the human body. The admiration that humans feel for non-human 
strategies of survival - the entanglement of a spider-web, the construction of a beehive, 
the hunting techniques utilized by a predator - partly explains why zoologists analyze 
them constantly as problem-solving models. The same kind of awe justifies the fact that 
people often imitate animal behaviors; tattoos, piercing and body art, which have become 
more common in recent years, recall the chromatic methods that some animals employ 
for self-defense. Similarly, non-human communicative forms are often reproduced in 
dance and music. According to several scholars, there are reasons to associate such a 
teriomorphic disposition to the fact that humans are born prematurely with respect to 
other living beings and, consequently, their pre-adult age is longer. This extended 
developmental period exposes humans to a plethora of external influences, affecting 
individuals from multiple ontogenetic perspectives. 
 For these and other reasons, conceiving of evolutionary processes in Darwinian 
autarchic terms is nonsense because, particularly as far as the human race is concerned, 
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ontogenetic mechanisms are always a historical debt to the ‘other’. The value of the 
“species norm” that Nussbaum defends, consequently, collapses if one adopts historicist 
methods of inquiry, which dismiss self-referential structures and describe life through the 
hybridizing pressures that a selector applies on a different living form. 39 From this 
stance, it is evident that prosperity cannot be defined, as Nussbaum characterizes it, in 
terms of mere “fitness” with respect to a predefined category. In fact, the relationship 
between individuals and what allegedly is their group of affinity is constantly destabilized 
by external influences. On the contrary, survival succeeds exclusively if living beings 
repeatedly question their sense of belonging and redefine their identity according to new 
configurations. The kynical spaces of “exclusion”, which Nussbaum qualifies as 
abnormalities that need to be corrected, are therefore ontological areas where individuals, 
species, and communities can expose themselves to regeneration and renewal. This 
means that the existential and sociopolitical liberation that Nussbaum endorses can hardly 
be achieved by highlighting the inadequacy that a living entity displays with respect to its 
presumed ontological class. One should rather say: true emancipation can be pursued 
only by emphasizing the completeness that all forms of life embody in their uniqueness 
and exceptionality as hybridized singularities. 
 What is at stake here is beyond the Darwinian theory of evolution and also beyond 
the essentialism which “plagues Nussbaum’s later work”40. What I am calling into 
question is the equivalence between “prosperity” and “property” which most essentialist 
doctrines presuppose. Namely, the philosophical view that perceives “prosperity” as 
necessarily correlated to the ownership of specific properties and which, on one hand, 
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claims to establish what living beings are allegedly supposed to be by nature and, on the 
other, labels the ones who do not fulfill those preconditions as defective. Aren’t we all 
beautifully faulty, mentally damaged and physically impaired with respect to any kind of 
ideal norm after all? Isn’t this what makes us unique and irreproducible? The distance 
that separates us from the norm is arguably what provides us with the versatility we need 
for coping with environmental changes, which demand new ontological “properties” to 
be acquired and old ones to be discharged. From this stance, the adaptation faculty that 
Nussbaum overlooks qualifies, in turn, all capabilities and properties as temporary by 
definition, also positing kynical “dispossession” as a further competence that 
evolutionary processes structurally require.  
 If one moves their attention to how modern-day consumerist perceptions of the 
‘good’ associate human prosperity with notions such as “ownership” and “property” - 
whether these refer to the most exclusive smartphone or the most luxurious BMW - one 
will realize that the property-dispossession dichotomy represents one of the  crucial 
crossroads where ontology and ethics converge. On the theme of “dispossession” I will 
return several times because it offers a foundation for the construction of a cosmopolitan 
morality that endorses ontological, social and cultural hybridization. It is also a powerful 
tool to employ for undermining the capitalistic ideological framework, which Nussbaum 
does not challenge effectively.   
 
2. 
The kynical viewpoint is more aligned with the beliefs of those who have highlighted the 
detrimental outcomes provoked by the western glorification of the ‘human’. According to 
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this anti-humanistic line of reasoning, partly counting on the post-structuralist attempt to 
explain humanistic categories in terms of power relations, the human subject can be 
identified by means of specific racial, ethnic, and gender attributes. Such an entity is 
often depicted by the European, adult, white, male ontological model that inspired most 
of the horrifying events which occurred during the 20th century. In addition to Fascism 
and Nazism, which clearly relied on humanistic preconceptions, Braidotti observes that 
the crimes perpetrated by the Communist regimes presupposed comparable philosophical 
viewpoints. The Stalinian system, in fact, was mostly inspired by an immoderate 
veneration of the orthodox Marxian dialectic which deified the entity ‘man’ as the only 
agent determining the historical flow. Braidotti believes that this type of humanistic 
Marxism was successful after World War II because it offered a political alternative to 
capitalism and simultaneously contributed to the defeat of fascisms. This is why it was 
adopted by progressive thinkers such as Sartre and de Beauvoir among many others.41 
 Braidotti points out how things changed considerably starting from the 1968 Cultural 
Revolution, which is also when Michel Foucault published The Order of Things (1967) 
and when critical thought adopted strategies questioning conventional Marxian 
methodologies. Foucault’s inquiry gave birth to a plethora of anti-humanistic discourses 
that did not respect dialectical principles. The bio-political aspects of Foucault’s work 
revealed how the new forms of power utilize humanistic themes in order to reinforce their 
authority. At the same time, post-structuralist feminism carried out an attack both on the 
social primacy of the male subject and on the feminist claims describing women through 
univocal humanistic voices. Following a similar line of reasoning, post-colonial thought 
aimed at the dismantlement of Euro-centric perspectives by highlighting the racial 
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components that characterize humanistic thinking. For Braidotti, anti-humanism is mostly 
represented by these anti-fascist, anti-sexist, anti-racist, and also post-Marxian views that 
were elaborated during the 1970’s by the post-structuralist generation.  
 Importantly, Braidotti affirms that while anti-humanism is an indispensable resource 
for post-human thought and for the theorization of a pan-human cosmopolitan bond 
among all people, it should not be confused with some sort of nihilistic cynicism42. She 
carefully distinguishes anti-humanistic strategies from the pessimistic claims expressed 
by post-modern thinkers, whose relativistic and anti-foundational arguments would 
provide cosmopolitan theory with catastrophic meanings. What she emphasizes is the 
necessity to elaborate an ‘affirmative’ type of cosmopolitanism that does not ground the 
sense of universal belonging on the existential condition of ‘shared vulnerability’:  
“The posthuman recomposition of human interaction that I propose is not the 
same as the reactive bond of vulnerability, but is an affirmative bond that locates 
the subject in the flow of relations with multiple others.”43  
        
I would like to bring my reader’s attention on two important points which partly 
challenge Braidotti’s view. First, as I have previously shown, every authentic 
cosmopolitan thought involves a kynical nihilistic component which, due to historical and 
semantic reasons, cannot be neglected without a justification. Second, post-modernism 
differs to a degree from post-structuralism, but in many respects can nonetheless be 
considered as its inexorable historical epilogue.  This is certainly the case of Italian post-
modern thought which is going to be the main focus of my analysis.  
 In Italy post-modern theories - including Gianni Vattimo’s Weak Thought and to 
some extent Massimo Cacciari’s Negative Thought - were partly elaborated in response to 
                                                 
42 “…philosophical antihumanism must not be confused with cynical and nihilistic misanthropy.”, Ibid. p. 6. 
43 Ibid. p.50. 
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the crisis that leftist political discourses underwent at the end of the 1970s. Around that 
time, partially due to the relevant success achieved by the Italian Communist Party, the 
humanistic type of Marxism described by Rosi Braidotti was still quite alive in Italy. It 
revealed all its detrimental essence when, during the so called ‘years of lead’44, it 
channeled some of its revolutionary energy through the actions and massacres performed 
by terrorist groups. At that point, it was clear that the sense of political autonomy put in 
jeopardy by the capitalistic modernization of the country could not be defended by 
making appeal to a Marxian humanistic sentimentalism. It was reasonable to 
acknowledge that the political dissolution of the humanistic ‘individual’ would have been 
inevitable, and could have hardly been eluded by endorsing a dialectical type of 
resistance. It is precisely what Gianni Vattimo affirms when he criticizes the attitude 
exhibited by the Frankfurt School members who advocated a re-appropriation of political 
subjectivity against the de-humanizing force of capitalism:  
“Adorno’s position is representative not only of a vast number of Hegelian-
Marxist thinkers in our culture, but of the various versions of phenomenology and 
- in another discipline - numerous developments in psychoanalysis that generally 
tent to position themselves within a re-appropriative horizon…”45 (italics mine) 
 
 The dawn of Italian post-modernism paralleled the growing awareness that the only way 
to oppose capitalism was to facilitate its own self-destruction by undermining the 
epistemological ground on which the humanistic subjectivity had always relied. Post-
modern Italian thinkers realized that the European, adult, white, male subject that post-
structuralism had aimed to deconstruct, could not have been completely dismantled 
without a spirited critique of the western notion of ‘truth’. From this perspective, the anti-
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foundational and relativistic claims that Braidotti rejects are prima facie in continuity 
with the discourses that post-structuralism had initiated. Vattimo suggests thinking of 
technology as the apex and, simultaneously, the twilight of western metaphysics. This 
means that humanistic philosophical discourses endorsing the primacy of the ‘individual’ 
also brought him to extinction. In so doing, Vattimo offers an epistemological foundation 
to Foucault’s view of ‘individuality’ as a way in which bio-power nourishes and breeds 
subjects with the purpose of suppressing them.46 From this view, post-modernism could 
be seen as the nihilistic epilogue of the post-structuralist project and, at once, the moment 
when contemporary philosophy retrieves the full essence of ancient Cynicism. It is what 
Peter Sloterdijk confirms within the Critique of Cynical Reason (1983), which was 
unsurprisingly published at the same time as Vattimo’s Weak Thought (1983):     
 “For the kynical realist, the idea of human individuality in times in which war 
machines, metropolitan streams of traffic, and unleashed production apparatuses 
consume the individual as their raw material, is no longer a fruitful hypothesis. 
Let us try the other end, free of any metaphysics of individuality and without 
humanistic nostalgia.”47 (italics mine)  
 
Post-modernism represents accordingly an indispensable resource for the recovery of 
cosmopolitan thought in its original form. Asserting the dissolution of humanistic 
individuality, post-modern thinkers also throw seeds for the rebirth of the Greek 
‘teriomorphic singularity’ which is predisposed to interact and hybridize with a diversity 
of living beings. In this sense, nihilistic definitions of subjectivity are of paramount 
theoretical importance because of the way they engage with the tele-techno-capitalistic 
society. On one hand, this imposes more isolated and fragile conditions of life to all 
people, and on the other it is making them more sympathetic toward their non-human 
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surroundings. Technological alienation is not valuable because it drags human beings 
away from their biological roots, as trans-humanists would claim. Rather, it is beneficial 
as long as it reminds people of who they really are and of the animal origins from which 
they come. Following this argumentative line, nihilistic technomorphisms turn into 
teriomorphisms, predisposing individuals with the capacity to interact with ontological 
and political differences. A maximization of the level of loneliness is then indispensable 
for theorizing the kynical coincidence between the “citizen of oneself” and “citizen of the 
cosmos”48. This means that philosophy must lead transcendental forms of subjectivity to 
dissolution in order to conceptualize a genuine sense of global belonging. In other words, 
the post-human cosmopolis can be edified exclusively on nihilistic foundations. Moving 
towards the main thesis, contemporary Italian philosophy, which conflates bio-political 
arguments with post-modern views, retrieves the dispossessing components that 
distinguished ancient Cynicism more than any other tradition. Therefore, it provides 
those foundations in the most explicit way. 
 
 
The Italian Retrieval of Cynicism 
 
1. 
The kynical element is indispensable for adequately understanding the anti-humanistic 
accounts of Italian thought that have been elaborated in recent times. Three of these 
accounts are particularly interesting because they entangle post-human factors with 
cosmopolitan components in a way that requires a kynical type of clarification.  
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 According to The Italian Difference (2009), during the last four decades Italian 
thought has mostly unfolded around the themes of nihilism and bio-politics. For the 
editors Chiesa and Toscano, these topics offer a trustworthy portrait of the contemporary 
Italian society, while also stimulating successfully the international philosophical 
discussion. Even though nihilistic and bio-political approaches were elaborated first in 
Germany and France, they needed to be filtered through the Italian exegesis before 
acquiring a global reverberation. This is particularly true in the case of Foucault’s anti-
humanistic ideas, which gained international recognition only after 1990 when the 
concept of bio-politics became pivotal in the Italian debate49. In The Italian Difference 
this phenomenon is mostly explained as depending upon the Italian philosophical 
capacity of utilizing abstract theoretical schemes for the comprehension of contingent 
epochal events. Both nihilism and bio-politics are particularly versatile categories in this 
regard because, thanks to their figurative character, they lend themselves to generate 
meta-political concepts that spontaneously travel toward “the other”50. By mixing 
nihilistic and bio-political arguments Italian Thought is able to describe historical 
phenomena through long-term conceptual devices, thus proving a powerful tool for 
transferring philosophical discourses from the national to the transnational level:  
“It is all too easy to imagine a Reading Agamben in Bogotà, a Reading Negri in 
Teheran, a Reading Vattimo in Beijing, a Reading Esposito in Seoul…”51 
 
 
Toscano and Chiesa’s view relies furthermore on Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential 
Politics (1996) which, a few years earlier, had also highlighted the relevance of Italian 
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Thought. 
50  Chiesa & Toscano (2009), p.5. 
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philosophy within the international scenario. In the introduction, Michael Hardt points 
out that such an international predisposition rests on the fact that contemporary Italian 
thought relies on the revolutionary movements that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. 
During this time in Italy, the attack on the State was more vigorous and persistent than 
anywhere else in Europe. Hardt observes that between the 1980s and 1990s Italian 
thought could no longer count on the material substrate supplied by those movements. 
However, Italy was still a very active laboratory generating new forms of political 
thinking52. Thus, due to the 1970s rebellious experience, Italian philosophy is able to 
provide other traditions with a plethora of innovative paradigms that are essential for a 
deeper comprehension of the ongoing globalizing phenomena. Through these 
observations, Hardt implicitly confirms Gramsci’s intuition that in the post-Westphalian 
political era the cosmopolitan personality that Italian philosophy has always embodied 
would prove beneficial and Italian intellectuals would no longer feel in contradiction with 
themselves53. 
 This conclusion is explicitly drawn in the remarkable accounts provided by Roberto 
Esposito, who also indicates transnational components as the essence of contemporary 
Italian Thought. Particularly in Dall’impolitico all’impersonale (2012) and even more in 
Living Thought: The Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy (2012) Esposito clarifies 
the fundamental factor distinguishing Italian anti-humanism from French post-
structuralism and German post-modernism. It is the insistence on the bio-political notion 
of ‘life’ due to which Italian philosophy appears to be always on the verge to transcend 
its own borders:  
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“…la differenza con la filosofia francese sta proprio nella centralità della 
categoria di ‘vita’, colta dal pensiero italiano fin dal suo inizio. Mentre la filosofia 
francese, a partire da Descartes, ha privilegiato la dimensione della coscienza o 
quella, tipica di Pascal, del dialogo interiore, la filosofia italiana dalle sue origini 
– con Machiavelli, Bruno, Campanella, Vico, fino a Croce e Gramsci – si è 
concentrata sulla categoria di vita nella sua complessa relazione con quelle di 
storia e politica.”54 
 
 
 (“…the difference with French Philosophy rests exactly in the centrality of the 
category of ‘life’ captured from the beginning by Italian Thought. While French 
philosophy, starting with Descartes, has favored the dimension of consciousness 
or the one, typical of Pascal, of the interior dialogue, Italian philosophy from its 
origins – with Machiavelli, Bruno, Campanella, Vico, until Croce and Gramsci – 
focused on the category of life in complex relation to the categories of history and 
politics.”) 
 
Unlike the French, the German and the English traditions, privileging the reflective 
dimension of philosophy, Italian Thought favors historical and political themes. These 
lead theoretical activity to leave its comfort zone and contaminate with outer influences. 
It is one of the reasons why Italian philosophy is cosmopolitan by essence:  
 
“Contrariamente all’atteggiamento tipico di alter tradizioni - orientate 
all’introspezione filosofica, al ripiegamento della filosofia sul proprio movimento 
interno -, il pensiero italiano ha sempre guardato fuori di sé: alla città politica (con 
Machiavelli), alla vita infinita dell’universo (con Bruno), alla natura (con 
Leonardo e Galilei o anche, diversamente, con Leopardi), al mondo della storia 
(con Vico). Quella italiana non è mai stata una filosofia della persona, del 
soggetto, della coscienza – ma una filosofia mondana o mondiale, esterna persino 
ai confini dello stato nazione.”55 
 
 
(“As opposed to an attitude typical of other traditions – oriented towards 
philosophical introspection and to the retreat of philosophy towards its own 
internal movement – Italian Thought has always looked outside of itself: to the 
political city (with Machiavelli), to the infinite life of the universe (with Bruno), 
to nature (with Leonardo and Galilei or also, differently, with Leopardi), to the 
world of history (with Vico). Italian philosophy was never a philosophy of the 
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56 
 
person, of the subject, of the conscience – but an earthly or world-wide 
philosophy, even external to the borders of the nation-state.”) 
 
The problem now is to understand in what sense all these accounts combine anti-
humanistic aspects and cosmopolitan components, which are generally portrayed as 
indiscernible connotations of humanistic thought. What kind of cosmopolitanism is 
Esposito referring to? A considerate reading of Living Thought (2010), which analyzes 
the history of Italian philosophy since the age of the Renaissance, will provide us with 
some plausible answers. 
 In Living Thought (2012) Esposito grounds the cosmopolitan core of Italian 
philosophy on the pre-national milieu that characterized the Italian Renaissance. The 
author points out that during that time in Italy the ‘national’ did not coincide with the 
‘territorial’ because early Italian intelletuals did not operate within the context of a well 
defined nation-state. Considering the anti-humanistic thread that leads Esposito’s 
analysis, his discourse likely presupposes Gramsci’s view that the delayed formation of 
the Italian nation-state was due to the humanistic character of the Renaissance, which 
Gramsci defined as essentially regressive56. As opposed to mainstream historical 
interpretation, conceiving of the Italian Renaissance as a progressive and secularizing 
process, Gramsci believed that the humanistic values that the Renaissance recovered from 
the classical ages were no different from the ideas promoted by Italian Catholicism. The 
humanistic rediscovery of ‘man’ was mostly inspired by the Stoical humanitas which, 
under the veil of egalitarian and cosmopolitan ideals, had represented the flag of the 
Roman Empire and then became the symbol of the Christian Evangelization of the world. 
Interestingly, Gramsci’s critique does not insist on these expansionist components as 
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much as it does on the conservative repercussions that humanistic cosmopolitanism 
brought about on domestic Italian politics. Reclaiming the Roman humanitas, Italian 
intellectuals also established discrepancy between Latin and vernacular languages, 
preserving a stable “detachment” between high culture and crowds: “Humanists are 
characterized by the conscience of an inevitable detachment between the man of culture 
and the mass.”57 (Italics mine). The Christian doctrine widened the human-animal 
dichotomy by waging a crusade against all instincts, while Italian humanists opened a 
fracture between different literary languages, thus ordering social classes in a stagnant 
hierarchical way. This humanistic injury, which in other European areas was alleviated 
by the religious Reformation, delayed both the territorialization of Italian political 
consciousness and the birth of the nation-state.  
 What Esposito adds to this analysis is the fact that the humanistic and pre-national 
milieu that Gramsci describes was characterized by a plethora of scattered cities, which 
were far from representing a solid political point of reference. In fact, the transition from 
medieval communes to the towns of the early Umanesimo and then of the full 
Renaissance did not produce anything comparable to a territory united by a political 
will58. Esposito portrays the cradle of Italian philosophy as a de-territorialized context, 
standing for a geopolitical environment that was cosmopolitan because it was constituted 
by a diversity of spread urban centers. Like in the case of ancient Cynicism, at the source 
of a philosophical school we find the ‘city’, which the Renaissance reevaluated both from 
the financial and the cultural viewpoints. At the same time, the city evolved into a theatre 
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where greed, injustices and corruption immoderately reproduced. Let us look at 
Esposito’s text through a kynical lens and see where this leads us. 
 From a kynical perspective one immediately sees that the de-territorializing essence 
that Esposito ascribes to Italian philosophy is mostly characterized in negative terms. 
Italian thought is not cosmopolitan because it constructs speculative notions that are 
universally applicable or because it elaborates comprehensive normative systems, but 
rather because it was always excluded from the philosophical domain. Esposito points out 
that, due to the literary character of Renaissance speculation, Italian Thought was in 
many circumstances considered a non-philosophy. For Hegel, true philosophical activity 
restarted during the XVI and XVII centuries, while in more recent times philosophical 
inquiries concerning the problem of humanism – from Maritain’s Humanisme integral 
(1934), to Sartre’s L’existentialisme est un humanisme (1946) to Heidegger’s Letter on 
Humanism (1947) – completely ignored the Italian origin of the problem.59 In agreement 
with Deleuze, Esposito believes that Italy was deprived of its own philosophical legacy.60 
Thanks to such a removal, Italian philosophy was able to establish a partnership with 
non-philosophical genres and acquire a very versatile argumentative personality: “But 
what if this escaping outside of itself – its continual de-territorialization – is the most 
originally living feature of Italian thought?”61 This means that Italian thought was born in 
exile and thrived in exclusion. Accordingly, the international demeanor identified by 
Esposito should be seen as depending upon a kynical condition of political 
marginalization.  
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  The case of Machiavelli is exemplary in this regard. Even though over the centuries 
numerous European thinkers have engaged with his texts, most of them relegated him at 
the periphery of the philosophical sphere or even considered him as a non-philosopher. 
For Esposito, this is not only due to the literary metaphors that Machiavelli’s texts often 
propose, but also to the practical purposes he pursues. As opposed to philosophical 
orientations chasing purely abstract targets, Machiavelli’s discourse prioritizes praxis 
over theory. Like the ancient Cynics, Machiavelli does not conceive of philosophy as a 
disconnected and impersonal deliberation because he believes that thought is never 
separate from concrete life experiences. These convictions are reflected in Machiavelli’s 
etero-referential style which presumes the philosopher’s personal commitment with 
respect to the ideas that he endorses.  
 The absence of a pre-political state of nature in Machiavelli’s theory depends upon 
the pragmatic essence of his doctrine, which reduces theory to praxis and conflates the 
human with the non-human, thus conceiving of the origin of philosophy as narrowly 
political:  
“To maintain that politics is originary, in Machiavelli, is tantamount to saying that 
it has no origin. It means that there is nothing pre-political, like a state of nature, 
for example, that politics can take over from, relegating it to an immemorial past. 
Politics occupies the entire horizon of the real: there is nothing before it or after it, 
neither a preordained beginning nor a foreseeable end.”62 
 
Following Machiavelli, it is due to the same pragmatic essence that Italian political 
philosophy speaks in most circumstances from a critical perspective. Italian thinkers 
rarely elaborate political concepts with the purpose of resolving social contradictions or 
conflicts. Differently from social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes or John 
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Locke, whose notions of sovereignty aim at moderating the tensions that endanger human 
coexistence, for Machiavelli, Bruno and Gramsci the political sphere structurally contains 
an antagonistic component which cannot be eliminated. This antagonistic spirit resounds 
in Machiavelli and Bruno’s sarcastic tones, recalling the bad speeches performed by the 
Cynics, and also explains the disassociation from local and national ruling powers that 
Italian philosophers always proclaimed:  
“Not only can Italian philosophy not be reduced to its national role, but its most 
authentic reason for being lies precisely in the distance it takes from that role.”63  
  
One should not be surprised that an ability to overcome sovereign limitations could give 
birth to a philosophical school that, similar to ancient Cynicism, is not reducible to one 
sole orientation, but is as fragmented as the scattered urban centers around which it was 
born. Differently from the one-dimensional tendencies characterizing Cartesianism in 
France and Lockism in England, Italian philosophy has always spoken through a plurality 
of voices that no univocal classification would be able to comprehend. Quoting Spaventa, 
Esposito affirms that the Italian school should rather be seen as the condensation of 
various European modes of thinking:  
“However, this is precisely the source of the contradiction that thwarts any 
attempt to identify a peculiar trait of Italian philosophy from within it. If 
Italian philosophy is not a particular orientation of thought, but I would almost 
say, thought in its fullness, the totality of all orientations, then its difference 
lies precisely in not having one, in that universality, in which all opposites are 
united; in that harmonious unity gathering together all aspects of the European 
intellect (ingegno).”64 
 
The transnational character of Italian philosophy is explained here in terms of a 
dispossession of identity, which Italian thinkers refuse to own and to be owned by. It is 
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due to such a deprivation that Italian theory is able to capture more accurately than other 
philosophical orientations the cultural diversity that proliferates throughout the European 
continent and beyond. One should meditate on how such a view acquires an even 
stronger meaning when considering that international interest for the Italian school 
emerged with the publication of Giovanna Borradori’s Recoding Metaphysics: the New 
Italian Philosophy (1989). In fact, around this time the European Union was rising and 
the successful growth of neo-liberalism began to imperil numerous national identities.  
 Nevertheless, if we remove the kynical lens these considerations will lose a large part 
of their significance. It is through a kynical account that one is able to justify both the 
aforementioned conflation between cosmopolitan features with anti-humanistic 
components and also the characteristics that Esposito identifies.  Nonetheless, how could 
one not see Diogenes’ shadow behind Esposito’s genealogical reconstruction? How could 
one not look at Machiavelli’s mocking reflections on the political city as the kynical 
counterpart of Leonardo’s veneration of nature? How could one not perceive a kynical 
mind behind Bruno’s anti-essentialist theory of life? Does it not make sense to think of 
Leopardi’s cosmic pessimism as a metaphysical reverence for the kynical praise of 
suffering? Did Italian Thought finally become aware of its kynical alter-ego? Why is this 
kynical specter haunting us at this time? 
 
2. 
In Italy, the similarities that I previously highlighted between Greek Hellenism and 
contemporary Europe began to emerge more visibly at the end of the 1970s, when 
economic growth, urban expansion and immigration phenomena occurred rapidly all at 
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once. The perfectly synchronized combination of these factors is certainly part of the 
reasons why kynical cosmopolitan values surfaced in Italian thought more visibly than in 
other cultural contexts. 
 For three years, between 1973 and 1975, a severe economic recession afflicted most 
of the developed capitalistic countries. The lowest apex in this sense was registered in 
1975 when, partly due to the petrol crisis, international trades were abruptly interrupted 
and Italy was affected in terms of a high level of inflation and a decrease of production. 
Nevertheless, between 1976 and 1990 Italy experienced an extraordinary growth, which 
was slow and irregular in the beginning and then more consistent starting from 1980, 
when capitalism took over and Italy became one of the most powerful industrialized 
societies in the world. Inflation progressively decreased while the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) grew beyond the 2.5 percent per year between 1983 and 1987. By the end 
of the 1980s Italy surpassed economically Great Britain, thus becoming the fifth financial 
power of the western world.65 
 An important consequence of this economic evolution was a further growth of the 
middle class urban population, which in 1971 had represented 38.5 percent of the citizens 
and reached 46.4 percent in 1983. Such an expansion mostly depended upon the swelling 
number of public employees, including professional figures, technicians and intellectuals. 
However, a soft augmentation was also registered in the private sector. At the same time, 
urbanization processes developing wildly and uncontrollably, represented one of the most 
challenging issues that the country had to face. At the end of the 1970s three important 
laws were approved with the purpose of normalizing construction activities, but their 
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implementation was hindered by the inefficient bureaucratic public apparatuses and by 
the paralyzing alliance between State and private owners.66 
 In addition to the urbanization difficulties, by the end of the 70s Italian cities were 
also challenged by a massive arrival of foreigners. Around that time, Italy stopped 
exporting labor force and became the targeted destination of thousands of immigrants. 
Some of them were Northern Africans whose main activity was selling clothing, bags or 
pendants along the roads or on the beaches. Some others were occupied in a great number 
of irregular job positions. Italian institutions proved quite unprepared in facing 
immigration issues. As a result, immigrants joined the elderly and the Italian youth of the 
peripheries in the social stratum that did not benefit at all from the growing affluence 
occurring on a national level. 
 The social and economic events previously described generated an ideal milieu for 
kynical reactions to multiply, particularly in Italy where kynical cultural elements had 
been preserved and nurtured for centuries by the Catholic Church. On this subject, 
several historians have recently highlighted the plethora of spiritual factors that 
Christianity inherited from ancient Cynicism67. After all, Diogenes’ praise of poverty is 
not very dissimilar from the Christian conception of indigence as a way to gain a 
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the claim that Cynicism considerably influenced the Christian doctrines and that Jesus himself should be looked 
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by the speeches held by the Cynics Menippus, Meleager and Oenomaus whose hometown, Gadara, was little 
more than thirty kilometers from Nazareth and its name is mentioned in two of the Synoptic Gospels, see 
Desmond (2008). 
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heavenly kingdom. Also, the kynical dismissal of laws partly reverberates in the free-
spirited figure of Jesus who “lived on the edges of official society among fishermen, 
prostitutes and tax-collectors”68. Moreover, ascetic practices have been endorsed by both 
spiritual traditions, while the kynical pre-humanistic adoration for the cosmos resounds in 
Jesus’ parables, praising animals as champions of wisdom and expressing unconditional 
love for mankind. All these analogies furthermore explain why several Christian fathers 
expressed sympathy for the Greek Cynics.  
 An examination of the historical connections between Cynicism and Christianity 
would certainly exceed the scope of this work. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight 
how kynical values have the tendency to reemerge in their revolutionary purity whenever 
Christianity strips its humble clothes and takes the shape of a power exhibiting worldly 
greed and authoritarian tones. As Sloterdijk points out, this is what happened in Italy at 
the end of the Middle Age, when the authority of the Church was aggressively questioned 
by heretic sects endorsing ascetic ideals and by religious orders grieving the loss of Jesus’ 
original message:  
“As soon as a power state in the robe of Christianity – whether it be as Papacy or 
as the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation – was established and the brutal 
world of the masters began to become too impudent, kynical ascetics appeared in 
the Middle Ages who, with the death skull and the Great Reaper tried to cut the 
haughty men of the world down to size.”69 
 
From this perspective, mutatis mutandis things were not much different in Italy at the end 
of the 1970s, when the country was about to enter a period of opulence and power was 
still solidly in the hands of the Christian Democratic Party. Although this party had been 
founded at the end of War World II on the catholic values of fraternity and equality, after 
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thirty years it had mostly forgotten its origins, thus becoming a conservative and 
capitalistic force. While values of frugality and collectiveness were gravitating toward the 
left side of the political spectrum, the necessity to defeat internal terrorism led Christian 
Democrats to carry out an aggressive repression of all forms of dissent and to reassert 
forcefully their authority.  
 Considering this sociopolitical atmosphere, it is not surprising that during the last four 
decades kynical voices have reappeared in Italian Thought more than in other 
philosophical environments. This is precisely what happened starting with the publication 
of Massimo Cacciari’s Krisis (1976), which gave birth to a series of critical discourses 
replacing Marxian elements with mystical connotations. From this perspective, the 
nihilistic concepts elaborated by Italian thinkers in recent years - including Massimo 
Cacciari’s negativity, Gianni Vattimo’s weakness, Franco Cassano’s slowness, Giorgio 
Agamben’s bareness, and Roberto Esposito’s impersonal - can hardly find a satisfactory 
explanation if not considered through the categories of asceticism and dispossession. In 
the next two chapters, I will illustrate in what ways post-1970s Italian Thought and 
Literature have conceived of the post-human through a kynical criticism of “reason”, 
“language” and “time”, which are commonly considered as essential attributes of human 
nature. I will then show how such an anti-humanistic discourse is indispensable for the 
construction of a cosmopolitan subjectivity which has the subversive potential to 
destabilize neo-liberal modes of thinking.  
 Reason and language will be discussed in chapter 2, wherein I will explain why the 
transition between irrational verbal tones of the late 1970s and the quietness of the early 
1980s did not necessarily signify political resignation as much as it stood for a shift 
66 
 
between two kynical forms of expression - i.e. parrhesia and diatribe. Particular attention 
will be paid to Massimo Cacciari’s Negative Thinking, Gianni Vattimo’s Weak Thought, 
literature from the 1977 movement, and the exotic atmospheres created by Italo Calvino 
in Mr. Palomar (1983).  Finally, a conflation of parrhesiatic and diatribic elements will 
be identified as the most fertile terrain wherein an idea of “truth” that disregards 
universalistic Euro-centric claims and discloses itself as self-expression can potentially 
come into being. This conception of human communication leads one to envision a 
desirable polycentric cosmo-political scenario whose constitutive molecules do not rely 
on regressive identitarian views, but rather on social syncretism and cultural interaction. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“I love him whose soul is overfull, so that he forgets himself 
and all things are in him: thus all things become his downfall.”  
Nietzsche    
 
“A silence, apparently the same as another silence,  
could express a hundred different notions.” 
Italo Calvino                                                                    
 
  
Prelude: on Negri’s Lack of Center. 
 
It is astonishing to realize that while Giovanna Borradori’s Recoding Metaphysics (1989) 
was bringing new Italian Thought to the attention of the international opinion, several 
Italian philosophers were proclaiming themselves as stateless thinkers.  
 In The Coming Community (1990), marking the beginning of a new philosophical 
phase in the evolution of Giorgio Agamben’s thought, the author describes himself as a 
“poet without homeland”. Also, Massimo Cacciari’s Geo-philosophy of Europe (1994) 
concludes with a chapter titled “The absent fatherland”, characterizing the forthcoming 
European identity in terms of twilight and self-dissolution. Similar themes materialized a 
few years later in Roberto Esposito’s Communitas (1998), representing an important step 
for the development of his bio-political discourse, and beginning with an account of the 
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ontological space where “community” and “nothingness” conflate. Partly due to 
impolitical assumptions presupposed by these texts, which all express skepticism towards 
the notion of the “community”, they appear to not partake in the same geopolitical milieu. 
What they share is rather a condition of marginalization, a voice speaking from the same 
state of exile.  
I have thoroughly explained in the first chapter why this sense of void should be 
interpreted through kynical philosophical categories. This viewpoint proves even more 
desirable when one considers that, without the support of the kynical conceptual 
framework, the abovementioned Italian impolitical discourses lend themselves to be 
interpreted as symptoms of resignation and surrender. It is in this way that Antonio Negri, 
for instance, in recent times spoke about Italian nihilism, which seemingly “has always 
been a weak philosophy, weak in the face of politics and bosses, dictators and popes.”70 
Negri’s criticism is largely elaborated from a Marxian perspective and is particularly 
merciless a propos the evolution of Italian Theory starting from the end of the 1970s. For 
Negri, the Italian philosophical fragmentation of this period proved politically irrelevant 
and, at once, submissive with respect to the ruling powers. Negri’s targets, in particular, 
are Gianni Vattimo’s Weak Thought and Italian post-modernism, which prioritized 
Heideggerrian discourses and dismissed Marxian postulates, thus contributing to separate 
philosophical activity from the struggles of ordinary people:  
“In the twentieth-century decline of ideas and debates, the vilest point was 
perhaps reached when some, with a certain pride, proclaimed their thought and 
their definition of contemporary philosophy as weak…Limp thought and the 
Craxi era go together: however, one should admit that Craxi’s Proudhonism was 
by all means weightier and philosophically more relevant than Vattimo’s and 
Ferrara’s light thought.”71 
                                                 
70 Negri (2009) The Italian Difference, in Chiesa & Toscano (2009) p. 14. 
71 Ibid. p.14.  
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Following this line of reasoning, Negri expresses disapproval for most of the 20th century 
Ita1ian philosophical ideas, with the exception of those represented by Gramsci and few 
other Marxian theorists, whose discourses presumably dismiss Hegelian aspects of 
synthesis and reconciliation, while also bringing ‘resistance’ back to the center of 
philosophical practice:  
“The fact is that difference is resistance…A resistance that breaks this horizon of 
domination not from the margins but from the centre, or better, which 
reconstructs a centre, a point which can use as a lever in order to transform reality 
at the very heart of the system.”72 (italics mine) 
 
Negri’s sharp provocation offers reasons for reflection and self-criticism. It is undeniable 
that, particularly after 1980, Italian philosophy was affected by what historians identify as 
a social ‘reflux’73, leading the majority of the population to dismiss political 
responsibilities and to look for a shelter within the comfort of a private life. Nonetheless, 
one wonders whether Negri’s evaluation is too ungenerous. Especially when considering 
that, primarily because of the fragmentation that afflicted the Italian working class 
starting from the end of the 1970s74, philosophical thought lost its material support and 
was forced to reshape itself in a new way. Negri’s complaint regarding Italian lack of 
cohesion is most likely an appeal to the Marxian precept according to which if class 
struggle cannot be carried out successfully, national struggle should be pursued as a 
means to dismantle capitalistic apparatuses. Nevertheless, this perspective neglects two 
factors: 1) first, the current inadequacy of the Marxian language of ‘internationalism’, 
                                                 
72 Ibid. p.20.     
73 The sociological term denoting a general inclination to reject political engagement and to escape the public eye 
which occurred in Italy between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. 
74 See Ginsborg (2001), p.54. 
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which has progressively dismissed its traditional leftist values, and in the present time is 
displaying a regressive essence; and 2) the rhetorical ambiguity that characterizes the 
notion of ‘resistance’, which in some circumstances materializes as the outcome of 
different and even opposite historical-political narratives. I will briefly clarify these two 
observations before moving forward.  
 It is important to notice that after the end of the Cold War, values of 
‘internationalism’ have often been borrowed by conservative movements opposing the 
expansion of capitalism in defense of cultural identities and ethnic self-preservation. 
Within western scenarios, political claims going up against globalization are currently 
expressed in two main areas: the Global Justice Movement, on one hand, generally 
conveying leftist modes of thinking and, on the other hand, extreme right political parties, 
which in recent times have gained an increasing consent. Opposing the Global Justice 
Movement, which strives to generate a global counter-hegemonic subjectivity through 
trans-national connections, conservative parties still rely on the “nation-state” as a ground 
for elaborating their demands, and in several cases have adopted international strategies. 
In 2005, for instance, nationalist parties from seven European countries - i.e.  the French 
Front National, the Italian Azione Sociale and Lega Nord, the Spanish Alternativa 
Espanola, the anti-Hungarian Great Romania Party, the openly anti-Semite Bulgarian 
party Ataka, and Belgium’s largest party, the Vlaams Belang - ratified the “Vienna 
Declaration” with the purpose to establish a European rightist contact group with a 
permanent basis in the Austrian capital. In view of the European parliamentary decree 
that a few years later would allow only pan-European groups to compete in the 
continental elections, party leaders planned to join forces. Holding annual meetings, they 
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began to cooperate on a common agenda which asks for the interruption of immigration 
throughout the European Union and for the protection of Europe against Islamic 
terrorism. The declaration also dismisses the potential ratification of the European 
Constitution and demands Asian and African territories to not be allowed to join the 
Union75. Similar objectives were furthermore recovered and discussed in a gathering that 
occurred in 2009 in Budapest, which proclaimed the birth of the Alliance of National 
European Movements.  
 Such an international cooperation has most likely been facilitated by shared counter-
cosmopolitan and anti-Semitic views76. Still, they also relied on rhetorical elements that 
are traditionally a prerogative of leftist political discourses, and which European rightist 
leaders have borrowed for fulfilling new voter demands. Anti-imperialistic arguments 
utilized by Marxian activists during the 20th century, for instance, have reappeared not 
only in the Vienna declaration but also in the languages developed by several 
conservative groups. Some of these factions include the German NPD, the Austrian 
FPO77 and lately Donald Trump’s party, whose jungles evoke “national greatness” and, at 
the same time, disapprove of the expansionistic policies that have been chased by 
previous American administrations. The new right has arguably rejected not only the 
colonial ideologies that characterized 20th century fascisms, but also the “free market” 
doctrines promoted by Thatcherism and Reaganomics during the 1980s78, replacing them 
in some cases with leftist themes such as economic equality and respect for the 
environment. Significant in this regard is the International Third Position, which 
                                                 
75
 See Belien ( 2005).   
76 See Lars Rensmann (2011), Against Globalism: Counter-cosmopolitan Discontent and Anti-Semitism in 
Mobilizations of European Extreme Right Parties, in Rensmann and Schoeps (2011), p. 143. 
77 Ibid. pp. 138-39.  
78 Ibid. p. 122. 
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advocates for wealth redistribution and ecological policies, while also pursuing an 
explicitly racist agenda.  
 This conflation of opposite political elements can be partly explained with the fact 
that extreme right factions, in comparison to their left-wing counterparts, are currently 
inclined to receive stronger support “from unemployed, less educated blue-collar 
workers”79who perceive themselves as significantly penalized by the global economy.  
Due to the necessity to satisfy these people’s expectations, in some circumstances 
traditional leftist modes of thinking find space within the right area of the political 
spectrum, thus assisting the international struggle against global capitalism on which 
conservative leaders are cooperating. Political theorists are then partly accurate when 
claiming that the events of 1989 buried the old internationalism and replaced it with the 
phenomenon of “internationality”, denoting “the bland but dangerous homogenization of 
the world whose very effect is to produce local resistance”80. More precisely, one should 
talk about a transition of internationalism from left to right. Because of this shift, 
grounding values of “internationalism” on a too cohesive kind of national philosophical 
thought - which Negri appears to invoke - might lead one to align with regressive themes 
such as anti-immigration and cultural protectionism. Therefore, it is reasonable to look at 
both cosmopolitan components and the fragmentation characterizing contemporary 
Italian philosophy as positive resources that it can employ for facing the challenge of 
globalization without endorsing intolerant forms of thinking. 
  Because of this transition of ‘internationalism’ from left to right, the notion of 
‘resistance’ advocated by Negri becomes highly problematic. One of the effects that 
                                                 
79 Ibid. p. 118. 
80 Tom Nairn, “Internationalism and the Second Coming”, quoted by Pollock (2000), p.622. 
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globalization brought about is, in fact, an ambiguous construction of ‘antagonism’, which 
is sometimes unleashed in the name of ‘equality’ and some others in defense of ‘identity’. 
Defending equality, anti-globalization claims still target wealth disparities that leftist 
discourses typically deplore. At the same time, some of these claims also align with the 
extreme-right will to protect cultural and ethnic identities from the presumed strikes fired 
by the financial global elite. Because of this ambiguity, the term ‘resistance’ risks being 
deprived of its conceptual axis and converted into an undecidable tool. Such ambivalence 
would furthermore prove particularly distressing for the Italian political consciousness, 
which accomplished democratization at the end of World War II with the relevant 
support of an anti-fascist movement of ‘resistance’. A symptom of all this is the bizarre 
case of the Northern League, which formed in the early 1990s as an anti-fascist as well as 
anti-nationalist movement, and at the moment represents one of the main far right 
political parties sponsoring racism and xenophobia. 
 On a larger scale, this undecidable mechanism is partially facilitated by economic 
exploitation which is no longer exercised exclusively on the central area of the Fordist 
factory, but it is distributed on a plurality of different borderline positions – i.e. 
precarious workers, immigrants, stateless, etc. – leading the subject of antagonism to 
disperse into a plethora of marginal and scattered figures which lack social self-
awareness. Negri’s association between ‘resistance’ and ‘difference’, revealing 
discernment of these dynamics, is arguably posited for dismissing chauvinistic 
conceptions of ‘antagonism’, which would deprive values of resistance of their 
progressive essence.  
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 In view of these reflections, our concern here is to ask whether cosmo-political theory 
should rely on the nostalgia for a middle point belonging to the past, or rather on an idea 
of ‘resistance’ that aims at converting such a loss of centrality to its own advantage. In 
this second case, what we are searching for is a notion of resistance that dismisses aspects 
of opposition; namely, a “non-resisting resistance” that is not grounded on Negri’s 
reconstruction of the centre, but on the kynical ability to think and speak from the edges. 
Post-humanistic philosophies which carry out a deconstruction of Euro-centrism by 
replacing theoretical centers with a plethora of inner borders can be helpful for this 
purpose. Humanistic systems of thought, whether in the form of ideals of the 
Enlightenment, the Hegelian spirit, or the Communist utopia, had relied on the support 
provided by both a speculative center and a series of well defined external frontiers - i.e. 
nature-culture, animal-human, collectiveness-individual, etc. On the contrary, post-
humanism associates the end of modernity with a shortfall of axis and with the 
insurgence of a plethora of inner margins that tear apart philosophical discourse. From 
the post-human perspective, philosophy should no longer be conceived of as the inquiry 
that looks at the peripheral line separating the subject of knowledge from the outer world. 
Rather, it becomes an exploration of the internal edges taking apart the numerous 
languages and modes of expression which, within the historical-cultural western milieu, 
engage, melt and occasionally collide with one another.  
 I have abundantly illustrated in the first chapter how the retrieval of kynical elements 
allowed Italian post-humanism to unfold along lines which are even more marginalized 
and de-centralized than the ones drawn by both German philosophy and French Theory. 
It is no accident that Italian anti-humanistic doctrines were largely influenced by 
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Massimo Cacciari’s Negative Thought. This associates the birth of an alternative 
modernity to the emergence of multiple speculative centers vivisecting philosophical 
discourse into a plethora of ontological and political inner margins. In the present work 
Cacciari’s voice, speaking the language of parrhesia, represents the philosophical spirit 
that first animated Italian Cynicism during the past four decades. This is what will now 
be discussed over the next pages, which will clarify how the shift in Italian thought 
between the late 1970s and the 1980s can be justified through the transition connecting 
two kynical rhetorical tactics. The main purpose is to take into account such an evolution 
in order to evaluate how post-human epistemological viewpoints and language theories 
affect cosmopolitan political discourse.   
 
 
Parrhesia 
 
 Negativity and Mysticism: an Alternative Modernity? 
 
1. 
The disregard of kynical components characterizing contemporary Italian philosophy has 
prevented most scholars from taking into account the parrhesiatic aspect introduced by 
Massimo Cacciari81, which is important for capturing the essence of his philosophical 
message.   
                                                 
81 As a fervent political activist, during the 1960’s Massimo Cacciari joined the Italian working class in several 
protests and cooperated with Mario Tronti, Alberto Asor Rosa, and Toni Negri to the Marxian magazine Classe 
operaia. Because of political divergences interfering between the aforesaid affiliates, Cacciari subsequently enrolled 
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The parrhesia, denoting ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘frank and open discourse’, was a 
fundamental right of the citizen during the ancient age of the Greek poleis. At that time, it 
was considered one of the greatest political goods that Greek people were entitled with, 
which is why the exiled perceived the loss of it as a sorrowful deprivation. Democratic 
parrhesia was nonetheless looked at with a sense of suspiciousness by the fourth-century 
aristocracy, thinking of it as a dangerous weapon that was given to the masses. It is partly 
for this reason that it became even more important during the Hellenistic epoch, when 
political liberties were revoked by the Macedonian dynasties. It was at this time that the 
Cynics adopted it as a rhetorical tactic for questioning the political authority of the 
leaders and for denouncing social injustices and immoral practices.82 Although kynical 
parrhesia displayed strong ethical connotations, Diogenes and his disciples often 
employed it with political intentions. For the Cynics it made no difference whether a 
certain speech was pronounced within the private or the public domain: in all cases, their 
conception of truth presupposed “the ethical imperative to act or speak out”83, even at the 
cost to jeopardize one’s own life. For these reasons, kynical parrhesia was frequently 
expressed in opposition with accepted norms by employing impolite tones which would 
often elicit tension and in some cases violence: “Truth is, then, the performance of self-
                                                                                                                                                             
in the Italian Communist Party and served as a member of parliament between 1976 and 1983, fulfilling duties 
which were apparently distant from his philosophical concerns. After the passing of Communist leader Enrico 
Berlinguer, Cacciari left the party but continued to be active for many years within the Italian left. Cacciari’s early 
texts such as Krisis (1976) and Pensiero negativo e razionalizzazione (1977) mainly focus on the contemporary 
‘crisis of reason’, which presumably brought metaphysical rationality to dissolution, facilitating the emergence of 
negative thought. Far from signifying mere irrationalism, this type of thinking reveals all the inner contradictions 
that for centuries animated the European tradition.  
82 Kennedy (1999) p. 33. 
83 Ibid. p. 36. 
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sufficiency or Cynic asceticism; this is the parrhesiatic challenge of telling and showing 
the truth of the self to an audience, regardless of how disruptive this process may be.”84 
In Geo-philosophy of Europe (1994) Cacciari reveals the paramount importance of 
this topic for understanding both the essence and the evolution of European cultures. The 
purpose of this section on Parrhesia is first to highlight the parrhesiatic connotations that 
have characterized Cacciari’s philosophy starting from the late 1970s; and second, to 
evaluate the repercussions that they bring on our post-human cosmopolitan discourse. For 
these goals, I will analyze Cacciari’s ideas in relation to both the doctrine of 
Eurocommunism and the revolutionary atmosphere raised by the Italian movements of 
protest in 1977, when Cacciari’s philosophy changed shape.  
 Even though Cacciari emphasizes the relevance of the parrhesia in the mid 1990s, 
most of his reflections on “negative thinking”, which came to light at the end of the 
1970s, exhibit kynical connotations. According to the dominant interpretation of 
contemporary Italian Thought85, after the publication of Krisis: Essay on Negative 
Thought from Nietzsche to Wittgenstein (1976) Cacciari’s thought developed very 
coherently, also influencing the subsequent evolution of Italian philosophy.86 It is 
convenient to begin our discussion by taking this text into consideration.  
The main objective that Cacciari pursues in Krisis is the identification of a post-
ideological mode of thinking that allegedly has replaced the traditional forms of western 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 I am mostly referring to Giuseppe Cantarano’s Immagini del nulla (1998) which is considered a reliable account 
of contemporary Italian Thought. For my inquiry, I will also rely on Giovanni  Catapano’s “Coincidentia 
Oppositorum: Appunti sul pensiero di Massimo Cacciari” (2003), offering valuable considerations on Cacciari’s 
philosophy. 
86 “That Cacciari’s text was central to the development of a number of subsequent tendencies in Italian philosophy, 
is attested by its influence on the development of ‘weak thought’…”, see Matteo Mandarini (2009), Beyond 
Nihilism: Notes Towards a Critique of Left-Heideggerianism in Italian Philosophy of the 1970s, in Chiesa & 
Toscano (2009), pp. 56-57.   
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rationality. For Cacciari, a significant correlation links the epistemological instability that 
quantum mechanics brought to the 20th century Marxian debates regarding the problem of 
labor. Ernst Mach, on one hand, addressed the first dilemma by interpreting the laws of 
physics as an economic organization of human sensorial perceptions. Neoclassical 
economics87, on the other hand, aimed at finding a solution for Marx’s transformation 
problem88 by dismissing in toto the mismatch that surfaced in between the value of 
commodities and their prices in the competitive market. Both solutions ultimately 
describe social change as a linear and regular process that dismisses all potential 
contradictions. None of them, however, succeeded. First, Mach did not elaborate a 
satisfactory account of the clash opposing Newton’s Classical Mechanics to Einstein’s 
General Relativity. Second, neither Bohm-Bawerk’s neoclassical critique nor revisionist 
Austro-Marxism were able to explain the monopolistic and protectionist transformation 
of the economy which occurred during the 20th century.89 For these reasons, Cacciari is 
after a western philosophical path that portrays ‘crisis’ and ‘conflict’ as constitutive of 
the social-historical process. Such a conceptual instrument is what Cacciari baptizes as 
“negative thought”.  
There is no need to remind the reader of the antecedents, following Hegel and Marx, 
who insisted more than others on “negativity” as the most convenient tool to employ for 
critical purposes. It is nonetheless important to differentiate Cacciari’s discourse from the 
philosophical analysis developed by the exponents of the Frankfurt School. While they 
all converge on the effort to elaborate a mode of thinking that dismisses unitary and 
                                                 
87 An approach to economic theory that opposes Marxism and explains the correlation between goods, outputs and 
income distributions in terms of supply and demand.  
88 In Marxian theory, this is a problem concerning how the original "values" of commodities transform into the 
"competitive prices" of the market. 
89 See Catapano (2003), p.480. 
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synthetic dynamics, Adorno and Marcuse still inscribed their theories within the sphere 
of dialectics, which Cacciari strives to overcome in toto. The legacy that Cacciari makes 
appeal to is, in fact, a series of kynical thinkers who from different perspectives carried 
out an aggressive attack on all forms of Hegelianism. 
Interestingly, the initial appearance of this type of “negativity” surfaced through 
Schopenhauer, whose asceticism represents the first evident crisis that western reason 
suffered with respect to its transcendental claims. Moving from a revision of the Kantian 
‘I think’ to a demolition of the Hegelian spirit, Schopenhauer deprived rationality of a 
large part of its transcendental power, also anticipating the formalization of knowledge 
that was carried out in following times by Neo-positivists. This ascetical detachment 
from the reality was then overturned by Nietzsche90, dismissing Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism and conceiving of knowledge as a coercive manipulation of the reality. It 
finally culminated in the mysticism of the ‘second Wittgenstein’, who described language 
not as a mirror of the outside world but as a series of communicative games that 
repeatedly oppose, collide and crash into one another. From Schopenhauer to 
Wittgenstein, western rationality has undergone a negative process that deprived it of its 
transcendental essences, and which set up the foundations for the dawning of an 
antagonistic type of mysticism. 
The true nature of Cacciari’s mysticism has been abundantly debated. Some scholars 
interpret it as a religious conversion, some others as the symptom of an ideologically 
                                                 
90 For future reference, it is important to clarify that the way in which Italian thinkers engage with Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is in all circumstances influenced by the critical edition provided at the end of the 1960’s by Giorgio 
Colli and Mazzino Montinari. These authors mostly aimed at invalidating the “Nazi, anti-Semitic, antidemocratic 
depiction of Nietzsche propagated by his sister at the beginning of the century”, see Vattimo (2006), p. 191.   
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over-determined conception of political struggle91. Giuseppe Cantarano is accurate when 
he categorizes the first hypothesis as unsustainable;92 after all, Cacciari tells us explicitly 
that his conception of the ‘mystical’ does not have anything to do with a sense of 
transcendence:   
“Il ‘mistico’ non è l’esperienza del trascendente – ma l’opposto. E neppure il 
‘mistico’ è la domanda su come è il mondo. Il ‘mistico’ è appunto l’esperienza del 
mondo come tutto limitato. Il ‘mistico’ ha origine dal fatto che il mondo è.”93 
 
(“The mystical is not the experience of transcendence – but the opposite. Nor is 
the mystical the question regarding how the world is. The mystical is precisely the 
experience of the world as a limited whole. The mystical originates from the fact 
that the world is.”) 
  
 
Because of this substantial disregard of transcendence, Cacciari dismisses religious 
messages and also takes distance from Marcuse’s conception of negativity, whose main 
purpose was to offer ontological alternatives to the one-dimensional thought spreading 
within capitalistic society. This observation might be helpful for evaluating the second 
hypothesis, pertaining aspects of over-determination, which Cantarano does not address. 
In what sense is the mystical “the experience of the whole limited”? What does Cacciari’s 
mysticism stand for? The thesis defended here is that the mystical that Cacciari theorizes 
has a kynical essence, signifying the ‘exiled’ language of the parrhesia. More 
specifically, Cacciari’s thought: 1) cannot be considered as fully post-modern: the 
plethora of parrhesiatic languages posited by Cacciari suggests an “alternative” type of 
modernity which does not reject completely the values of the Enlightenment nor western 
metaphysics in general; 2) is inscribable within a parrhesiatic scenario that exceeded the 
                                                 
91 See Mandarini (2009), Beyond Nihilism: Notes Towards a Critique of Left-Heideggerianism in Italian Philosophy 
of the 1970s, in Chiesa & Toscano (2009) p. 69. 
92 “…ma non c’è nulla di più lontano del mistico dal religioso nel pensiero di Cacciari.” Cantarano (1998), p. 328. 
93 Cacciari (1976) p. 94, English Translation mine. 
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over-determined sphere of Euro-communism, and which involved more radical political 
positions as well. Cacciari’s parrhesia identifies a pluralistic conception of antagonism 
that the 1977 movement of protest partly implemented ‘from below’; 3) Cacciari’s 
parrhesia is utilized for highlighting the internal discrepancies that characterize the 
western cultural world, which presumably will be able to thrive only by accepting its 
inner conflicting diversity. This is the main presupposition for what we could identify as 
a ‘multiculturalism of friction’, which will be discussed exhaustively at the end of this 
section.  
 
 
2. 
Within the fragment mentioned above, the reader will find more than one reason for 
approving a kynical reading of Krisis. First of all, once transcendent significances of the 
‘mystical’ have been ruled out, the expression ‘whole limited’ most likely indicates a 
condition of proximity to the margins. It is what Cacciari confirms a few lines later: “È 
l’esperienza complessiva del limite così tracciato che da origine al mistico…Lì dove si 
trascende il limite, lì non vi è mistico.”94 (“It is the comprehensive experience of an 
outlined limit that gives birth to the mystical…Wherever one transcends the limit, there is 
no mystical.” (Italics mine) In view of these words, it is reasonable to think of Cacciari’s 
mysticism as a marginalized conscience that perceives the world from the borders, and to 
converge with Mandarini’s view depicting this type of negativity as a “marginal position 
                                                 
94 Ibid. pp. 94-95. 
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that is the very condition of immanence but which renders the mystical worldly - and the 
worldly mystical.”95 (italics mine) 
 Moreover, the discharge of the question “how the world is” leads us to disregard the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and to take into account the theories expressed in the 
Philosophical Investigations. From this perspective, the “mystical” cannot symbolize the 
outer frontier separating ‘subject’ and ‘world’ and circumscribing human reason. It rather 
becomes the experience of the inner borders segmenting knowledge into a diversity of 
language-games96. The ‘limits’ that Cacciari describes symbolize the lines partitioning 
numerous speech contests which, in turn, give birth to a wide “family” of different forms 
of knowledge:  
“Se i giochi avessero un’ ‘Idea’ comune, non potrebbero più chiamarsi giochi: 
essi sarebbero di nuovo riducibili a essenze, rappresenterebbero deduzioni-
dimostrazioni di verità assolute. L’operari corretto è qui semplicemente vedere se 
si dà qualche tratto in comune tra i vari giochi. Si scopre, allora, che i giochi 
formano una famiglia: si vedono somiglianze, parentele, affinità soltanto.”97 
 
 
(If games shared a common “Idea”, they could no longer be defined as games: 
they would be once again ascribable to essences and would represent deductions-
demonstrations of absolute truths. The correct operari is here to simply ponder 
whether different games exhibit some common traits. One discovers, then, that 
games form a family: one sees only similarities, relations, affinities.”) 
 
Such a pluralism of expressive forms does not resolve into mere irrational tones. As 
opposed to authors such as Apel, Lyotard, and Vattimo, explicitly characterizing their 
philosophical discourses as post-modern, Cacciari does not conceive of the twilight of 
                                                 
95 Mandarini (2009), p. 59.  
96 Mandarini’s account is again helpful here: “Cacciari refuses to identify the mystical experience in the early 
Wittgenstein, for instance, with that of transcendence, on the ground that mysticism is – rather – the experience of 
(this side of) the limit…Instead, the mystical stems from negative thought’s excision of all reference to a ‘real 
world’ transcending the limits of language and that, thereby, enables a multiplicity of technics to internalize those 
very limits, autonomising themselves in a variety of specific ‘language’ games’”, Ibid. pp. 59-60. 
97 Cacciari (1976), p.80. 
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humanistic ideologies as an inexorable fading of western reason. Neither Schopenhauer’s 
asceticism, nor Nietzsche’s will to power or Wittgenstein’s mysticism, in fact, can be 
described in mere irrational terms:  
“Il Wille zur Macht nietzscheano non solo non ha nulla di ‘irrazionalismo 
vitalistico’ – non solo non intende recuperare sul piano meramente soggettivo la 
crisi dei fondamenti scientifici – ma si pone come interpretazione e risoluzione di 
questa crisi.”98 
 
(“Not only does the Nietzschean Wille zur Macht not entail any ‘vitalistic 
irrationalism’ – not only does it not aim at ‘recovering’ on the merely subjective 
plane the crisis of scientific foundations – but it sets itself up as interpretation and 
resolution of this crisis.”) 
 
Cacciari’s mystical does not dismantle truth per se; rather, it replaces a unitary 
conception of “veracity” with a proliferation of different modes of thinking which are all 
provided with the same accountability. Far from transcending the dimension of reason, 
Krisis Thought unveils all the contradictions that western knowledge conceals, thus 
bringing a plethora of verbal tensions to the surface of the philosophical and the social 
conscience. Through such a multiplication of discursive centers and inner margins, 
Cacciari identifies a negative area which coincides neither with the space of universal 
reason nor with the domain of the irrational and that, consequently, is perched between 
the great narratives of modernity and post-modern discourses. Following the fall of 
humanism, Italian philosophical thought is pushed more and more toward this third 
dimension: an alternative reality, wherein reasonable argumentations can still be 
elaborated, but truth can be spoken exclusively from ‘exile’.  
 From this perspective, Cacciari’s parrhesiatic conception of the “negative” retrieves 
part of the speculative themes that had inspired his predecessors of the Frankfurt School. 
                                                 
98 Ibid. p.64. 
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It is sufficient to think of how significantly the condition of ‘exile’ experienced by 
Adorno, who was forced to leave Germany for several years when the Nazis came to 
power, influenced both his critique of Hegel’s “positivity” and his Negative Dialectics: 
“I cannot resist telling you that my eyes were opened to the dubious nature of this 
concept of positivity only in emigration, where people found themselves under pressure 
from the society around them and had to adapt to very extreme 
circumstances.”99Although Cacciari would hardly welcome Adorno’s catastrophic 
account of the Enlightenment, Krisis Thought possibly brought about in the Italian 
cultural milieu the same instability that Adorno’s negativity had awakened within the 
domain of German theory. Following Krisis, Italian philosophy achieves for the first 
time a cosmo-political condition of statelessness.  
 Considering that Cacciari, unlike Adorno, was never forced to abandon his country, 
such a strong sense of homelessness needs to be explained through the social-historical 
factors triggering the resurgence of Cynicism in Italy which have been examined within 
the first chapter. Furthermore, it was partly due to these phenomena that around the time 
Krisis Thought was developed, the 1977 movement of protest carried out the last 
vigorous attack on governmental institutions. One should not be surprised if, in such a 
socially unstable climate, philosophical reflection no longer felt at home. 
 It could be argued that the margins identified by Cacciari’s conception of the 
mystical, which does not follow strictly from Marxian postulates, is the superior border 
that separates middle-class forms of expression from low-class literary codes. In so 
doing, this mysticism would denote the endorsement of a bourgeois type of antagonism 
                                                 
99 Theodor W. Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, quoted by Samir Gandesha (2012), Homeless Philosophy: 
The Exile of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Exile in Arendt and Adorno, in Rensmann & Gandesha (2012), p.250. 
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that disbelieves the workers’ revolutionary potential. This is essentially the interpretation 
provided by Matteo Mandarini. Relying on the intense debate that Antonio Negri 
established with Cacciari at the end of the 1970s, Mandarini posits a close association 
between Krisis and the Euro-communistic strategy adopted by the PCI at that time100. 
According to him, Cacciari’s mysticism presumably conceals an aristocratic notion of 
“revolution from above” which Negri condemned on all levels. It was first implemented 
within the doctrine of the Historic Compromise, leading the Italian Communist Party to 
lose the sympathy of the subaltern classes. Subsequently, it turned into a conception of 
the political which agreed “to the apologetic subordination to existing states of affairs or 
– at best – to a fetishistic over-determination from above, i.e. to ideology and political 
opportunism.”101  
 This interpretation, which is acceptable if grounded exclusively on Cacciari’s 
cooperation with the Communist Party, should be nonetheless rectified according to the 
idea of irresolvable conflict that Cacciari’s negativity embodies. Enrico Berlinguer’s 
doctrine of the “compromise”, in fact, faithfully counted on ideological superimpositions 
crossing Marxism and Christian doctrines102 which Cacciari’s theory does not envision. 
The coexistence of the opposites that Cacciari posits in Krisis does not presuppose 
ontological or ethical intersections but absolute incompatibility among different 
                                                 
100 Euro-communism was the theoretical model adopted at the end of the 1970s by the Spanish, French, and Italian 
Communist Parties, aiming to reform Leninism so as to make it more suitable for the western European 
environments. Moving from Gramscian postulates, Euro-communism isolates the political from the sub-structural, 
locates within the Party the main responsibility to carry out social change, and conceives of parliamentary reforms 
as mandatory steps that the revolutionary process undergoes. The Negri-Cacciari alliance dissolved at the end of the 
1970s, when the former believed that political struggle had to be accomplished through extra-parliamentary tactics, 
while the latter decided to endorse the reformative project pursued by the PCI. 
101 Mandarini (2009), in Chiesa & Toscano (2009), p. 70. 
102 See Ginsborg (1989) pp.478-482. 
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discursive positions, which are meant to experience a constant state of reciprocal 
hostility:  
“E tutto questo: senza nessuna conciliazione…Potere non è sintesi – se fosse 
sintesi, non vi sarebbe più bisogno di un potere…C’è un conflitto infinito – come 
c’è un divenire: un eterno ritorno.”103 
 
(“And all this: without any conciliation...Power is not synthesis – if it were 
synthesis, power would no longer be needed…There is an infinite conflict – as 
there is a becoming: an eternal return.”) 
 
 Based on these observations, Cacciari’s negativity appears to be more reluctant to the 
idea of a negotiation than any reformist Marxian strategy. This was partly acknowledged 
in the early 1980s by Negri, characterizing Krisis as a “wonderful attempt to positively 
recuperate the efficacy of negative thought”104. Far from embodying the opportunistic 
demeanor that Negri detected, Cacciari’s kynical mysticism represents the attempt to 
preclude antagonistic ideas from being domesticated by the Christian Democratic 
hegemony. What I would like to highlight is Cacciari’s effort to elaborate a post-
dialectical form of antagonism that encompasses a plurality of different struggles. As 
Restaino rightly observes, this strategy utilizes the Marxian inheritance within a 
theoretical context that exceeds the domain of traditional Marxism105. Cacciari’s 
mysticism, symbolizing the frontier wherein a discord between various linguistic 
positions occurs, presupposes the belief that political struggle could no longer be 
described in bipolar terms. For this reason, Cacciari’s over-determined cynicism needs to 
be explained as a counterpart of the cynicism “from below” that was personified, during 
those years, by the numerous extra-parliamentary groups still active in Italy.  
                                                 
103 Cacciari (1976), p.69. 
104 Mandarini (2009), in Chiesa & Toscano (2009), p. 68. 
105 See Catapano (2003) p.477. 
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       Cynicism and Under-determination  
 
1. 
The conflation of “cynical conventionalism” and “hypocritical postulation of the 
mystical”106 that Negri detected in Cacciari’s thought at the end of the 1970s should be 
ascribed, in more positive terms, to the wider kynical atmosphere that characterized those 
years. A kynical spirit, indeed, animated the numerous extra-parliamentary groups which 
at that time were still extremely lively in Italy and which furthermore Negri himself 
endorsed.  
 Towards the end of the 1970s the leader of Autonomia Operaia was still inscribing 
most of his philosophical reflections within the scope of traditional Marxism. Meanwhile, 
the Italian social milieu was giving birth to forms of dissent which proclaimed autonomy 
not only from the entire party system and from the rebellion that had occurred a decade 
before but, in many circumstances from the actual Marxian ideology. The 1977 
movement107, in particular, was strongly critical and desecrating with respect to 
“stereotipi ideologici, modelli, ritualità e miti della tradizione terzinternazionalista”108 
(ideological stereotypes, models, rituals and myths of the Third-internationalist 
tradition”) and had been the flags of the 1968-69 protest. The struggle carried out by the 
‘77 activists was only in part identifiable through centralized Marxian categories such as 
                                                 
106 Mandarini (2009), in Chiesa & Toscano (2009), p. 68. 
107 A spontaneous protest mostly involving extra-parliamentary leftist groups which dismissed political dialogue 
with both the party-system and the labor unions. Historians usually identify within the movement two main 
branches: the so called ‘creative’ one, on one hand, was ironic, sympathetic to feminist perspectives and inclined to 
generate alternative societal structures; the militaristic faction, on the other hand, did not dismiss violence as a 
revolutionary strategy. Mostly because of the “alternative” aspects qualifying the protest and also due to the 
recurrent and illegitimate association between the 1977 rebels and 1970s terrorism, the movement was in some 
circumstances repressed with unjustified aggression by the governmental institutions, and then largely removed 
from the Italian national consciousness.   
108 Balestrini & Moroni (1988) p. 504, English translation mine.  
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“working-class” or “proletariat”, which had been the main conceptual points of reference 
nine years earlier. The new rebellion unfolded along marginal borders that materialized 
within Italian society, which was striving to exit a phase of economic recession and to be 
accepted within the advanced capitalistic world. Origins of the new antagonistic subject 
were, in fact, the borderline areas that Asor Rosa named as “second society”, denoting all 
the people who were in some ways excluded from the mechanism of production: young 
unoccupied individuals, the youth of the urban peripheries, women, drug addicts, as well 
as ostracized of all kinds109. In view of this social derivation, the attack that the activists 
accomplished with respect to the nation-state unburied not only the injustices and the 
inequalities that were perpetrated within the Italian society, but also the traumatic 
consequences that the post-industrial era was bringing to European communities. These 
repercussions were furthermore particularly distressing in Italy, wherein de-
industrialization processes proved unable to fully relocate the labor shed from 
manufacturing within an efficient tertiary sector110, thus generating an overabundance of 
borderline social conditions.  
Examining in detail the historical evolution of the 1977 movement, which took shape 
in Rome and faded away in Bologna at the end of the year, would be certainly helpful but 
here would exceed the scope of our theoretical purpose. What needs to be shown is rather 
the fair degree of parrhesiatic mysticism that was evoked by these particular forms of 
dissent. The importance of this analysis rests in the fact that part of the kynical 
cosmopolitan essence embodied by the movement, which was strangled without 
                                                 
109 Ibid. Chapter 10. 
110 Ginsborg (2001) p. 13.  
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compromises by governmental institutions and then substantially removed from national 
conscience, was most likely preserved within the subsequent Italian philosophy. 
 First, Cacciari’s negativity reappears in the 1977 antagonistic demeanor. This 
replaced the aforementioned “ideological centrality” with the effort to acquire proximity 
to social margins, also pursuing a kynical self-exclusion. A key element is the way in 
which the movement engaged with the theme of ‘work’. In 1968 the Marxian principle of 
the “re-appropriation” of work had been adopted as an ideological value by the protest. 
Differently, in 1977 the considerable instability of the new job market, generating forms 
of labor that were temporary and precarious, led the rebels to express their disapproval by 
emphasizing proudly their condition of labor “dispossession”. The ideal of the “refusal to 
work”, which had never truly been put into practice a decade earlier, became a moral 
bulwark for the new activists. In light of this ideal, they were able to portray their job as a 
secondary obligation, while depicting their ordinary life in terms of nomadism, migration, 
and statelessness. Cosmo-political values were then utilized by the protesters as kynical 
tools of dissent. The importance that even Negri placed on the “refusal to work” for 
replacing “productivity” with “creativity”, for providing the proletariat with autonomy 
and self-valorization, ultimately sabotaging the alliance between capitalism and state 
apparatuses, reveals the extremely kynical atmosphere within which these ideas were 
elaborated: “This solitude of mine is creative, and this separateness of mine is the only 
real collectivity that I know.”111 It is instantaneous to recognize in these words the need 
for isolation that our discourse on “kynical antagonism” posited within the first chapter. 
Although Negri would probably reject such an interpretation, some of the ideas that he 
                                                 
111 Negri (2005) p. 259. 
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developed around that time counterbalanced ‘from below’ Cacciari’s over-determined 
mysticism. 
And nonetheless, Cacciari’s marginalization ‘from above’ presupposed a parrhesiatic 
collision among opposing language-games, while Negri expressed in several occasions 
doubts with regard to a protest that was encompassing an under-determined plurality of 
voices. Partly due to the ideological lack of center that was previously described, the new 
protest was much more segmented and diversified than the one that had taken place in 
1968. In 1977 the rebelliousness unfolded through a diversity of accents which were 
often reciprocally conflicting and contradictory. According to the main sociological 
accounts, an essential incompatibility distinguished the “spontaneous” and “creative” 
wing of the movement from the militaristic one. The former was ironic, irreverent and 
inclined to elaborate alternative social structures rather than opposing the existing ones; 
the latter still relied on orthodox interpretations of Marxism and, in many cases, looked at 
violence as the only plausible antidote for accomplishing social change. A plethora of 
discursive divergences could be furthermore identified within each insurrectionist 
community. The adoption of avant-guard forms of expression and dissociated languages 
was one of the reasons why the revolutionary agenda was often restructured from week to 
week and, in some occasions, “le rivendicazioni del lunedì” were “diverse da quelle del 
martedì”112 (Monday’s claims were different from Tuesday’s). Because of such internal 
inconsistency, converting anti-humanistic metaphors - the divided ‘I’, the dissociated 
subject, the statelessness syndrome, the loss of identity, etc. - into a real psychosocial 
condition,113the new antagonistic subject could be neither comprehended nor defined by 
                                                 
112 Balestrini & Moroni (1988) p.609. 
113 Ibid. p.612. 
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any unitary type of narrative. Negri, being in charge of one of the militaristic cells, often 
expressed reservations regarding such an under-determined variety of tones: “The 
divergence has, as I stated earlier, invested strategic and tactical projects that tend to 
diverge. Is there a reason that this divergence should exist? In my opinion, it risks 
proving fatal for the entire movement.”114 
Was it because of his centralistic demeanor that Negri was looked at with skepticism 
in some areas of the movement? Was it due to Negri’s disregard for the kynical factors 
characterizing that historical phase that he was not fully able to represent the protest? It is 
reasonable to believe so. And paradoxically, Cacciari’s conjectures appear to depict the 
spirit of those years, at least in some respects, more faithfully than Negri’s did. It is not 
by coincidence that a few scholars around that time converged with such an intuition: 
“In modo ancora più esplicito, dietro queste pagine dell’autore, più che 
l’organizzazione marx-leninista dei lavoratori, ci pare di scorgere le linee 
operative di alcune frange delle attuali autonomie giovanili, cioè di quei 
giovanetti votati alla droga e alla galera che in questi mesi hanno insanguinato 
troppe piazza italiane, illudendosi così di accendere il moto liberatorio della 
rivoluzione. Sembra logico, infatti, che quando il linguaggio non ha più un 
significato oltre quello convenzionale della matematica e la vita non è che un 
rischio e una sete di potere in una insanabile conflittualità tragica, l’uomo non sia 
più un essere razionale e personale soggetto di inviolabili diritti e doveri, bensì un 
«brutum bestiale», e la società un’arena di violenza e di rapina tra i più forti e i 
più scaltri.”115  
 
 
(“Even more explicitly, behind these pages of the author (Cacciari) we seem to 
detect, rather than a Marxian-Leninist organization of the workers, the operative 
lines of some branches of the current youthful autonomies, meaning those kids 
oriented towards drugs and jail who, during these past months, have spilled blood 
around too many Italian squares, while believing to activate, in so doing, the 
liberating engine of the revolution. It seems logical, in fact, that when language no 
longer has a meaning, except for the conventional one of mathematics, and life is 
nothing but a risk and a thirst for power within an unsolvable tragic conflict, man 
is no longer a rational being nor a personal subject provided with inviolable rights 
                                                 
114 Negri (2005) p. 234. 
115 Poppi (1993), p. 155, English translation mine. 
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and duties, but is a ‘bestial brutum’, and society is an arena of violence and 
robbery among the strongest and most clever ones.”) 
 
It is mandatory to take distance from the excessively destructive tones characterizing 
this fragment, which the author partly rectifies at the end of the article and which 
certainly represent neither the essence of Cacciari’s philosophy nor the authentic 
spirit that brought to life the 1977 movement. And nonetheless, the association that 
this passage establishes between Krisis and the protest is not completely devoid of 
meaning. At the same time, if the commentator had differentiated over-determination 
from under-determination, he would have likely dismissed the concurrence between 
Cacciari’s text and those social phenomena, while also exposing their specular 
correspondence. Far from coinciding geometrically with the irrational and 
incongruent claims advanced by the movement, Cacciari’s Negative Thought 
represented nonetheless the effort to understand them and provide them with some 
sort of rational meaning. Predictably, a similar correlation can be partly detected 
between Krisis and the literature that the 1977 protest expressed. Let us examine 
Enrico Palandri116’s Boccalone (Big Mouth, 1977), a cult text considered to be 
representative of the movement, to see if it helps us acquire a better understanding of 
both Cacciari’s parrhesia and the essence of that historical moment. 
 
 
                                                 
116 Enrico Palandri is an Italian writer and translator. Having obtained a degree in dramaturgy from the University of 
Bologna, where he studied, among others, under Umberto Eco’s supervision, in 1977 he collaborated with Radio 
Alice in the editing of a book titled Fatti Nostri. His first novel, Boccalone, was also written during that period, and 
then published several times by Fachinelli, Feltrinelli and Bompiani. In 1980 Palandri moved to London, where he 
worked as a language instructor and journalist, ultimately obtaining a position as a Professor of Modern European 
Literature at the University College. His literary works, including Le pietre e il sale (1986), Le colpevoli ambiguità 
di Herbert Markus (1997), and I fratelli minori (2010), have been translated in different languages and 
acknowledged numerous awards.  
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2. 
As partly suggested by the title, referring to the protagonist’s loquacious personality, the 
novel conveys parrhesiatic messages.  
 Adopting a kynical type of literary language, Palandri draws the skeleton of an 
innovative antagonistic discourse. Neither the narrative structure nor the communicative 
expressions employed by the characters reveal dialectical purposes. This is evident 
because of several reasons. First, although the plot alludes to some of the main political 
events that occurred in 1977 - i.e. the explosion of the protest in Bologna during the 
spring, the students’ attempt to transform daily city life, the repression carried out by 
governmental tanks, the killing of a terrorist accomplished by the police in Rome - at the 
same time it does not follow a linear sequence of episodes. Disregarding the triadic 
conception of temporality that Marxian theories generally presuppose, the story unfolds 
as an irregular and divergent flow of existential reflections. Palandri sporadically hints at 
the surrounding political atmosphere but, quite strangely, mostly focuses on the romantic 
relationship that the protagonist has with a woman. At first reading such an emphasis on 
eroticism might appear as a symptom of social disengagement; in reality, it allows the 
author to express instinctive and unfiltered parrhesiatic feelings, which political 
narratives generally dismiss. Through the correlation between politics and love, which is 
generally overlooked, Palandri moves the reader’s attention toward the margins of 
ordinary political discourses, thus faithfully representing the voices expressed by the 
outsiders of the movement.  
Circling the theme of love, the narrative weaves the portrait of a rebellious demeanor 
which differs considerably from the one that had inspired the ’68 revolution. The clash 
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between erotic desires and working-routine, that Boccalone laments in several occasions, 
symbolizes not only a refusal of the bourgeois careerist values, but also a dismissal of the 
’68 ideal of the “re-appropriation of work”:  
 “la mia macchina dei desideri non è sincronizzata con la macchina del 
lavoro...inventerò me stesso... nel linguaggio che ancora ci appartiene, che non è 
quello dello scambio, il desiderio non conosce scambio ma solo il furto o il 
dono”117 
 
(“my machine of desires is not synchronized with the machine of work...I will 
create myself…in the language that still belongs to us, which is not a language of 
exchange, desire does not know exchange, but only theft or gift...”) 
 
Wearing the metaphorical masks of the thief and the vagabond118, Boccalone celebrates 
the revolutionary principle of the “refusal to work”, also pursuing Diogenes’ self-
exclusion from the social system. And nonetheless, despite Negri’s inflexible 
condemnation of “Nietzsche who went to Parliament”119, Palandri makes appeal to 
Zarathustra at the beginning of the story. Boccalone’s erotic attitude is mainly 
exemplified by the Nietzschean vision of “overflowing” (traboccamento), personifying a 
political demeanor that is never constrained within the scope of firm ideological theories, 
but rather overcomes all limitations:  
“il traboccamento è invece quando le zone in cui vi eravate riconosciuti si 
svuotano completamente, le categorie svaniscono come l’etere, in cui vi accorgete 
parlando di poter affermate le cose e il loro contrario ed anche altro che non 
c’entra ffatto, che tutto ha ugualmente sense, il che vale a dire più o meno che non 
ne ha nessuno.”120 
 
(“Overflowing happens when the zones with which you had identified become 
completely empty, categories disappear like ether, in which you realize, while 
speaking, that you can affirm things and their opposites, and even others that are 
                                                 
117 Palandri (2002), p.40, English translation mine. 
118 “...mi piace ancor meno lavorare, se mai dovrò scegliere un lavoro, farò l’accattone...”, Ibid. p. 70. 
119 The title of a text wherein Negri criticized vigorously Cacciari’s philosophy and political choices.   
120 Palandri (2002) pp.11-12. 
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not related to them at all, and it all makes sense anyways, which more or less 
means it makes no sense at all.”) 
 
As opposed to the rigid concepts endorsed by traditional leftist political groups and partly 
retrieved by Negri, Boccalone unleashes chaotic flowing words which are disorderly and 
scattered, following a plethora of different directions. As in Cacciari’s Krisis, a 
conception of language endorsing Nietzschean-Wittgensteinian themes defends the 
irreducibility of the negative vis-à-vis Marxian concepts and, at once, proclaims the rising 
of an innovative strategy of dissent:   
“non riuscire ad essere soggetti della propria esistenza porta spesso a sentirsi 
oggetti di un sistema più ampio, totale: dio, il marxismo, tutte le teologie, di 
questo mondo e anche dell’altro...”121  
 
(“Being unable to be subjects of one’s own existence often leads one to feel like 
an object of a larger, total system: God, Marxism, all theologies, of this world and 
the other...”) 
 
Boccalone’s rebellion discloses itself through short-term, impulsive and incongruous 
sentences, animating a narrative that discharges repeatedly its center and seeks proximity 
with the outer margins of human communication. Such a verbal antagonism unfolds with 
the support of several parrhesiatic moves breaking the rules of Italian codified language 
and melt colloquial expressions, impolite phrases and also foreign words – “quantorompi, 
maddaj, mavalà, affanculo marco!”122, “como pasa, muchacha? bien chéri, estò como un 
caco benigna!”123. Palandri’s main purpose is certainly the creation of a literary style that 
undermines professional conceptions of writing practices. The situationist lesson that was 
dear to the ’77 protesters, promoting the adoption of artistic languages that could never 
                                                 
121 Ibid. p.61.   
122 Ibid. pp.81-82. 
123 Ibid. p. 62. 
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be retrieved by bourgeois social groups, surfaces within Boccalone’s multicolored 
speeches, which lend themselves to be interpreted according to a plethora of divergent 
readings. Owing to this under-determined essence, Palandri’s narrative repeals all types 
of comprehensive labels and prevents itself from being potentially turned into a 
commercial product. In a society which has progressively become a “supermercato delle 
parole”124 (supermarket of words) wherein every speech materializes as a commodity 
only an extremely elastic literary discourse is able to defeat the detrimental logic of 
profit. It is probably why, in the initial acknowledgments, Palandri clarifies that “questo 
non è un romanzo e che io non sono uno scrittore”125 (“this is not a novel and that I am 
not a writer”). 
 Far from delivering pessimistic messages, Boccalone’s “krisis” of identity - “I am no 
longer who I used to be, I change repeatedly my face, I don’t know who I am 
anymore…”126 - reflects ‘from below’ Cacciari’s negativity, thus positing a multi-
centered type of antagonism. A lack of self-identification is in fact utilized by Palandri 
for sabotaging consumerist processes, which thrive by selling identities as pathological 
attachments to material objects. Boccalone’s confessions provide us with a metaphorical 
representation for some of the concerns that were expressed in the first chapter with 
regard to neo-humanistic theories. As opposed to Nussbaum’s ‘capability approach’, 
characterizing liberty through categories such as property, ownership and species-
belonging, Boccalone’s homelessness embodies a post-human subjectivity that pursues 
emancipation by dismissing every potential desire for self-classification and, in this way, 
counters effectively all forms of commodification. Palandri’s dispossession of wealth 
                                                 
124 Ibid. p.43. 
125 Ibid. Acknowledgments.  
126 “...non sono più lo stesso di una volta, cambio continuamente faccia, non so più chi sono...”Ibid. p.50. 
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epitomizes a spiritual disposition which deprives itself of all rigid definitions in order to 
successfully escape marketing dynamics: “Ho scritto solo su me stesso (anche se la 
differenza tra me e gli altri, l’identità, non so bene cosa sia e non me ne frega più un 
granché)”127 (“I have only written about myself, even though I don’t know what the 
difference between me and the others, the identity, is and I don’t care much about it…”) 
 As some have rightly argued, Palandri’s narrative ultimately exemplifies a transversal 
political struggle that disregards social and national barriers, and also has the capacity to 
alleviate the excessive sectorialization of the collective which is enabled within 
contemporary western systems.128 Cacciari’s ‘exiled’ verbal games find their 
countercultural alter-ego within Boccalone’s stateless condition, also mirroring the erratic 
pursuits the protagonist performs across both metropolitan dimensions and national 
borders. The way in which the narrative manages to deconstruct city areas by offering “a 
liquid and metamorphic representation of the urban space”129 - in Binetti’s words - 
reverberates within the transnational journeys through France, Spain, and Turkey that are 
recounted in the novel. These casual travels initiate the protagonist to a community of 
wanderers whose desire to evade urban and national control is exemplary of a 
revolutionary demeanor which converts cosmopolitan ideas into values of resistance. 
This resistance is devoid of dogmatic content because it is “not influenced, and therefore 
not limited, by the accomplishment of a programmed purpose”.130  
Despite Boccalone’s linguistic leaps, the ironic subtitle “a true story full of lies” 
reveals that this novel is not incompatible with values of truth. Cacciari’s negative 
                                                 
127 Ibid. p.140. 
128 See Righi (2011) p.131.  
129 “una rappresentazione liquida e metamorfica dello spazio urbano”, Binetti (2008) p. 68. 
130 “una potenzialità creativa e rivoluzionaria non condizionata, e per questo non limitata, dal raggiungimento di una 
finalità programmata” Ibid. p.69. 
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epistemology is partly preserved in Palandri’s text, which does not dismiss completely 
the possibility for language to adhere to the facts. The truth that is spoken by the 
protagonist, however, does not exhibit transcendental connotations; rather, it uncovers 
Boccalone’s daily experiences and under-determined perceptions, proving often 
contradictory and paradoxical. Boccalone speaks the “truth” in the sense that he speaks 
his own life, without filters or reservations.131 Spoken life and spoken truth conflate in the 
experience of the parrhesia as it used to be conceived of by the Greek Cynics; namely, as 
‘true life’. In place of abstract notions of truth, which are predominant in contemporary 
scientific theories and which Cacciari partially deconstructs in Krisis, Boccalone’s 
speeches portray truth kynically. Namely, as a genuine and brave self-exposure which the 
parrhesiast unleashes even at the risk of provoking embarrassment, discomfort, or 
conflict. 
What does the love for a woman have to do with all this? What role does Anna play 
in the economy of the novel? The purely passionate and unstable relationship that the 
protagonist has with Anna certainly reverberate within Boccalone’s purposeless voyages 
and the political attacks on the traditional institution of the “family” expressed by the ’77 
movement. Nevertheless, Anna is a very problematic character. She is described as an 
extremely sensual creature, but in most circumstances she is revealed as an ethereal 
shadow. The physical attractiveness and fiery attitude which Palandri ascribes to her 
collide with her translucent, almost intangible character. Anna’s impulsive personality 
elicits most of Boccalone’s existential and political considerations and empowers his 
parrhesiatic demeanor. And nonetheless, Anna is never given the chance to speak, 
                                                 
131 “Sono un chiacchierone, mi è difficile non parlare delle cose che ho in testa; la bocca è attaccata direttamente al 
cervello e amplifica i pensieri, anzi è un tutt’uno col cervello.” Palandri (2002), p. 23. 
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remaining in the background of the entire narrative. Does Cacciari’s mysticism reappear 
in Anna? Is Anna the experience of the edge, the sense of the limit, the entity that renders 
“the mystical worldly - and the worldly mystical” that was previously discussed? It is 
reasonable to believe so. Anna accompanies relentlessly the sayable but differs from it; 
Boccalone is inseparable from her but, at the same time, he can neither comprehend nor 
overcome her eccentricity. Their romance is just as frustrating as the language-mysticism 
relation that Cacciari posits in Krisis, because Boccalone’s verbal expressions presuppose 
in all cases a voiceless presence. This haunting specter is Anna, the closeness to the 
margins, immanent and spiritual at once.   
 
 
Multiculturalism, Self-Assertion, Self-Expression. 
 
 Let us pause for a moment and reflect. What do all these historical, sociological and 
literary considerations tell us about Cacciari’s negative thought? It will become more 
evident once we have briefly summarized what we have discovered thus far.  
 According to Krisis, the progressive collapse of humanistic ideologies presumably 
gave birth to a negative thinking disclosing itself as a perpetual conflict. This type of 
negativity revealed itself first through Schopenhauer’s asceticism, and finally in the 
mysticism of the ‘second Wittgenstein’, conceiving of language not as a mirror of the 
world but as a series of verbal games opposing one another. Nonetheless, Cacciari’s 
antagonistic mysticism can be described neither as an endorsement of religious tones, nor 
entirely as the “revolution from above” that was theorized by the Eurocommunistic 
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doctrines. Our historical, sociological, and literary analysis of the 1977 protest brought to 
light a plethora of correspondences between Krisis thought and the movement. The 
‘mystical’ that is at stake here should be considered in correlation to both the parrhesiatic 
atmosphere characterizing that time and a kynical notion of truth.  
 Far from endorsing anti-foundational views, Cacciari nevertheless dismisses 
transcendental accounts of human knowledge, while describing truth in terms of 
authenticity and genuine life experience. Mirroring a reality that is contradictory by 
essence, truth can be asserted but it remains in all circumstances inconsistent. From this 
stance, moral principles, cultural practices, and collective identities, depending upon 
specific historical events and processes, cannot be labeled as merely arbitrary. However, 
because they are ultimately rooted within an ontologically incoherent substratum, they 
materialize and acquire self-awareness by referring at all times to their conceptual 
opposites.  It is in this sense that Krisis Thought, stepping out of the scope circumscribed 
by western modernity, cannot be considered as fully post-modern. 
Predictably, in Geofilosofia dell’Europa (1994) Cacciari indicates the parrhesia as 
the discursive space where Europe’s philosophical and spiritual souls conflate: 
“La parresía è l’elemento che il Greco avverte come ciò che massimamente lo 
distingue dal barbaro. L’esule soffre della perdita della parresía come della 
mancanza del bene più grande (Euripide, Fenicie, 391). Inutile ricordare che il 
valore della parresía svolgerà un ruolo decisivo nell’Annuncio neo-testamentario. 
E dunque entrambe le componenti della cultura europea vi trovano 
fondamento.”132 
 
(“The parrhesia is the element that the Greek conceives of as what maximally 
distinguishes him from the barbarian. The exiled person suffers the loss of the 
parrhesia, as of the greatest good. (Euripides, Fenicie, 391). It is unnecessary to 
remind the reader that the value of the parrhesia will recover a crucial role in the 
neo-testamentary announcement. And therefore both the components of the 
European culture find in it their own foundation.”) 
                                                 
132 Cacciari (1994) p.21, English translation mine. 
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The reference to Christian tradition suggests that Cacciari’s parrhesia cannot merely 
coincide with the ‘right to speak’ which had been granted within the context of the 
democratic poleis. In the Judaic doctrinal context the parrhesia was essentially 
synonymous with the courage to speak in front of God’s authority, thus recalling the 
insubordinate ‘true life’ that the Cynics posited during the Hellenistic epoch.133 This 
kynical reading is furthermore validated by numerous metaphors, symbolizing a 
rebellious usage of language, which Cacciari borrows from Judaic literature. In Giobbe 
nella cultura contemporanea (Job in Contemporary culture, 1989), for instance, Cacciari 
recounts the birth of Western Theology, which allegedly came to being when Job 
screamed before God’s muteness and questioned his normative power.134 A similar 
allegory can be found in Icone della Legge (Icons of the Law, 1985), wherein Aaron’s 
parrhesiatic attitude opposes Moses’ mystical impassibility. Their conflicting 
brotherhood is, in turn, interpreted as the impolitical origin of the European identity, 
whose primordial character is portrayed as stateless and nomadic.  
Geo-philosophy of Europe (1994) and The Archipelago (1995) openly exhibit the 
repercussions that Cacciari’s ontology and epistemology bring to the political domain. 
According to these texts, the European peoples will be able to manage their destiny only 
by bringing to the surface their reciprocal tensions, thus recovering the “mystical 
absence” that characterized their birth. Parrhesiatic strategies, stressing the contrastive 
                                                 
133God is conceived by archaic Judaism as a despot who recognizes freedom of speech exclusively to good men. 
Consequently, the lack of parrhesia would presuppose bad conscience. Similarly, in the New Testament the 
parrhesia mostly signified virtue, courage and self-confidence: in John’s Gospel it is associated to Jesus’s public 
speeches, whereas in Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians it denotes the faith and confidence delivered by God to 
his believers, see Scarpat (2001) Chapter 2. 
134 Cantarano (1998) p. 332. 
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component of communication, are ideal for this purpose because they highlight moral and 
political incompatibilities between different belief systems. The Nietzschean metaphor of 
the ‘overflowing’ is in turn recovered by the late Cacciari for representing a European 
community that brings to light and encompasses a diversity of communication codes as a 
means to achieve a condition of unsupported stability. The allegory that Cacciari utilizes 
is the image of the archipelago, an ensemble of islands which fluctuate and from time to 
time collide, holding the continent on a shaky type of balance. For Cacciari, a true 
harmony between different European cultures and also between western, eastern and 
southern universes cannot be obtained by undermining the cultural peculiarities that 
characterize groups and communities. The European spirit, on the contrary, will be able 
to thrive only if it acknowledges its internal “coincidence of the opposites”; this offers the 
conceptual seeds for the emergence of a polycentric social model that could be 
potentially recovered in other parts of the world. The term kosmos, for Cacciari, precisely 
denotes such a harmony of the divergences, which are not inclined to merge with one 
another but to find their balance within their reciprocal incompatibility: “Kosmos, a 
pithagoric word: harmony of the different, which Harmony produces…”135.  
Whether Cacciari’s philosophical theory is exhaustive or compatible with the post-
human cosmopolitan discourse developed here is something to ponder considering the 
concerns that have been addressed within the previous chapter. Cacciari’s effort to posit a 
non ideological form of “negativity” that reevaluates the importance of the kynical 
singularity vis-à-vis universalistic systems of thought is significant. One should also 
appreciate Cacciari’s innovative critique of modernity, as well as his attempt to promote 
cultural pluralism without the assistance of the values of ‘inclusion’ that were formerly 
                                                 
135 Cacciari (1994) p.138. 
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criticized. Through a series of conceptual rearrangements, describing human 
communication as a de-centralized and fragmented dynamic, Cacciari provides us with 
useful tools for enhancing both critical thought and social diversity.   
What is problematic is the way in which Krisis Thought conceives of ‘conflict’. 
While dissention per se is an indispensable resource for our cosmopolitan theory, which 
encompasses antagonistic components – i.e. cosmopolitanism as a repugnance that the 
“plebeian” expresses regarding idealistic belief systems, as Sloterdijk would put it -, at 
the same time Cacciari conceives of conflict as an ‘end’ and not as an ‘instrument’. For 
Cacciari, ‘conflict’ is not eradicable in any ways from human life, because it constitutes 
the ontological core of the reality, thus representing the beginning and the conclusion of 
all human actions. This ontology of the opposition leads him to ground his notion of the 
‘political’ on the Schmittian friend-foe dialectic, according to which social relations 
presuppose structurally polemic dynamics. Cacciari’s notion of ‘truth’ is polycentric and 
diversified but, at the same time, generates the foundations for a social scenario wherein 
discursive positions prove irreconcilable with one another due to some essential 
incompatibilities. In so doing, Negative Thought promotes cultural variety but risks 
prioritizing values of ‘preservation’ over ideas of ‘transformation’, also condoning the 
chance for conflict to shift from the domain of language to the sphere of practice. This 
cannot be endorsed by a radical cosmopolitan theory. Such aporia depends upon two 
interconnected factors: 1) the logical confusion between the ‘contrary’ and the 
‘contradictory’; 2) the misconception of the parrhesia as self-assertion rather than as self-
expression. I will digress on these two points before moving forward. 
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I owe to Giovanni Catapano the attentiveness on a logical imprecision that Cacciari 
neglects and that prevents his theory from fully reaching its purposes. I am referring to 
the confusion between ‘logical contradictions’ and ‘real contradictions’.136 Cacciari 
develops an ontological model that admits contradictions of the form A & non-A as 
postulates, so as to obtain a political theory promoting social diversity. However, he 
forgets that not all differences are contradictions and that, as a matter of fact, most of 
them do not logically oppose one another. In so doing, he mistakes the ‘contrary’ - 
denoting a ‘real contradiction’ of the form black & white - for the ‘contradictory’ - which 
can be exemplified by the ‘logical contradiction’ of the form black & non-black. Such a 
misunderstanding is not new in the history of philosophy; Trendelemburg notoriously 
identified this misunderstanding within the Hegelian system and, more recently, Laclau 
and Mouffe made appeal to it in order to develop an efficient form of socialist 
antagonism137. 
Catapano’s observation that a reasonable multiculturalism does not need to be 
grounded on ontological contradictions is acceptable.138 However, Catapano would likely 
modify Cacciari’s discourse in order to make it compatible with the principle of the 
“excluded middle” and to re-inscribe it within the domain of modernity. Differently, the 
view defended here rather leans toward the post-modern perspective insisting on the 
intermediate area that rests between A and non-A. Kynical cosmopolitanism, that is, 
prioritizes the Nietzschean dimension wherein ‘facts’ subtly overflow within the  domain 
of the ‘interpretations’, and where ‘real contradictions’ - i.e. differences, diversities, 
antagonisms, which crash in some circumstances but are not necessarily incompatible 
                                                 
136 Catapano (2003), p.494. 
137 See Laclau and Mouffe (1985). 
138 Catapano (2003), p.494. 
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from the logical viewpoint - come to the foreground. A few examples in this regard might 
assist us in making these considerations more tangible.   
In recent times one often hears politicians, journalists and media commentators 
talking about a collision between civilizations, particularly referring to Christianity and 
Islam, whose principles and moral precepts allegedly circumscribe two incompatible 
ideological universes.  As a matter of fact, in numerous circumstances the welcoming of 
Muslim rituals within western societies incurred serious difficulties, also generating 
tension and violence.  Take for instance the tradition of the hijab which in several Muslim 
cultures girls and women are taught since a very young age to wear whenever they appear 
in public. In Italy a considerable attention has been recently paid to the case of Fatima, a 
14 year old Bangladeshi girl living in Bologna, who refused to comply with such a 
practice and, as a result, was forced to shave her head by her parents. It is impossible to 
understand or justify in any way the horrifying conclusion of this episode, which 
ultimately led Fatima to talk to her teachers and then to ask for the protection of Italian 
institutions.  
And nonetheless, why should one look any differently at the hypothetical 
circumstance of western parents authoritatively and violently prohibiting their daughter 
from wearing a miniskirt or from putting on some make-up. Conflict and tension 
notoriously occur in many families due to generational differences, and this is likely more 
recurrent when people live abroad.  For example, second generation American teenagers 
of Italian, French or Spanish origins often refuse to speak their parents’ language because 
of the fear to be socially ostracized, and consequently establish conflictual relationships 
with their relatives. If it is true that there is an incompatibility between civilizations, we 
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would also have to acknowledge the likely incongruity between different familial 
generations. 
To some observers the case of Fatima may appear to be different, because it reveals 
the supposed irresolvable mismatch separating a religiously oriented mentality from a 
society which for centuries has grounded itself on secularizing values. Nonetheless, this 
perspective could be countered by acknowledging Italian rural areas wherein catholic 
values are still perceived very intensively and, unsurprisingly, head handkerchiefs are 
even now common among older women. This observation aims to remind the reader of 
two facts. First, the secularization process has hardly come to end within numerous 
western areas. Second, many women around the world might choose to wear what 
apparently looks like a religious dress not necessarily due to moral or spiritual 
convictions, but simply because it fulfills psychological or physical needs. An illustrative 
example is the case of the burkini139. Most recently, several French municipalities have 
banned the burkini as unhygienic and “incompatible” with their secular tradition. 
Ironically, a high percentage of non-muslim women purchase it because they believe it is 
more “compatible” with their bodies. 
These examples are even more significant if we take into account Appiah’s 
cosmopolitan theory, which postulates that individuals rarely embrace new behavioral 
practices based on the acceptance of specific ethical principles. The reference that Appiah 
makes to the foot binding custom that was practiced in China for thousands of years and 
quickly disappeared during the first part of the 20th century is noteworthy.140 The first 
campaign for the abolition of this tradition was in the 1910s and 1920s, which relied on 
                                                 
139 Combining the terms burqa and bikini, it denotes a bathing suit which covers the whole body except for the face, 
hands and feet. 
140 Appiah (2006), p.75. 
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health justifications, showing damages and inconveniences of bound feet. Quite 
paradoxically, this campaign was less efficient than the following, which made an appeal 
to the fact that foot binding was not common in any other country in the world. At that 
point people began to see bound feet as a symbol of ugliness, and as a result the practice 
faded away. This example shows how people do not always ground their habits and 
rituals on spiritual reasons, because their pragmatic adaptation instincts often prove to be 
more powerful. Therefore, discursive frictions and tensions, though indispensable for 
people to evolve and survive, do not necessarily conceal the structural incompatibility 
that Cacciari’s bivalent ontology takes for granted.  
This aporia affects the way in which Cacciari conceives of the parrhesia. Converting 
the friend-foe relation into both an ontological principle and the essence of politics - as 
Habermas would say - leads one to define the bounds of the ‘political’ by positing “the 
self-assertion of one collective identity against another”141. This appears to be the way in 
which Cacciari characterizes his language-positions. Each relies on principles that are 
stable and consistent throughout the entire course of a hypothetical communicative 
intervention. Cacciari, that is, conceives of parrhesia mostly as self-assertion, presuming 
that verbal considerations are directed exclusively outward and never put the speaker’s 
ideological background to the test. On the contrary, the authentic parrhesia involves a 
self-questioning component that the Cynics, partially drawing their views from the 
Platonic tradition, strongly emphasized. The kynical ‘true life’ was meant to impinge on 
the social consciousness not only by denouncing inequalities and injustices, but also 
through self-critical messages that the parrhesiast conveyed with his speeches. In so 
doing, the speaker’s soul would undergo a transformative process which would 
                                                 
141 Quoted by Borradori (2003), p.53. 
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subsequently prove beneficial for the entire community. It is no accident that the Socratic 
teaching ‘I know that I know nothing’ was maintained as an ethical point of reference by 
Diogenes and his disciples. 142 Following the Socratic example, kynical parrhesiasts aim 
at emancipating other consciousnesses as much as they strive to liberate themselves from 
prejudices and beliefs that they had until the moment of the speech. From this 
perspective, ‘truth’ cannot be conceived as an act of preservation, as it appears to be in 
Cacciari’s discourse, but needs to be posited as a form of release, a dispossession of 
thought. The experience of the parrhesia turns then into an act of self-expression, leading 
the speaker to achieve the highest level of freedom; that is, the removal of one’s own 
preconceptions.  
When Habermas characterizes moral cosmopolitan principles in terms of the 
combination between “potential for self-criticism” and “power for self-
transformation”143, his theory of communicative action appears to be in agreement with 
these parrhesiatic connotations. Nonetheless, the view endorsed here rests in between 
Habermas’s unfinished modernity, conceiving of conflict as a communicative mistake 
that needs to be rectified144, and Cacciari’s alternative modernity, which de-centralizes 
western ‘reason’ by positing a plethora of conflicting rationalities. However antagonistic 
it may be, cosmopolitan thinking is in any case a longing for emancipation and 
awareness; as such, it should be grounded completely neither on social compliance nor on 
conflict, but rather on the intermediate space dividing the two. The Kynical perspective 
acknowledges the necessity of a preliminary amount of tension for accomplishing self-
                                                 
142 These topics have also been discussed meticulously by Foucault, to whom Cynic philosophy was extremely dear, 
see Flynn (1988) p. 106. 
143 Borradori (2003), p. 50. 
144 Ibid. p.63. 
109 
 
liberation, while also confining conflict to the oral level. The exiled life-space from 
which the kynical spirit observes the reality provides one with the capability to accept 
communicative frictions and also with the desire to comprehend the other’s viewpoint, in 
order to ultimately reconcile with the harmonious geometry of the kosmos. Kynical 
isolation represents then the area of exception, a micro-universe wherein the reasons of 
the individual and the reasons of the community are suspended and repeatedly questioned 
so as to facilitate mutual understanding. Verbal collisions are, therefore, welcomed 
exclusively with the purpose to enhance reciprocal consideration, also presuming that 
once this is obtained, tensions significantly decrease.  
Despite these limitations, Krisis Thought represents the first visible step that Italian 
Theory took toward the acquisition of the kynical view. Therefore, it is essential for 
understanding the subsequent evolution of the Italian philosophical ideas and also for our 
post-human cosmopolitan purposes.  
 
 
Diatribe    
 
Mediterranean Cynicism  
 
1. 
The transition between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s led Italian 
Thought to rectify, at least in part, Cacciari’s philosophical discourse through the 
acquisition of new conceptual tools. This decade has been mostly influenced by Gianni 
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Vattimo’s Weak Thought, which has received a fair amount of both approval and 
criticism. As I anticipated in the beginning of this chapter, some of the most aggressive 
attacks on this mode of thinking are moved by Antonio Negri, who in several 
circumstances labeled it as a sterile attempt to combine French post-structuralism and 
Heideggerianism. Negri believes that Weak Thought betrayed the revolutionary spirit that 
had animated the 1970s, while giving way to a submissive line of thinking that is capable 
to confront neither neo-liberal nor conservative political forces. For similar reasons, 
Michael Hardt also underestimates Vattimo’s philosophical discourse by labeling 1980s 
Italian post-modernism as some sort of “poisonous culture”145. These evaluations, mostly 
elaborated from a strictly Marxian perspective, are not willing to admit that the relevant 
historical and sociological shifts which occurred at the end of the 1970s required 
dissenting voices to switch drastically their vocal tones.  
 Hardt is certainly aware that, in the beginning of the 1980s, collective modes of 
disagreement experienced difficulties not only due to the excessive repression of all 
forms of protest carried out by the Italian State, but also because of the progressive fading 
of Fordism. This phenomenon brought about a significant crisis within the working class, 
thus depriving leftist ideas of their material substrate. The corresponding state of 
emergence that both the Italian Communist Party and the Labor Unions underwent, 
moreover, aggravated a social scenario wherein communitarian forms of political 
participation were already suffering the increasing pressure exercised by consumerist 
values. At that point, the institution of the ‘family’ remained as the one and only ‘body’ 
wherein some sort of opposition could be carried out with respect to the relentless neo-
liberal invasion.  
                                                 
145 Hardt & Virno (1996), p.7. 
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 It needs to be said that the modest successes obtained by capitalism in Italy, wherein 
it was never able to fully validate Marx’s prediction concerning the concentration of 
wealth in fewer and fewer hands, is mostly due to the familial components that 
distinguish the Italian economy. The proliferation of widespread small entrepreneurship 
and family oriented companies, in fact, “allowed some real sense of agency to spread far 
down into the nation’s economic activity”146, preventing the logic of profit from 
completely taking over Italian life. Such a familial resistance, which anthropological 
accounts identify as distinctive of several Mediterranean cultures147, partially endorsed 
kynical values of frugality and self-sufficiency, while in some circumstances also 
supporting the amoral “cynical” individualism which western capitalism was 
disseminating. What is surfacing here is an ambiguous and dual type of cynicism which, 
in some circumstances, aligned with the capitalistic accumulation of individual wealth, 
while in some others opposed it by taking the shape of a bottom-up form of resistance. 
Debatably, a few cultures appear to be located in a closer proximity than Italy was - and 
still is - to the line that Peter Sloterdijk draws between contemporary cynicism, 
manifesting itself as pursuit of self-interest, moral carelessness and political resignation, 
and the virtuous kynicism that has been described thus far.  
 The indistinctness between these two modes of thinking reverberates within the 
borderline Mediterranean position that Italy occupies and that became more critical 
during the 1980s. At this time the Italian people began to look at northern countries such 
as France, Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, or west at the Iberian Peninsula, with the 
same attention and interest that they paid with respect to the Balkans, the Middle East, 
                                                 
146 Ginsborg (2001), p. 29. 
147 On this subject, see the fascinating account provided by Bouchard and Ferme (2013), chapter 1. 
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and south to Africa.148 This partly explains why, even though Italy was entering the realm 
of major economic powers, within the scope of the emerging European Union it 
performed from the beginning a very “erratic” role149. Despite the willingness to devolve 
part of its sovereign power to supranational institutions, Italy’s contribution to continental 
discussions was minimal, almost evanescent. Also, dispositions such as the 1987 Fabbri 
Law, which sets up a department for implementing European policies, and the 1989 La 
Pergola law, regulating both the translation and approval of all European amendments,  
were never incorporated properly within the Italian bureaucratic procedures. As a result, 
Italy had the opportunity to affect European decisions but, with respect to them, behaved 
always very anarchically. 
 Italian politicians engaged just as vaguely with the conflicting relationship that was 
slowly surfacing between western and eastern worlds, whose reciprocal collisions 
emerged more visibly during the 1980s. Although since World War II Italy had always 
been a faithful ally of the United States, between 1983 and 1985 the Italian government 
“took distance from Israel, sought to work with the moderate Arab countries (Egypt, 
Jordan, and Tunisia), and tried to build bridges with Yassar Arafat’s PLO”150, thus 
exhibiting openness with respect to eastern influences.  
 
2. 
 For all these reasons, a reliable account of contemporary Italian Thought needs to 
take into consideration the borderline space that Italy progressively came to occupy with 
                                                 
148 “The mediterraneità of Italy was to become ever more important during the last decades of the 20 th century”, 
Ginsborg (2001) p.235. 
149 Ibid.  p. 239. 
150 Ibid. p. 236. 
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respect to the western geopolitical landscape during the last 4 decades. Furthermore, if it 
is true that in Italy “it is not the state or any organization in society which provides 
examples for the family, but the family which provides metaphors and role models for the 
state”151, than it is reasonable to characterize such a marginal condition through the 
circular dialectic cynicism-kynicism that was previously mentioned in reference to Italian 
familism. Neither northern nor entirely southern, neither western nor eastern, 
contemporary Italy is cosmopolitan in the narrowly kynical sense. That is, because it is 
incapable to fit in any well-defined geopolitical domain.  
 Within the 1980s historical scenario, governmental repression and consumerist 
incursion played a major role, whereas international borders were seeking a new 
configuration. Considering this background, it is no accident that dissension began to be 
expressed with literary tools which were even more ascetic, more nihilistic, and in some 
respects more cosmo-political than the ones employed in previous years. After all, the 
scholars of Hellenism, which is considered here as a historical paradigm of reference, 
reveal that kynical thought disposes of an argumentative tactic that is less explicit, more 
subtle, and in this type of circumstances more convenient than the parrhesia. 
 We know from Kustas that Hellenistic diatribe was appreciated by both rhetoricians 
and philosophers precisely because of its versatility. As opposed to the parrhesia, 
strongly insisting on antithesis and contradictions, diatribe conveyed indignation by 
generating a “meeting ground or focus”152 for the polarizations that had in previous times 
characterized classical Greek Thought. The Cynics were rarely provided with democratic 
rights to speak in public meetings, and so they often needed to engage in conversations 
                                                 
151 Ibid. p. xiii. 
152 Kustas (1976) p.3. 
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by means of strategies that would not respect ordinary dialogic rules. Diatribe was ideal 
in this regard because it aroused ethical concerns through a disruptive rhetorical fusion of 
logical arguments and emotional elements. Spontaneity and hybridization are the main 
factors qualifying this discursive genre, which employs “abrupt and pungent diction, 
dramatic expressions of puzzlement”153, as well as sharp irony, hostile silence and even 
noise in order to deliver feelings of righteous annoyance.  Thanks to its hybrid essence, 
diatribe functions by unpredictability and naturalness, thus escaping all possible 
definitions and allowing ostracized individuals to sabotage and mimetically creep into 
exclusionary dialogic spaces.154 For this reason, it was often adopted by the dog-
philosophers who, as “street speakers”, used it to break in political discussions from their 
exiled life-space.155 
 In this section, I will take into account the diatribic elements that characterize the 
Italian 1980s, showing how the debate that Cacciari established with Vattimo can be 
better understood when considering the dialectic parrhesia-diatribe. I will also explain 
that through this conceptual dichotomy Italian Thought set up a cosmo-political rhetoric 
involving counter-hegemonic significances. For these purposes, it will be crucial to focus 
on the cultural production that came to light in 1983, when some of the philosophical 
conclusions that Peter Sloterdijk reached with the Critique of Cynical Reason (1983) 
reverberated in Vattimo’s Weak Thought (1983) and Italo Calvino’s narrative.  
 
 
 
                                                 
153 Ibid. pp. 38-39. 
154 See Kennedy (1999) p. 41. 
155 Ibid. pp.40-41. 
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Impurity as Mimesis: Resistance in the Post-modern world.   
 
1. 
Fundamental, in Gianni Vattimo’s post-human discourse, is again the philosophy of 
Nietzsche.  
 Nevertheless, while Cacciari mostly borrows from Nietzsche the impolitical 
philosophical perspective, Vattimo’s analysis moves from the Marcusian approach 
prioritizing the artistic essence that the “will to power” theory embodies. This 
observation, for which I am indebted to Giuseppe Cantarano156, is accurate but would 
remain incomplete without acknowledging the Heideggerrian components qualifying 
Vattimo’s post-1980 reading of Nietzsche. For Vattimo, it is true that the crisis of 
humanism is essentially an outcome of the ‘Death of God’, leading ‘man’ to roll from the 
ontological center to the tangential space ‘X’ wherein all ordinary values and beliefs need 
to be reformulated creatively.  However, it is also true that such a loss of centrality 
discloses itself by means of the de-humanizing phenomena that Heidegger detected 
within the 20th century society of technology and rationalization of labor. Following 
Heidegger, in The End of Modernity (1985) Vattimo conceives of contemporary 
capitalism, technology, and science not as contrasting humanism, but rather as what 
reveals its inner essence and, at the same time, leads it to a final dissolution:  
“Technology is a threat to metaphysics and to humanism in appearance alone, for 
it is in the very nature of technology that the defining traits of metaphysics and 
humanism – which both had previously kept hidden from view – should be 
brought into the open.157  
 
                                                 
156 Cantarano (1998), p. 226.  
157 Vattimo (1988), p. 40. 
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 Similar to Heidegger, Vattimo also indicated a nihilistic path in order to recover 
balance once all metaphysical platforms collapsed and ‘Being’ revealed its substantial 
historicity. Heidegger’s historical ‘Being in the world’ is also a ‘Being toward death’; 
that is, a life experience whose authenticity is measured according to the capacity to 
engage with one’s own potential annihilation. Likewise, Vattimo conceives of nihilistic 
modes of thinking as the key for exiting the space of modernity without a scratch.  
 It is nonetheless crucial to distinguish passive nihilism from active nihilism. The 
former looks at both the late-modern “crisis of reason” and fall of ultimate foundations as 
dramatic events that need to be redirected through acts of metaphysical substitution or re-
appropriation. Whether it materializes as a Marxian effort to liberate social relations from 
exchange-value, or discloses itself through the critique of mass culture elaborated by the 
Frankfurt School, in all circumstances passive nihilism presupposes the conviction that 
western metaphysical discourses should be replaced with more authentic “truths”. For 
Vattimo, such an attitude ultimately degenerates in forms of nostalgic pessimism, 
political resignation, and even violence. It is reasonable to infer that Cacciari’s 
alternative modernity, replacing humanistic reason with a multiplicity of surrogates, 
would be categorized by Vattimo as passive nihilism.  
 Active nihilists, on the contrary, are able to turn the fall of the ideologies and the de-
essentialization of the world into an opportunity for self-liberation. For this ambitious 
purpose, it is necessary to undermine the spirit of modernity by positing a weak form of 
subjectivity which would substitute rigid conceptions of knowledge with more flexible 
and symbolic representations. Accordingly, truth can no longer be placed within the 
domain of metaphysics, but needs to be relocated on the border that philosophy shares 
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with rhetoric and art. Vattimo believes that knowledge should be grounded neither on 
transcendental nor on logical foundations; its nature is essentially hermeneutical and, as 
such, dependent upon the wide variety of historical-cultural conditions which each 
experience presupposes. In all circumstances, truth comes to sight from an impure 
horizon of meanings, because verifications and evaluations are always formulated within 
“the space of freedom both of interpersonal relations and of the relations between 
cultures and generations. In this space no one ever starts from scratch but always from a 
faith, a belonging-to or a bond.”158 Epistemic statements do not materialize out of an 
objectivity towards which minds spontaneously converge; rather, they can be constructed 
exclusively as outcomes of successful dialogic interactions: “…truth is born in agreement 
and from agreement, and not vice versa, that we will reach agreement only when we have 
all discovered the same objective truth.”159In place of Massimo Cacciari’s archipelago of 
multiple rationalities, Vattimo deconstructs Euro-humanism by positing a weak truth that 
unfolds by ‘contamination’ and ‘hybridization’, leading the Heideggerrian ‘Being’ to an 
ultimate twilight. 
 Although Weak Thought is examined within a wide critical literature, scholars have 
never emphasized the diatribic factors it characterizes. What I am suggesting here is to 
evaluate Vattimo’s discourse as a cosmo-political tactic of resistance exhibiting the 
following diatribic elements: a) the conception of ‘hybridization’ and ‘contamination’ as 
mimesis; b) the dual role that is played by ‘irony’ and ‘silence’, which serve both as 
counter-hegemonic tools and multicultural discursive strategies. Point a) will be 
                                                 
158 Gianni Vattimo, Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought, in Vattimo and Rovatti ed. by (2012) p.50. 
159 Vattimo (2009),  Nihilism as Emancipation, in Chiesa and Toscano (2009), p.32. 
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discussed within the remaining part of this section, whereas point b) will be addressed in 
the section titled Democracy and Cosmopolitanism: a Diatribic Perspective .   
  In support of our general thesis, characterizing Weak Thought as a diatribic 
philosophical discourse, it should first be noted that the dichotomy passive-active 
nihilism posited by Vattimo appears to be in line with the couplet cynicism-kynicism 
earlier discussed in reference to the 1980s Italian society, and which Sloterdijk also 
articulates in his Critique.  For Vattimo, the nostalgic grief that is a leitmotif among 
passive nihilists ultimately facilitates the proliferation of the cynical phenomena that are 
recurrent within contemporary western environments. In these settings, existential and 
political pessimism often turn into materialism, opportunism and individualistic greed.  
Such a perspective partly resounds within the way in which Sloterdijk describes neo-
cynicism, which he diagnoses as a form of “enlightened false consciousness”. This notion 
essentially indicates a series of critical discourses formulated through disenchanted tones, 
which ultimately prove ‘ideological’ because they dismiss the hilarious and satirical 
weapons that effective emancipating modes of thinking have always employed 
throughout human history: “The characteristic odor of modern cynicism is of a more 
fundamental nature – a constitution of consciousness afflicted with enlightenment that, 
having learned from historical experience, refuses cheap optimism…In the new cynicism, 
a detached negativity come through that scarcely allows itself any hope…”160 It is not by 
coincidence that both Vattimo and Sloterdijk’s main targets are the Frankfurt School and 
in particular Adorno, whose philosophy is described in the Critique as the most 
exemplary conceptualization of neo-cynicism. 
                                                 
160 Sloterdijk (1988), p. 6. 
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 On the other hand, the diatribic significances that Vattimo’s active nihilism involves 
are evident. Dismissing the primacy of science and reevaluating art and rhetoric for the 
construction of knowledge, Vattimo provides disciplines which had always been 
excluded from the domain of truth with the opportunity to speak. In this way, weak 
thought wages war against all sorts of “totalitarian” philosophical discourses and 
comprehensive theories, while also “pissing against the idealistic wind”, as Sloterdijk 
would tastelessly put it. After all, nothing could feel more intolerable for an orthodox 
idealist than a viewpoint that considers art - which Plato had condemned as deceitful and 
the Hegelian system labeled as a secondary form of knowledge - as a genuine way to 
describe the reality. By way of the impurities defended by Vattimo, philosophy takes off 
its rationalistic attire exhibiting shamelessly its contaminated body, allowing emotions 
and instincts to infiltrate theoretical discourses and providing social outsiders with a 
voice. 
 An objection could claim that some of these characteristics can be ascribed to 
Vattimo’s philosophy as well as to Post-Modernism in general. In fact, around the same 
time both French Post-structuralism and American Neo-Pragmatism aroused similar 
concerns with regard to the possibility for human reason to define truth in universal 
terms, also calling for interdisciplinary constructions of knowledge. And nonetheless, 
Vattimo’s hermeneutics pursues philosophical intentions which are less theoretical and 
more critical than the ones that are chased by the aforementioned schools of thought. For 
instance, Vattimo acknowledges the considerable debt that Weak Thought owes to 
Richard Rorty’s reflections on the limits of knowledge. At the same time, he believes that 
Rorty’s attempt to replace transcendental doctrines with forms of cultural anthropology 
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would not successfully undermine the humanistic features that qualify western scientific 
discourses.161  
 Correspondingly, Vattimo appreciates the Post-Structuralist effort to overcome Euro-
centric perspectives. However, he also observes that such a move might ultimately 
celebrate the very values of ‘progress’ and ‘innovation’ which modernity has embodied 
for centuries. This is the reason why both Foucault’s microphysics of power and 
Deleuze’s rhizomes are labeled as still too nostalgic of metaphysics162, while Derrida’s 
deconstruction is dismissed as a pure “free play, or the desire for discovering – in 
continuation – new semantic horizons”163. What is needed for Vattimo is not an 
innovative philosophical discourse, but rather a kynical critique of the ones formulated 
thus far. This mistrustful demeanor brings to light the diatribic inner essence that Weak 
Thought personifies. 
 
2. 
 The mimetic connotations that qualify Vattimo’s diatribe will surface more visibly if 
one examines the strategy that Weak Thought employs for undermining the philosophical 
inconveniences on which both French and American post-modern approaches lose their 
footing. The solution is for Vattimo to conceive of post-modernity not as an 
‘overcoming’ but as a Verwindung of modernity.  
 This Heideggerrian term, denoting a plurality of different meanings - “to recover 
from an illness, to resign oneself to something, or to accept (another’s judgement)”164 – 
                                                 
161 See Vattimo (1988), chapter 9.  
162 Vattimo and Rovatti ed.by (1983), p.9. 
163 Borradori (1989), p. 5. 
164 Vattimo (1988), p.39. 
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stands for an attempt to rethink western history by acknowledging the errors and illusions 
that it conveyed, without necessarily ignoring the messages and values that the European 
people inherited. Following the historicist trail that Italian philosophy opened with 
Gianbattista Vico165, Vattimo’s project aims at recombining in different manners the 
narratives that western thought perpetuated, so as to alleviate the ‘humanistic malady’ 
diagnosed by Nietzsche, ultimately leading modernity to self-dissolution.  In so doing, 
Vattimo’s Verwindung gives birth to a series of hybridized and contaminated forms of 
thinking which remodel the western tradition, while also predisposing it for absorbing 
external influences:  
“To identify the new with the other, as for instance with another culture - whether 
that of another civilization or of a different language-game, or that of a virtual 
world contained in those traces of our tradition which never became dominant -
…It means accompanying being along on its twilight journey and preparing for a 
postmetaphysical world.”166 
 
Let us grapple with this passage for a while. What should one infer from the 
identification between the ‘new’ and the ‘other’? Is the ‘new’ what was always before our 
eyes, but for some reasons we were not able to see? If not, in what sense can a creative 
effort engage with cultural inheritances and historical legacies, which are firmly rooted in 
the past? Is the ultra-metaphysical humanity that Vattimo invokes a long-gone forgotten 
dimension? 
 A supposition can be sketched with a sufficient degree of reasonability; that the 
association of the ‘new’ with the ‘other’ counterbalances values of modernization with 
hybridization dynamics. From this perspective, the ‘hybrid’ comes across as a powerful 
resource that critical thinking can employ in order to oppose the updating logic of profit 
                                                 
165 As Borradori observes, see (1989), Introduction. 
166 Gianni Vattimo, Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought, in Vattimo and Rovatti ed. by (2012), p. 51. 
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chased by western capitalism. Far from endorsing techno-phobic views, Vattimo appears 
to conceive of hybridized forms of life - whether they materialize as transnational 
identities, trans-class subjectivities, intercultural customs, teriomorphs or even cyborgs - 
as tools that can be used for identifying an ultra-human space. This is a dimension 
wherein nature and culture overlap, while science and technology can be liberated from 
“il loro uso capitalistico”167 (the capitalistic utilization of them). This means that the 
homogeny diffused by globalized markets cannot be opposed by reclaiming ontological 
“purity”. This maneuver, as we said earlier, would result in a distorted type of nihilism. 
Rather, it should be disrupted and sabotaged through the mimetic facade that crossbred 
forms of life build up in order to conceal their real essence. Hybridization, from this 
outlook, acquires a value of dissent because it is conceived of as mimesis.  
 The fascinating metaphor of ‘The infinite lawn’ that Italo Calvino recounts in 
Palomar168 (1983) will help us acquire a more solid grasp of this aspect characterizing 
Vattimo’s thought. A well decorated lawn is a perfect example of an entity which is 
artificial and, at the same time, natural. The gardener spreads on the ground a selected 
species of seeds and then, in order to achieve his creative goal, tries to uproot as 
meticulously as he can all the weeds:  
“You have to grasp the entire plant with a curving movement of the hand and 
delicately slip the roots from the earth, even if you have to pull up a bit of sod and 
some of the lawn’s rare blades of grass, half smothered by their aggressive 
neighbor. Then you must throw the interloper in a place where it cannot put down 
                                                 
167 Vattimo ( 1974) Il soggetto e la maschera, quoted in Cantarano (1998), p.228, English Translation mine. 
168 It is the novel that best represents Calvino’s last narrative, encompassing post-modern as well as post-
anthropocentric themes. The title carries the name of a man who philosophically interrogates the world that 
surrounds him, and is most likely a reference to the Californian scientific observatory, thus revealing the 
epistemological intentions pursued by the author. The book consists of 27 short texts which are arranged 3 by 3: 
numbers 1s generally describe visual experiences of natural phenomena, numbers 2s engage with anthropological 
and cultural elements, numbers 3s take into account speculative problems, including the essence of time and space 
as well as the relationship between mind and reality. The chapter called “The Infinite Lawn”, which is considered 
here, comprises all the aforementioned themes and arguably exemplifies the purposes of the entire work.  
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roots again or scatter seed. When you start pulling up one weed, you immediately 
see another appear a bit farther on, and another, and still another. In no time that 
stretch of lawn, so smooth that it seemed to need only a few touches, proves to be 
a lawless jungle.”169  
 
As much as the artist attempts to eliminate all impurities, the final result will be in any 
case a conflation of different varieties of plants and elements, because “the harmful 
grasses are so thickly interwoven with the good that you cannot just thrust in your hand 
and pull.”170 Is the artificiality which characterizes the final product, and fulfills the 
gardener’s ego, real? No, it is not. Despite the appearances, the garden is still made of a 
plethora of natural imperfections which resisted the homologating pressure applied by the 
man’s hand. What initially gave the impression of a hopeless surrender is ultimately able 
to accomplish its purpose; notwithstanding the illusory ‘weakness’, the garden was able 
to preserve its own inner essence.   
 Considering the post-human postulates established within the first chapter, the way in 
which weak thought reappears within Calvino’s literary analogy elicits thoughtful 
reflections. Italian post-modernism aligns with recent evolutionary theories according to 
which, both in animal and human worlds, mimetic practices are structurally necessary for 
survival and prosperity to succeed. Calvino’s lawn alludes to those areas of social 
undergrowth where human life is in close proximity to the survival threshold, where 
boundaries among individuals are more flexible and ontological fusions are generally 
more recurrent. From this stance, weak thought also recalls a series of low-class modes of 
expression which, particularly during the 1980s, began to speak hybridized types of 
languages for conveying dissent and frustration. For instance, I am referring to 
                                                 
169 Calvino (1985), p.30. 
170 Ibid. p. 31. 
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phenomena such as graffiti, murales and street art, which combine a large variety of 
colorful, amorphous and sometimes monstrous representations with the dryness of the 
urban constructions, dismissing stereotypes portrayed within commercials and pushing 
antagonistic communication towards the lowest limits of legality. I am also referring to 
the “punk” movement, which mingled distorted sounds with destructive noises, and 
largely disregarded the harmonic criteria that had been adopted in most popular music 
genres during previous decades. I am furthermore alluding at practices such as piercing, 
tattoos, branding, and body art which in recent years have propagated throughout 
numerous western areas. Arguably, Italian post-modernism retrieves these mimetic 
phenomena by calling for the necessity to infect philosophical and literary discourse with 
a variety of bio-cultural contaminations, so as to escape the domestication that occurs 
within the higher strata of globalized society.171   
 Following this path, Weak Thought conceptualizes a bottom-up type of struggle 
which is cosmo-political by essence. As opposed to communitarian views indicating 
cultural spotlessness, traditional identities and national myths as the most effective 
weapons to adopt for defending self-determination, Vattimo’s discourse emphasizes the 
emancipating essence that self-transformation maneuvers encompass, thus exhibiting 
theoretical similarities with several cosmo-theories. The antagonistic mimesis posited 
here, in fact, presupposes not only Habermas’ “potential for self-criticism” but also, and 
more significantly, the “masking” training which Damian Hill considers as mandatory for 
constructing a radical cosmopolitan subjectivity: 
 “Like the actor who underwrites the metaphysical significance of his own 
personal background, his tastes, dislikes, and idiosyncratic makeup as causal 
                                                 
171 I am partly relying here on the post-human theory elaborated by Roberto Marchesini, who has highlighted more 
than others the mimetic aspects that characterize countercultural phenomena, see (2002) chapter 6. 
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inhibitors against effecting a real and plausible character, the aspiring moral 
cosmopolitan, in the spirit of an autonomous ontological rebel, discounts the 
particular former narratives of her existence as the unauthored and non-
autonomously chosen aspect of her identity that she now overthrows by the 
guidance of a spirit of moral creativity that is to be put in the service of a new and 
radically different person. The mask – the moral persona, the training place – is 
the provisional reality that permits this transition.”172 
 
Correspondingly to Hill’s ontological rebel, who disregards her ideological background 
because it could prevent her from performing successfully, Vattimo’s Verwindung 
unfolds as a liberation process during which a becoming person, social group, or 
community interrogate their metaphysical upbringing. In this way, human consciousness 
is able to explore a wide variety of alternative ethical values and cultural options, while 
concealing its true self behind numerous masks. Such a mimetic cosmo-political 
inclination, which is what Vattimo’s identification of the “new” with the “other” 
essentially stands for, brings further light over the notion of weakness. Far from denoting 
defeat173, weak thought is rather the attempt to make philosophical discourse many-sided, 
teratomorphic, and unpredictable. Ultimately, such effort transforms into a de-centralized 
and non-dialectic type of antagonism that proves more efficient within a post-modern 
political environment, and which was evoked at the beginning of this chapter. Now let us 
examine more closely how this diatribic perspective affects political thought by 
considering the different ways in which cosmopolitan theory looks at democratic 
practices. 
 
 
                                                 
172 Hill (2000), p.94. 
173 In addition to Negri, Franco Cassano has also associated weak thought with similar meanings, see in particular 
Approssimazione (1989) p. 116.   
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Democracy and Cosmopolitanism: a Diatribic Perspective 
 
1. 
 
According to the aforementioned evolutionary conjecture, in the post-industrial world 
mimetic phenomena recur more frequently in proximity of social undergrowth174. In view 
of this premise, one should reasonably also ask how cosmopolitan theory relates to 
principles of self-determination and democratic discourses within a diatribic 
philosophical context.  
 From a kynical viewpoint, it goes without saying that the language of democracy 
cannot be elaborated within the “pure” space of rationality that Habermas reclaims from 
the tradition of the Enlightenment. This is due to two main reasons. On one hand, the 
attempt to ground democratic principles on solid philosophical foundations would 
relocate cosmo-political discourses within a metaphysical domain, from which Vattimo’s 
hermeneutics strives to depart. If we move from the philosophical assumptions Habermas 
takes for granted, we would still make appeal to a universalistic conception of truth, 
which our line of reasoning has tried to weaken. On the other hand, the spotless dialogic 
flows Habermas calls for would not be able to represent those strata of the societies 
where, as it was previously clarified, impurities and contaminations are constantly 
occurring. The well-elaborated arguments on which he builds his theory of 
“communicative action” risk benefiting the most skilled rhetoricians, while excluding 
from verbal exchanges those who do not have the privilege to develop appropriate 
                                                 
174 Roberto Marchesini has also expressed this claim, see (2002) chapter 6. 
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dialectic capacities.175 In so doing, Habermas’s “ideal speech” would simply annihilate 
all oral differences, thus sterilizing communicative practices and maintaining stagnant 
power relations. All these observations arguably converge within Vattimo’s account of 
Habermas’s perspective as the “risk of legitimizing a future world dominated by experts 
of various kind.”176  
 The fact that Vattimo utilized these words for contributing to The Italian Difference, 
collecting a series of texts which presumably represent most faithfully the contemporary 
Italian Theory, is not a mere coincidence. The criticism that Italian Thought addresses to 
Habermas is not fortuitous, but has a history that can be traced back to the early 1980s. 
This was when Italian post-modernism suggested displacing the redundant superfluity 
characterizing present-day democratic practices through the contamination of rational 
discourse with diatribic silences and ironic tones. The way in which philosophical ideas 
resurface from literary narratives is astonishing. Let us consider the following paragraphs 
which are taken respectively from Vattimo’s The End of Modernity (1985) and Calvino’s 
Mr. Palomar (1983): 
“Let us start from the not completely unfounded hypothesis that hermeneutics as a 
specific philosophical position (hermeneutic ontology, as it were) develops in an 
historical and cultural situation in which dialogue is in fact rendered difficult, not 
by an overwhelming distance between the interlocutors, but rather by the 
occurrence of a homologation that makes it insignificant and superfluous.”177 
 
Following Heidegger, Vattimo is convinced that metaphysical discourses have 
progressively converted democratic ideas into ideological apathy, and that only a form of 
communication that relies on the quietness of the “indefinable” would be able to invert 
                                                 
175 This critical reflection was suggested to me by Kennedy (1999), p. 38. 
176 Vattimo (2009), Nihilism as Emancipation,  in Chiesa and Toscano ed.by (2009), p. 34. 
177 Vattimo (1988), p.155. 
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such a degrading tendency. Philosophy, for this purpose, needs to combine with both 
ordinary language and poetry, which do not aim at dominating the reality, but rise from it 
as a ‘resound of silence’. The philosophical horizon that is rising here remained, for the 
most part, always unseen to western thought: silence as a path to democracy. Democracy 
- the most valuable discovery that presumably the West has ever brought to light, the 
highest moral ideal, the aspiration that in our time guides and regulates political 
communication far and wide and which, in turn, finds its nourishment precisely within 
what common sense considers as one of the capacities that are most representative of the 
human species, i.e. language - is now exposing its post-human alter-ego: the solemnity of 
the “unsaid”, the dignity of remaining quiet, animal muteness as a privileged mode of 
expression. Does such a conceptual overturning involve kynical significances? 
 Let us interrogate Calvino’s narrative on this subject. In Mr. Palomar, the first 
dismissal of language occurs metaphorically when the protagonist’s attention is captured 
by the blackbirds’ whistle, which is presumably very similar as an ordinary human 
whistle. Palomar’s reflections, pertaining to the way in which these animals are able to 
convey their messages, lead him to wonder whether the true essence of their 
communication rests within the silent intervals dividing whistles from one another: “And 
what if it is in the pause and not in the whistle that the meaning of the message is 
contained? If it were in the silence that the blackbirds speak to each other?…A silence, 
apparently the same as another silence, could express a hundred different notions;”178 The 
hundreds of significances that Palomar strives to extrapolate from the blackbird’s silences 
would not simply fulfill zoological or anthropological curiosities; they would also fill up 
the semantic void which saturates the space circumscribing democratic oral practices, 
                                                 
178 Calvino (1985), pp. 24-25. 
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wherein an overabundance of unneeded information has made social interactions 
pointless. Biting one’s own tongue, within this scenario, becomes the most meaningful 
way to communicate:  
 “Whether he should refrain from expressing his idea is more debatable. In times 
of general silence, conforming to the silence of the majority is certainly wrong. In 
times when everybody says too much, the important thing is not merely to say 
what is right, which in any event would be engulfed in the flood of words, but to 
say it on the basis of premises and consequences, so that what is said acquires the 
maximum value. But, then, if the value of a single affirmation lies in continuity 
and coherence of the discourse in which it is uttered, the only possible choice is 
between speaking continuously or never speaking at all. In the first case Mr. 
Palomar would reveal that his thinking does not proceed in a straight line but 
zigzags its way through vacillations, denials, corrections, in whose midst the 
rightness of that affirmation of his would be lost. As for the other alternative, it 
implies an art of keeping silent even more difficult that the art of speaking. 
 In fact, silence can also be considered a kind of speech, since it is a 
rejection of the use to which others put words; but the meaning of this silence-
speech lies in its interruptions in what is, from time to time, actually said, giving a 
meaning to what is unsaid.”179 (Italics mine) 
 
In view of the sarcastic tones employed by Calvino, whose 1980s production is entirely 
narrated through what Iovino describes as the “silence of the ego”180, it is a shame that 
Italian post-modern discourses have been mostly analyzed from semeiotic and 
epistemological viewpoints, disregarding their political value. If one looks at Calvino’s 
narrative from a hermeneutical perspective, the blackbird’s art of keeping silent - which 
is more complex and advanced than the human art of speaking - is most likely promoted 
for providing marginalized voices with expressive power. In circumstances when dialogic 
practices become flat and empty, the democratic “right to speak” risks penalizing 
minorities, whereas a diatribic type of muteness might prove a convenient strategy for 
obtaining attention.  
                                                 
179 Ibid. p. 103. 
180 Serenella Iovino (2014), Hybriditales: Posthumanizing Calvino, in Amberson and Past ed. by (2014) p. 222. 
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 On this subject, Italian 1980s post-modernism has been exceptionally farsighted. The 
worldwide success recently accomplished by populisms of all sorts, mostly obtaining 
approval from middle and lower social strata, brought to light new dynamics linking 
democratic practices, language rituals, and channels of information. In particular, the 
reiterated attacks on the legitimacy of the press, which is no longer considered in 
numerous political environments as a source of unquestionable truth, result in a two-sided 
paradoxical phenomenon. First, an overwhelming multiplication of short-term, impulsive, 
often contradictory verbal perspectives that proliferate on the web and which apparently 
provide a larger number of individuals with the chance to express their voice. Second, the 
crisis experienced by political parties, many of which thrive by silencing themselves 
before the mainstream media. This twofold tendency is certainly evident if one recalls the 
case of Italy where, starting from the 1990s, “silence” has been utilized repeatedly for 
gaining consent. The hegemony exercised over Italian politics for approximately twenty 
years by Silvio Berlusconi, who arguably inaugurated the aforementioned populist wave, 
was partly obtained through both an incessant denigration of the Italian press and the 
refusal to engage in ordinary dialogic exchanges with preexisting political groups. In 
addition, at the end of Berlusconi’s era self-muteness has been adopted even more 
successfully by the 5 Stars Movement. This group of post-ideological activists, founded 
in 2009 by comedian Beppe Grillo, in just a few short years became the main Italian 
political faction by attacking the self-referential party-language, also dismissing 
interactions with mainstream media. 
 Should one conclude that we are currently living in a world wherein the most 
effective way to communicate is to carry out a dispossession of verbal communication? Is 
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it reasonable to assert that in the late-modern society silence is potentially able to enhance 
feelings of democratic solidarity better than any dialogue? This picture might seem 
excessively radical. After all, as Habermas would rightly point out, a total dismissal of 
comunication might bring about repercussions which are even more dreadful than the 
ones that we are trying to prevent. It is nonetheless evident that the argumentative 
technicalities that characterize certain dialectic mechanisms within western democracies 
are by now perceived by many as redundant, intangible and, as such, illegitimate. This 
would explain the crisis that on a global scale is affecting Democratic Parties, which in 
recent times often appealed to “politically correct” speech as their main discursive 
strategy. Moreover, flat and unnecessary dialogues prove detrimental also because of the 
multicultural features characterizing contemporary western environments, wherein an 
exponential escalation of communication often generates violent misunderstandings 
between different ethnic and social groups.  
 In view of these observations and considering how the path toward democracy 
unfolded throughout the centuries by means of secularization processes – i.e. 
secularization of religious modes of thinking, secularization of political authorities, etc. - 
it is reasonable to wonder, from a diatribic perspective, whether ‘silence’ could be 
adopted as a conceptual instrument for secularizing ‘language’. The silence evoked here 
would not coincide with a collapse of communication per se. Rather, it stands for a 
destabilization and de-potentiation of language, which is no longer seen as the recipient 
encompassing absolute truths, but is asked to continually reassess its emancipatory 
purposes within a scenario where conflicting interpretations multiply day by day. From 
this stance, ‘silence’ would disclose itself as the temporary pause where self-doubts fill 
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the mind. ‘Silence’, as flexible speech dismissing stubbornness and fanaticism, as the 
uncertainty of a message whose authenticity and intentions are pondered numerous times 
before being delivered.  
 Italian post-modernism appears to pursue this hermeneutical trail by adopting both 
“silence” and “self-irony” as secularization instruments. These categories function as 
tools reinforcing the democratic principle of ‘non-violence’, and also as weak semantic 
areas wherein different discursive positions have the chance to carry out self-reflection 
and self-criticism. In this way, opposing viewpoints are able to question their own 
cultural legacy and to emphasize reciprocal connection, as Appiah would say, “not 
through identity but despite difference”181. While Mr. Palomar undermines verbal 
homogeneity by conjuring the silence of eastern atmospheres, in more recent texts 
Vattimo indicates “self-irony” as the fundamental value for coping with the multicultural 
challenges that the late-modern Babel generates day after day. Vattimo’s opinion is that if 
traditional identities do not stop taking themselves so seriously, as if they were the most 
legitimate and respectable, globalizing processes will always be perceived as a threat, 
eliciting violent reactions. Self-irony, presuming that customs, habits and beliefs depend 
upon contingent historical and sociological components, is the most effective attitude to 
adopt for pursuing a free and peaceful coexistence. Such a value exceeds the pure space 
of rational thinking, rather emerging from the diatribic crossroad wherein philosophy and 
art overlap, and wherein democratic ideas acquire an aesthetic significance:  
 “It seems clear that the reconciliation of peace and liberty in the post-modern or 
late-modern world will be attained only on condition that esthetics prevails over 
objective truth. The variety of lifestyles and the diversity of ethical codes will be 
able to coexist without bloody clashes only if they are considered as, precisely, 
                                                 
181 Appiah (2006), p. 135. 
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styles not reciprocally exclusive, but compatible like the artistic styles within an 
art collection – and for that matter within a museum…”182 
 
Through the categories of “silence” and “irony”, Italian Post-modernism erodes the 
aggressive essence of language and indicates the path that leads to a complete 
secularization of communication. The philosophical outcome is a model of hermeneutical 
democracy which depicts the public sphere as an area wherein cultural divergences are 
not more dreadful than the discordant notes coming from a song. As a further result, 
Italian Thought relocates truth from the domain of “rationality” to the more flexible space 
of “reasonability”, carrying out the transition from self-assertion to self-expression that 
Cacciari had not been able to fully attain.   
 
2. 
The point now is to evaluate how the problematic relationship between weakened forms 
of communication and democratic participation would be discussed from the perspective 
of Vattimo’s diatribic hermeneutics. How can both mutual understanding and self-
determination be obtained within a culturally diverse environment? Addressing this 
question is crucial because it allows us to explore how the “local” relates conceptually to 
the “global”, and how the “particular” interacts with the “universal” within a kynical 
philosophical context. For this purpose, I will rely on Weak Thought in order to clarify 
the diatribic developed here with respect to both the multicultural and the humanistic 
cosmopolitan perspectives. 
 The multicultural position taken by Will Kymlicka, claiming that democratic 
practices can succeed exclusively within a vernacular setting, cannot be easily dismissed: 
                                                 
182 Vattimo (2007) p. 58. 
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“Democratic politics is politics in the vernacular. The average citizen feels at ease 
only when he discusses political questions in his own language. As a general rule, 
only elites are fluent in more than one language, and have the chance to maintain 
and develop their linguistic skills continuously, and feel at ease discussing 
political questions in different languages and in a multilingual atmosphere.”183 
 
Considering the importance that our previous analysis placed within communicative 
authenticity, the kynical philosopher would certainly agree with Kymlicka that 
democratic participation increases when individuals feel comfortable within their cultural 
and linguistic setting. It is nonetheless also true that in the contemporary world, wherein 
mono-cultural environments are becoming extremely infrequent, Kymlicka’s restriction 
of democracy to the domain of the vernacular might prove a dangerous move. As 
Archibugi rightly points out, vernacular communities might feel the necessity to purge 
themselves of all impurities, thus implementing racist policies, social segregation and, in 
extreme cases, ethnic cleansing.184 
 This risk would nonetheless depend on a distorted way to conceive of the 
“vernacular”, which in many circumstances is still seen as the immaculate process 
through which local communities were able to determine themselves without receiving 
any external influences. In reality, vernacular cultures and languages are the result of a 
long hybridizing evolution that mingled different elements, often molding local realities 
through global pressures. Several scholars currently agree that national customs and 
rituals cannot be merely considered as the result of popular struggles, because cultural 
uniformity was in many circumstances achieved with the relevant contribution of a top-
down type of standardization. Research shows that the reduction of the cultural variation 
                                                 
183 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 214, quoted in Archibugi (2008), p. 256. 
184 Archibugi (2008), chapter 10. 
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within the nations and the expansion of the variation between them partly increased as a 
consequence of political coercions, which forced the populations to strengthen internal 
similarities and to minimize external differences.185  
 Such a perspective finds a stronger confirmation within Sheldon Pollock’s analysis 
according to which western vernacularization processes were to some extent affected by 
cosmopolitan forces. As opposed to Gramsci and Bachtin’s hypothesis portraying 
vernaculars as literary instruments through which people reclaimed autonomy from 
imperial powers, Pollock argues that vernacular cultures actually materialized with 
considerable support from the European elites, which “associated with or directly 
controlled” 186 the local royal courts. From this perspective, the vernacular can no longer 
be looked at as a symbol of demotic purity, because it materializes from some sort of 
“Creole” fusion interconnecting the particular with the universal. Kymlicka’s perspective, 
therefore, is meaningful so long as the vernacular is taken for what it really is: a 
particular form of expression which comes to being and survives with the support of both 
external and global influences.   
 Within the circular dialectic that the particular establishes with the universal, on the 
other hand, humanistic cosmopolitanism prioritizes the universal. While multiculturalists 
generally strive to preserve cultural autonomy in order to maximize democratic 
participation, humanists believe that enhancing trans-cultural communication through a 
centralization of political regulations is in most circumstances preferable, even at the cost 
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of reducing democratic involvement. Particularly this is the case of Daniele Archibugi, 
who endorses this view by mainly relying on the evolution of post-colonial India.  
 After the 1948 independence from the British Empire, the Indian government made 
official 18 languages out of the 1,650 vernacular idioms spoken throughout the territory. 
The system currently allows vernacular languages to be spoken locally and official 
languages to be used within each of the 18 states, while dialogues between the central 
government and the single states take place exclusively in Hindi and English. In so doing 
- Archibugi points out - Indian people were able to establish a relatively successful 
parliamentary democracy, also improving considerably their economic condition and 
preventing potential conflicts between local populations from occurring. Thus, the Indian 
example allegedly shows that unifying territories through the institutionalization of a 
lingua franca, particularly when English can be chosen for both intra- and inter-national 
purposes, proves ultimately beneficial.187 
 While Archibugi’s observations are significant and worthy of consideration, it is 
nonetheless dubious whether institutionalization maneuvers such as the one previously 
described ultimately enhance the cosmopolitan ideals that he endorses. Archibugi is 
aware that the post-independence political resolutions implemented by the Indian 
government went to the considerable advantage of the Indian elites, which is partially 
why economic inequalities in India are still highly unacceptable. He is also aware that the 
capability to speak English is restricted to 20 percent of the Indian population, and that in 
numerous southern areas people still refuse Hindi as their main mode of communication. 
Because of these factors, not only have individuals and peoples been denied political 
representation, but also cultures whose importance cannot be minimized. The 
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homogenization of culture, of which language standardization is one aspect, ultimately 
jeopardizes the uniqueness and exceptionality of life, thus inhibiting the capacity for self-
expression. This cannot be condoned by a cosmopolitan kynical theory. 
 These considerations apply significantly to the case of post-colonial India, wherein 
centralization strategies facilitated the birth of an imperialistic type of universalism which 
had never characterized its past. Although both in Europe and in India vernacularization 
processes replaced earlier imperial practices at the beginning of the early-modern era, we 
know from Pollock that in ancient times Indian cosmopolitanism involved significances 
which had little to do with the coercive methods utilized by the Romans. As opposed to 
the ways in which the Roman Empire expanded, Sanskrit power did not unfold by 
enumerating peoples or standardizing legal practices, nor did it carry out any attempt to 
transform the world into a metropolitan centre.188 Within the Sanskrit historical context, 
power signified a celebration of moral and verbal ideals and, consequently, did not 
employ cultural symbols as tools for self-legitimization. In the Latin universe the term 
“cosmos” stood for the “the lands that had fallen under the Roman power”; Indian 
cosmopolitanism, on the contrary, encompassed “voluntaristic” connotations honouring 
“all that moves with life”.189 
 Sadly, the institutionalization procedures enforced in post-colonial India did not 
unbury any of these historical components, but slowly led to the birth of violent forms of 
universalism such as Hindutva, or fundamentalist Hinduism, which had never 
characterized Indian culture in previous times. In 1998 the Bharatiya Janata Party, 
representing Hindutva, was able to take control of the national government, also 
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providing both its paramilitary section, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National 
Volounteers Union) and its ideological section, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World 
Hindu Council) with a considerable amount of political power: “The very names of these 
groups now speak what had never been spoken before, postulating in the one case a 
single Indian “peoplehood” (janata) and in the other Hinduism as an aggressive 
universalism (vishwa).”190 The Bharatiya Janata Party, currently representing one of the 
most influential political groups in the Indian Parliament, pursues a political agenda that 
includes the enhancement of India’s military and nuclear potential as well as a cultural 
program of “pseudotraditionalism that has cynically coopted and polluted the 
cosmopolitan past.”191 Despite the benefits that Archibugi emphasizes, therefore, the case 
of India shows that prioritizing excessively the “universal” over the “particular” by way 
of institutional maneuvers, in some circumstances brings about not only a reduction in 
democratic participation, but also counter-cosmopolitan effects. 
 What position would a kynical devotee of ‘weakness’ take with respect to the debate 
that multiculturalists establish with cosmopolitan humanists? How would Vattimo enter 
the conversation that I have just described? Arguably, Weak Thought would label both 
philosophical views as forms of passive nihilism. The former, because it conceives of 
“communities” in essentialist terms and, in so doing, might indirectly assist the 
proliferation of ethnic fundamentalisms. The latter, because it favors comprehensive 
institutional procedures over bio-cultural diversity and political participation, thus 
aligning with the all-embracing discourses that western metaphysics has perpetuated for 
centuries. A diatribic thinker would suggest to combine the value of decentralization that 
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are dear to multiculturalists with the importance that cosmopolitan humanists place 
within trans-cultural communication, so as to open a third and more desirable nihilistic 
path. More explicitly, kynical cosmopolitanism agrees in part with Kymlicka that the 
vernacular is ideally the dimension wherein authentic democratic practices succeed, 
while also conceiving of the vernacular as the space where socio-cultural hybridization 
needs to occur persistently in order for a community to regenerate and survive. From the 
diatribic perspective, that is, local realities would be considered as the privileged “exiled” 
laboratories for the experimentation of cosmopolitan models that can potentially be 
imitated and adopted in other political contexts. The key would be to look at the 
vernacular not as a pristine idol to worship, but as a Creole crossroad wherein particular 
components, global influences and different identities conflate.  
 As a matter of fact, the correlation linking Creole cultures with western vernaculars 
has never emerged as visibly as it does in the present moment. When Vattimo points out 
that globalizing processes will not enforce homologation but rather a plethora of 
hybridized forms of life192, he implicitly compares the anti-colonial struggles  carried out 
for centuries by American, South-Asian and African indigenous people to the series of 
resistances that western local realities are now opposing to the neo-liberal expansion. 
Weak Thought associates the end of modernity with the end of colonialism, also 
anticipating the rise of a multitude of cultural forms which do not fully belong to western 
legacy: “Nella trattazione vattimiana emerge il nesso strettissimo tra fine del 
colonialismo e crisi della coscienza eurocentrica europea, che filosoficamente chiamiamo 
fine della metafisica.”193 (“In Vattimo’s discussion an extremely close connection links 
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the end of colonialism to the crisis of the European consciousness, which we name 
philosophically end of metaphysics”)The oppression that was for centuries disseminated 
within the isolated spaces of colonialism is now returning and threatening western 
communities, often triggering aggressive reactions. The attention that linguists and 
cultural anthropologists are currently drawing to the analogies relating vernacular 
languages with Creole literary forms, which for a long time were considered as irrelevant 
and are now provided with “vernacular dignity”194, should be seen as an outcome of this 
epochal transition. 
 A reasonable idea of democracy can no longer be discussed apart from these 
historical presuppositions. Bearing in mind Vattimo’s hermeneutics of Verwindung, 
democratic discourses should in all cases take into account the crimes that European 
colonizers committed for centuries, also acknowledging the responsibility that western 
peoples owe to the masses of immigrants that once inhabited the colonies and are now 
being pushed toward the old continent. An association is surfacing here between 
“democratization” and “creolization” which coincides neither with a reckless promotion 
of ethnic mixtures nor with mere philanthropic values. Through the former, in fact, we 
would nourish the meaningless pluralism that one often witnesses within the neo-liberal 
“society of the supermarket”195 - to use Vattimo’s expression – wherein traditions and 
symbols are sold as commodities. The latter, as it was exhaustively clarified within the 
first chapter, conceal a paternalistic conception of the “foreigner” which stigmatizes 
“struggle” as inhuman and “exclusion” as shameful, perpetuating in some circumstances 
the agony that migrants and refugees experience on a daily basis. Rather, what our line of 
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reasoning is trying to emphasize is the semantic correlation linking cultural blending and 
social emancipation which Creole customs personify.  
 Through the elaboration of innovative symbolic strategies numerous native 
communities were able, at least in part, to displace the inputs that were coercively 
imposed onto them by transmitting their own cultural inheritance to newborn forms of 
expression. Despite the evident European influence affecting Creole cultures and 
languages, Creolization processes took place in all circumstances as a two-way effort in 
which the colonized was able to alter the colonizer by means of hybridizing tactics. These 
include “mimicry, signifying, vernacularization, substitution of one term by another, the 
underground, subversive, rhythmic rereading of an over-ground, dominant harmonics.”196 
All this is recaptured by Vattimo’s exegesis of globalization which, as Monaco observes, 
provides local groups with the ability to refashion global influences: “il locale risponde 
all’appello postogli dal globale mutando l’appellante stesso, il globale, e dando origine 
alla loro commistione e alla prolificazione di forme di vita ibride.”197 (“Modifying the 
global, the local responds to the appeal the global invokes, while giving birth to both their 
union and a proliferation of hybridized living forms”) Following Vattimo’s hermeneutic 
democracy, prioritizing the superimposition between philosophy, art and rhetoric as the 
neutral discursive area wherein social struggle does not involve bloody destruction, a 
plethora of Creole allegories could now be employed by western local communities for 
opposing the invasive techno-capitalistic logic of profit. Thus, in view of Kymlicka’s 
close association between “vernacular” and “democracy”, the diatribic philosopher would 
respond metaphorically that in the post-modern era democratic politics is “politics in the 
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Creole”: self-determination presupposes in all circumstances the post-colonial 
experience, which taught us that liberty and emancipation cannot be enhanced without a 
persistent renegotiation of cultural components. 
 Massimo Cacciari would likely disregard these considerations as representative of a 
detrimental system of thought. In chapter 4 of Geo-philosophy of Europe, Cacciari takes 
into account the cosmopolitan value of ‘tolerance’ and criticizes as negligent all 
philosophical doctrines that promote mutual respect by weakening, forgetting or 
suspending ontological differences. For Cacciari, these approaches translate social 
divergence into an illusory appearance, ultimately converting tolerance into a substantial 
intolerance for all cultural variations.198 The reference to Weak Thought is undeniable. 
And nonetheless, the evolution of Italian philosophy that has been reconstructed thus far 
appears to indicate the circular transition between parrhesia and diatribe as the most 
convenient device through which epistemological views and language theories challenge 
political discourse. The parrhesiatic components unburied from Cacciari’s texts are 
beneficial so long as they contain the uncompromising post-modern tendency to 
stigmatize values of ‘truth’ as completely insignificant, and impede communication from 
spilling over the domain of the purely irrational. The diatribic perspective that has been 
then clarified, on the other hand, allows us to look at ontological and discursive 
impurities as tools of resistance, also preventing verbal games from becoming 
excessively self-assertive. By injecting within language a variety of self-critical and self-
interrogating intrusive elements, Italian Thought ultimately describes truthfulness in 
terms of “authenticity”, and characterizes “identity” as a transitory hybridizing process. 
Following this conceptual trail, one is spontaneously led to envision a polycentric 
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geopolitical scenery whose interactive constitutive molecules do not rely, for their 
survival, on the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy that Cacciari’s “archipelago” takes for 
granted, but on the mimetic factors that have surfaced from Weak Thought. In the next 
chapter we will discover how all this can be further evaluated in view of post-1990 Italian 
philosophy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“The highest poverty, with its use of things,  
is the form-of-life that begins when all the  
West’s forms of life have reached their historical consummation.” 
Giorgio Agamben 
 
 
 “True generosity towards the future is to give everything to the present” 
Albert Camus, The Rebel 
 
 
Prelude: Temporal Variations, Historical Collapses 
 
1.  
The parrhesia-diatribe route that has been discovered from the 1970s and 1980s Italian 
philosophy, points to a cosmopolitan model which encompasses both local and global 
components, also employing social fusions and intercultural dialogue so as to 
conceptualize innovative and more desirable spaces of resistance. This chapter will 
circumscribe more exhaustively such a cosmo-local perspective by taking into account 
further repercussions on the moral and political planes. For this purpose, we will continue 
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to interrogate Italian post-human doctrines, while also referring to the current debate on 
cosmopolitan theory.  
 As it was formerly anticipated, the kynical perspective defended here sympathizes 
with the idea that cosmopolitan theory needs to be reformulated in view of the post-
colonial experience. I am referring to authors such as Boaventura de Sousa Santos, whose 
notion of Subaltern Cosmopolitanism filters cosmopolitan thought through the eyes of the 
communities which have been excluded from the western universalistic project. Santos 
identifies two levels of globalization: the expansion of economic neo-liberalism is in all 
circumstances opposed by “counter-hegemonic” forces encompassing a “vast set of 
networks, initiatives, organizations, and movements that fight against the economic, 
social, and political outcomes of hegemonic globalization, challenge the conceptions of 
world development underlying the latter, and propose alternative conceptions”.199 In 
particular, Santos strives to rethink cosmopolitanism from the perspective of the “south”, 
a phrase which denotes all forms of subordination - i.e. economic exploitation, racial 
oppression, gender discrimination, etc. –, and empathizes with all people who happen to 
be penalized by Euro-centric perspectives.   
 Even more significantly, I am alluding to the contributions offered by Walter 
Mignolo, Sheldon Pollock and Homi Bhabha to the provocative text Cosmopolitanism 
(2000), which deconstructs traditional cosmopolitan conjectures by looking at them from 
a plurality of post-modern viewpoints.200 Mignolo establishes a close correlation between 
humanistic discourses, evangelizing practices and modern colonialism, also insisting on 
the urgency to restructure cosmopolitan theory from a more critical stance. The affinity 
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that the kynical position shares with his analysis surfaces in relation to the principle of 
“inclusion” challenged within the first chapter, and which Mignolo also undermines: 
“Today silenced and marginalized voices are bringing themselves into the conversation 
of cosmopolitan projects, rather than wanting to be included. Inclusion is always a 
reformative project. Bringing themselves into the conversation is a transformative project 
that takes the form of border thinking or border epistemology…”201   
 “Border thinking”202 is also a theoretical tool adopted by Pollock and Bhabha. Both 
authors believe that the humanistic representation of the “self” as an ensemble of 
concentric circles encompassing progressively wider affinities – i.e. families, friends, 
cities, regions, nations, etc. - does not give honor to the numerous forms of displacement 
which proliferate within the contemporary globalized world. From their viewpoint, 
immigrants, refugees, and the stateless, who are coercively uprooted from their 
motherlands because of political or economic instability, are the ones who inhabit the 
most authentic cosmopolitan dimension. As opposed to the idyllic intercultural life-space 
that humanists dream about, this unfolds through a wide variety of labour exploitations, 
ethnic discriminations, moral collisions, cultural miscomprehensions, and psychological 
tensions of all sorts. The antagonistic cosmo-localism that we are trying to define aligns, 
at least in part, with what Pollock and Bhabha identify as “cosmopolitan vernacular”; 
namely, a transnational space of exile wherein ideological exchanges, moral negotiations 
and language translations turn into strategies of existential resistance: “Vernacular 
cosmopolitans are compelled to make a tryst with cultural translation as an act of 
survival. Their specific and local histories, often threatened and repressed, are inserted 
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‘between the lines’ of dominant cultural practices. To occupy such an ‘in-between’ space 
is often the result of oppression and inequality.”203 
 In order to clarify the distinction between the kynical perspective and the 
aforementioned discourses, in this chapter I will call attention to one of the most 
fundamental assumptions that they all presuppose. Regardless of the subtle discrepancies 
that keep these theories apart, they all converge on the hypothesis that a critical type of 
cosmopolitan theory cannot be posited without deconstructing ordinary conceptions of 
history. Traditional cosmopolitanism, inheriting the legacy of the Enlightenment and the 
correlated faith in human reason and progress, mainly relies on the Christian-Newtonian 
representation of temporality as an entity which flows indistinctively in all parts of the 
universe and can be quantified in absolutistic terms. Based on these presuppositions, 
humanistic accounts of time explain history as a linear, regular and cumulative 
progression of units, which ultimately leads all societies to develop in proportion to the 
same model. The anti-humanistic trail that our epistemological and linguistic reflections 
unburied within the previous chapter, therefore, will not be able to reach its ultimate 
destination without an opportune critique of such a temporal paradigm.  
 
 
2. 
 For this purpose, Italian Cynicism can be once again extremely beneficial. Beginning 
in 1990, Italian Theory evolved via radical attacks on “history” which brought the post-
modern discourses that had been earlier formulated to their final nihilistic stage. While it 
is true that alternative theories of time were surfacing within other western philosophical 
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contexts – it is sufficient to recall Francis Fukuyama’s idea of the “last man” and 
Derrida’s notion of time as ‘out of joint’ – this critical inclination arguably resounded at 
full volume in Italy, likely due to the revolutionary sociopolitical climate that 
characterized the country in the early 1990s.  
 Around that period, the events that were significantly reshaping the global 
geopolitical scenario reverberated through destructive domestic episodes which led the 
Italian people to suffer a sorrowful collective trauma. At the international level, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the crisis of the leftist ideologies certainly echoed all over Europe, 
unsettling numerous sociopolitical environments and electorates. However, the 
consequences of that collapse proved particularly devastating within the Italian society, 
which had given birth to the strongest European Communist party and, during the 1970s, 
the most enduring leftist movements of protest. Moreover, the birth of the European 
Union, requiring members to devolve part of their sovereignty to the cause of a 
supranational cooperation, certainly destabilized numerous communities. And 
nonetheless, sociological data confirm that the post-Maastricht depression was 
exceptionally intense in Italy, whose debt and inflation were both very high - respectively 
103 percent of GDP instead of 60%, inflation of 6.9 percent - while its budget deficit 
counted 9.9 percent against the required 3 percent.204  
 These international shifts were exercising intense pressure on a domestic scenario 
which was already problematic, due to what historians usually define as a transition from 
the ‘first’ to the ‘second’ republic. During this process, numerous strikes were inflicted 
on governmental institutions, also substantially replacing the political actors that had 
ruled the country for decades with new ones. The crisis initially materialized in Milan, 
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where Italian magistrates identified an enormous web of briberies linking the 
entrepreneurial class to the political elite. The so called “tangentopoli” framework – 
literally, “city of bribery”– that was disclosed by the magistrates revealed a plethora of 
corrupted connections which had infected the political system for a long time. Within this 
system illegal funding to the parties in exchange of personal favors had become a widely 
accepted practice. The “mani pulite” (clean hands) operations accomplished by 
investigators and prosecutors brought to court thousands of politicians and businessmen, 
leading several political factions to dissolution. 
 The tangentopoli scandals, which were initially restricted to the Northern areas of the 
country but progressively emerged from all angles of the political apparatus, triggered a 
series of local attacks on the legitimacy of the Roman government. Among these 
reactions, the most destructive one was the 1992 birth of the Northern League, a political 
group which claimed to represent a presumably independent Northern culture demanding 
secession from the state. The arrogant requests advanced by the League, whose rhetoric 
often degenerated into xenophobic and racist stigmatizations of Central and Southern 
Italians, were nonetheless symptoms of a wider discontent. In line with the anti-
corruption values spreading across the peninsula, protests were also directed against the 
national taxation system. Many of the complaints expressed by the League found a fertile 
terrain within the small entrepreneurial class, which had been a close ally of the State in 
previous decades and now found itself strongly penalized by the post-Maastricht 
measures. Furthermore, the assaults launched towards the central government from the 
Northern parts of the country resonated even more loudly in the south, where the 
influence that was exercised by Mafia clans was not decreasing. The 1992 assassinations 
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of anti-mafia prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and his assistant Paolo Borsellino revealed 
the considerable weakness afflicting the state within southern regions, generating 
significant feelings of hopelessness across the whole nation.  
 All these events triggered a disruption within the unitary way in which the Italian 
people had for years perceived the historical flow. From then on, this was arguably going 
to disperse along three main directions: a) first, the aforesaid Northern attacks on the 
Roman government were once again bringing to light the importance of the Southern 
question, which had never before been appropriately addressed by governmental 
institutions. In 1990 unemployment among southern youths was extremely high - about 
44.1% against the 14.6 % of the centre-north - while the GDP reached the lowest peak 
since 1970. Moreover, although life expectation was considerably shorter than anywhere 
else in Italy and infrastructures were completely inefficient, local politics was still very 
amoral and clientelistic. 205 For a government which was already approving numerous 
privatizing resolutions and reshaping the public system in line with the neo-liberal values 
of “performance” and “productivity”206, this was a sufficiently valid reason for revoking 
several forms of financial assistance. Consequently, neither northern Italian nor foreign 
capitals looked at Sicily, Calabria or Campania as lands for potential investments. 
Simultaneously, the discrepancy between the way in which the temporal flow was 
experienced in the “modernized” and “efficient” North compared to the presumed delay 
of the South undeniably surfaced yet again. 
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 b) The abrupt disappearance of the political parties which had been the main 
protagonists since the end of WWII – i.e. the Christian Democratic Party, the Socialist 
Party, the Republican Party, and the Social-democratic party - left a significant void 
within the popular conscience. The fading of the Christian Democracy, above all, proved 
extremely upsetting for a large part of the Italian electorate. Built on catholic moral 
foundations, it had played a crucial role in the democratization of the country, often 
banking on its interclass type of political orientation so as to gain consent from a 
diversity of social strata207. The departure of this political faction led the popular 
consciousness to question the previous fifty years of Italian history, which had flown in 
the name of liberty and equality and allowed the Italian society to achieve a highly 
wealthy condition, but were ultimately exposing a rotten core. For many Italians, history 
was abruptly put on hold. The party-dynamics that they were familiar with were suddenly 
interrupted, spreading hesitation and indecision across the country and leading the 
number of non-voters to increase considerably at the 1992 national elections.208  
 Such a state of temporal suspension infiltrated numerous social environments, 
including the political group that had survived the mani pulite scandals without 
contracting any particular damages. The Communist Party, to which I am referring, by 
the end of the 1980s had split into several factions and mainly merged into the more 
moderate and reformist PDS (Democratic Party of the Left). Thanks to the juridical 
legitimacy that it was still defending, the PDS could have certainly benefited from the 
crisis more than any other group, and played a crucial role in redirecting Italian politics 
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towards desirable horizons. On the contrary, “a certain immobility”209 qualified the 
attitude chosen by its leaders who, in a moment that was requiring drastic solutions, 
adopted “caution and mediation”210 as their strategies, thus nourishing the aforesaid 
climate of stagnation.  
 c) Within a social atmosphere characterized by illegality, vacillation and 
motionlessness, only scattered groups of people perceived the crisis from a more positive 
perspective due to the potential that this could have ultimately brought about a cultural 
renovation. These virtuous minorities - to use Ginsborg’s phrase - were mostly an 
expression of urban middle classes relying on public employment which, during the 
preceding ten years, had developed sharp “critical attitudes towards many aspects of 
Italy’s helter-skelter modernization. Environmental pollution, the chocking of city centres 
with public transport, indiscriminate private consumption accompanied by much public 
squalor – these were all elements which fueled their critique of the politicians’ failure to 
govern.”211 Such a reflective demeanor was mainly common among left-wing or catholic 
citizens who still placed importance on public morality, and identified more intensively 
than many of their compatriots with both the virtuous phases of the Republic’s history 
and the dissenting voices still alive within the institutions. Digging within the detrimental 
outcomes produced by the crisis, these citizens were able to uncover signs of a potential 
rebirth from the arrogant politics which, until that moment, had seemed to be 
undefeatable.  
 Claiming that these hopeful expectations have been fulfilled during the following 
years would likely prove to be delusionally optimistic. What can be affirmed with 
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sufficient accuracy, however, is that the three ways in which time unfolded in Italy 
beginning in the early 1990s – i.e. delay, suspension, rebirth – found expression within 
three philosophical critiques of history. All these theoretical efforts exhibit kynical 
connotations, inasmuch as they dismiss humanistic representations of temporality through 
dispossessing maneuvers. Recalling Heidegger’s description of man as ‘full in world’, 
one could metaphorically assert that each of these three lines of thought qualifies the 
post-human as ‘poor in time’. More specifically, delay comes from the parrhesiatic spirit 
that animated Italian Theory during the previous decades, while suspension arises from 
its diatribic soul. As such, suspension represents here both the most nihilistic peak 
reached by contemporary Italian Cynicism and also what poses the conditions for the 
development of more affirmative conceptions of the ‘political’. This chapter will delve 
into this analysis in order to understand how post-human conceptions of history affect 
cosmopolitan theory. 
 
 
Poverty in Time, first attempt: Delay 
 
Minor Neo-humanisms: the New Autonomy of the South 
 
1. 
Let us attempt to circumscribe more exhaustively the “exiled” cosmo-local laboratories 
previously imagined. What type of temporal model would best represent them? In other 
words, what conception of time would allow local realities to preserve their ontological 
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and political autonomy, while facilitating intercultural exchange and moral dialogue? 
How are we to conceive of the historical flow so as to obtain a cosmopolitan discourse 
that is not assertively “inclusive”, and which permits cultural and ethical differences to 
coexist without making appeal to any fanaticism of belonging? Addressing these 
questions without remaining trapped within paradoxical black holes is not an easy task.   
 An option at our disposal is the discourse that philosopher and sociologist Franco 
Cassano began to elaborate starting from the early 1990s. Through texts such as 
Approssimazione (Approximation, 1989), Southern Thought (1996), and Paeninsula 
(1998) Cassano has aimed at rectifying traditional cosmopolitan perspectives by 
providing an alternative conception of time. The essence that Cassano’s analysis 
personifies is narrowly post-colonial because it examines western thought, Mediterranean 
cultures, and also Italian history through some of the theoretical tools mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter. Drawing principally from Edward Said’s considerations on 
orientalism, Cassano points out that European discourses have frequently portrayed Italy 
as an exotic and attractive land whose paradisiacal façade coincided with its essential 
imperfection. Similarly to other Mediterranean realities, Italy has often represented the 
frontier separating Christian and Islamic worlds, and also the space wherein modernity 
was never able to reach its ultimate purposes. As such, it comes into sight as the ‘other’ 
by essence:  
“The Mediterranean (…) means backwardness and resistance to 
modernization…a swamp filled with conflicts, terrorists, superstitions and 
fundamentalisms: it is anti-modernity (…) never touched by the Protestant 
reform, the true cure-all that opens every door to modernity (…). The only 
acceptable meaning is the one mediated by tourism: wonderful landscapes (…) 
vacation beaches where the disciplined forces of the industrial polis escape to 
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enjoy their moments of freedom and of sun, and rediscover nature and their 
bodies.”212 
 
For Cassano, such an objectified construction of the south generated a social environment 
wherein feelings of reciprocity and solidarity substantially disappear, converting life into 
an isolating and destructive experience. Southern Thought claims that western modernity 
transformed human beings into alienated monads whose shortfall of empathy and 
capacity to communicate ultimately provides people with an extremely depressive 
existence. The legacy of the Enlightenment, defended by those who believed that 
scientific and technological progress would have eventually emancipated human beings, 
reveals its delusional core when one looks at the ruthless exploitation of labor, the 
devastation of landscapes and the despoliation of nature that are currently detectible 
across numerous southern areas.  
 Interestingly, Cassano places the origins of such a detrimental process within the 
historical phase when European philosophy dismissed the “Mediterranean”, which in 
ancient times had represented a geo-philosophical point of reference, and began to look at 
the Atlantic Ocean as a universe to conquer. The ethical values of balance and 
moderation endorsed by classical Greek Thought, whose virtuous personality was rooted 
within the insular climate from which it materialized, at that point had been completely 
forgotten. The fading of the Greek civilization followed the definite loss of a perfect 
equilibrium that had been established between soil and water, yielding to a long series of 
immoderate imperialistic projects which include the Hellenistic kingdoms, the Roman 
conquests and modern colonialism.  
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   Such a process ultimately produced a bipolar geopolitical system wherein the “north” 
discloses itself as the inclination to overcome all borders, also imposing on the “south” an 
accelerated perception of time. In this regard, Cassano points out how contemporary 
turbo-capitalism sustains itself on a brutal rationalization of temporality, which in all 
circumstances aims at maximizing its productive potential. As a matter of fact, the 
idealization of profit that one witnesses in the present epoch is partly grounded on the 
assumption that real life does not take place in the present, but is always deferred to a 
hypothetical future. Individuals are encouraged to achieve as fast as possible this 
imminent condition, which in all circumstances proves unattainable. The neo-liberal 
exploitation of the human existence reproduces itself precisely through such a temporal 
framework, which forces individuals to compete wildly against one another to the point 
of accepting passively their own annihilation. It is a civilization that Cassano identifies as 
homo currens, ironically denoting the rushing as well as self-destructive routines that 
people experience within modern society.  
 How to dismantle this vicious spell? How to stop such a self-devouring mode of 
social development? The reading of Cassano’s texts defended here identifies an 
interpretive thread which, on one hand, overcomes Said’s post-colonial views and, on the 
other, inherits the kynical components qualifying Albert Camus’ philosophical work. I 
will illustrate in detail the reasons that sustain this exegetic stance before evaluating 
southern thought from a critical cosmopolitan viewpoint. 
 Following Said, Cassano does not try to solve the aforementioned riddles by relying 
on the post-modern expedients earlier scrutinized in reference to Weak Thought. Said’s 
complaints pertaining to the “crippling effects of the ‘ideological anti-humanism of 
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Foucault, Barthes, Lyotard and others”213 are reclaimed by Cassano, who also believes to 
a degree that, “despite the (…) influential ideas of a certain facile type of anti-
foundationalism (…) is possible to be critical of humanism in the name of humanism and 
that, schooled in its abuses by the experiences of Euro-centrism and empire, one could 
fashion a different kind of humanism.”214 Such a polemic perspective reverberates within 
Cassano’s evaluation of Nietzsche and Heidegger, whose pioneer philosophical 
discourses were crucial for the subsequent attacks on western reason. Southern Thought 
looks at them as side effects triggered by the very humanistic malady which they were 
attempting to heal. Nietzsche’s post-humanism is regarded as an arrogant effort to 
overcome all possible horizons, a space wherein the ocean becomes a “desert, a 
loneliness that coherently moves toward its meeting with folly.”215 Heidegger’s 
reactionary doctrine, pursuing the opposite path, is interpreted as a “fundamentalism of 
the land” which proves just as counterproductive: “Neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger 
shows the path… Those who do not want either to be shipwrecked or become peasants or 
poets must work more modestly on a double motion, on a contradiction, on the conflicted 
lawfulness of departing and returning.”216 
 What scholars have yet to emphasize is the essential factor that distinguishes 
Cassano’s neo-humanistic view from Said’s post-colonial critique. Pushing Southern 
Thought beyond the landscapes defined by the theory of orientalism is, as Cassano 
explicitly admits, the pivotal role of the temporal element:  
“Said’s contribution is certainly valuable in helping to build the autonomy of those 
who have long been in a subaltern position. But perhaps we should add that, in the 
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case of the South, symbolic subjection passes also, and especially, through its 
definition as a space of backwardness and underdevelopment, as an unfinished 
version of the North. Symbolic dominance plays out around the imposition of a 
specific conception of historical time.”217      
 
The importance to theorize an alternative temporal paradigm leads Cassano to overcome 
Said’s post-colonial perspective and to develop a Mediterranean neo-humanism which 
dismisses an excess of rationalistic components, while preserving the values of 
“tolerance” and “liberty” that presumably animate western democratic systems. It is what 
Cassano strives to do by engaging with the work of Albert Camus. 
 
2. 
In a lecture titled “The New Mediterranean Culture” (1937) delivered in Algiers while 
Europe was suffering discrimination, xenophobia and oppression of all kinds, Camus had 
formerly envisioned the potential for the Mediterranean to become a geopolitical context 
where empathy and respect for ethnic and social differences could be rediscovered. 
Dismissing an imaginary “nationalism of the sun”218, the lecture revalued the 
multicultural tradition of the Mediterranean, wherein East and West meet in an 
“internationalism no longer inspired by a Christian Principle, by the Papal Rome of the 
Holy Roman Empire”219, but by man himself. Camus’ minor humanism, displaying 
kynical hostility towards transcendental concerns and excessively cerebral lines of 
reasoning, was mainly grounded on a predilection for nature as well as on skeptical 
feelings with respect to “that evil toy called Progress”220. Cassano appreciates Camus’ 
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critique of history, which dismisses delusional faiths within teleological or providential 
purposes, and places in human beings the responsibility to accomplish their own political 
and spiritual awakening:  
“Turning upside down the canon that Christianity and Marxism have in common 
(both optimistic with regard to the final end of history but pessimistic toward 
humanity), on a number of occasions Camus declares himself pessimistic toward 
history and optimistic toward humankind: if history is not the history of salvation, 
revolution, or progress, and nothing can be expected from it, then the only option 
lies in humanity and its dignity. For Camus, the aversion to the religion of history 
is not a secondary theme, the opportunity for a brilliant polemic; rather, it is a 
decisive juncture.”221 
 
Cassano inherits this rebelliousness against history by positing “slowness” as an 
existential, moral and political ideal. From his standpoint, “thinking on foot” is the ideal 
demeanor to adopt in order to undermine the structural framework that sustains the 
contemporary globalizing techno-capitalism:  
“We must go slow like an old country train carrying peasant women dressed in 
black, like those who go on foot and see the world magically opening head, 
because going on foot is like leafing through a book, while running is like looking 
at its cover… Going slow is everyone’s ability to be a philosopher, living at a 
different speed, closer to beginnings and ends, where we experience life at its 
fullest, either as it begins or as we take leave from it.”222 
 
Dismissing the readiness of those who take pride in consuming their daily existence as 
fast as possible, Cassano looks at “delay” as a conceptual instrument to endorse in order 
to counter Northern pressures and to provide the southern conscience with ethical and 
political dignity.  
 Cassano’s kynical incitement to dispossess oneself of the temporal anxiety and to 
remain “poor in time” recalls furthermore the principle of self-reliance, which was also 
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endorsed by Diogenes’ disciples in ancient times. What is in fact crucial from Cassano’s 
perspective is to dissociate the concept of “slowness” from the qualities that are 
commonly ascribed to southern peoples – i.e. laziness, indolence, apathy – and to think of 
it as the animating core of a self-aware and independent entity. A successful 
emancipation of the south presupposes the refusal of all external definitions and 
classifications, as well as the willingness to become an autonomous political subjectivity. 
In this regard, Cassano’s admiration of the morals and customs praised during the 
classical age of the Greek poleis retrieves the very ethical appeals that the Cynics had 
made during Hellenism. Southern Thought in fact locates the virtuous and moderate 
aspects characterizing Greek civilization within the coastal shores which the Greeks 
never overcame in search of territorial conquests. Such a view is historically accurate to 
the extent that, although the Greek city-states were reciprocally connected for purposes of 
trade exchanges, they were nonetheless “self-sufficient enough for autarkeia to be 
regarded as a practical ideal.”223 The importance of self-reliance, which can be detected 
within Plato and Aristotle’s texts, became even more fundamental during the Hellenistic 
age, when the poleis had substantially lost their political autonomy and had transformed 
into administrative centers. It was during this time period that the Cynics adopted self-
reliance as a fundamental ethical principle, while also comparing moral strength to a 
perfect city-state that does not need to rely on any other political community for its own 
survival.  
 Because of the similar climate from which Southern Thought materializes, Cassano’s 
primacy of nature over history acquires kynical connotations, recalling Diogenes’ belief 
that moral integrity and self-reliance allow virtuous individuals to endure through the 
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uncontrollable misfortunes generated by the temporal flow. In so doing, Cassano’s ideal 
of autonomy circumscribes an exiled subordinate space wherein one can be redeemed 
from the illusory and harmful chimeras that northern mentalities perpetuate. 
Unsurprisingly, the delayed life pace that Southern Thought advocates is also associated 
with the image of a “happy poverty” that Camus experienced during his childhood on the 
streets of Algiers, “under a happy sun, in a nature with which one feels harmony, not 
hostility”.224 Despite severe economic restrictions, the Algerian years elicited in Camus 
joyful memories, evoking a long-gone social environment that dismissed feelings of envy 
and resentment and enhanced values of solidarity and alliance. What Italian Thought 
retrieves from Camus’ existential experience is an antagonistic conception of “poverty”; 
poverty, that is, as a counter-hegemonic tool. In what sense can the condition of “poor” 
be a space of resistance? Is it possible to conceptualize a notion of human prosperity that 
is not grounded on the material accumulation which the society of consumerism promotes 
fervently? How are we to remove self-fulfillment from the domain circumscribed by 
ordinary societal ambitions such as wealth, sumptuousness and supremacy of all sorts? 
These questions bring forth controversial reflections.  
 On one hand, it is reasonable to converge with Cassano’s observation that optimistic 
glorifications of poverty are often an expression of privileged social areas, wherein 
hunger is not truly experienced and contempt for luxury is conveyed with the sole 
intention to fit in to a particular status. On the other hand, one wonders whether an image 
of “poor” that ignores the negative features acknowledged by common sense could be in 
some ways helpful for our critical purposes. The concept we are looking for is devoid of 
gloomy connotations like “deficiency”, “neediness”, or “scarcity”; as such, it does not 
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entail an urgency to upgrade from supposed substandard circumstances or to chase the 
status quo definition of “better off”. The notion of “poverty” we are searching for does 
not disclose itself as an “incompleteness” that needs to be perfected, nor as a potentiality 
that strives to achieve its own actuality; dismissing any aspirations for the future, it 
adheres in all cases to the current moment.  Poverty, from this perspective, is pure 
appreciation for the present. Regarded per se, this conception of poverty refuses pitiful 
and pathetic representations and brings to light the kynical values of “frugality”, 
“temperance”, “parsimony”, and “simplicity” that Southern Thought promotes.   
 Cassano’s cynicism, depicting poverty a way to engage with the temporal flow, looks 
at the Mediterranean as a geopolitical universe which can potentially give birth to 
alternative forms of social development embracing values of moderation. Rejecting the 
overconfident attitude displayed by northern globalism, the south is the space wherein 
philosophical thought, moral principles and political practices can reacquire a just 
balance. In particular, the Mediterranean tradition is vital to the extent it provides the 
notion of the border, which is commonly regarded as a geographical entity, with an 
ethical content. From this perspective, the margin is not only what separates different 
communities from one another, but also what gathers human beings together by 
reminding them of their physical and moral limitations. Reinterpreting the frontier as an 
ethical boundary, Cassano envisions the rise of a southern multicultural civilization that, 
as Bouchard meaningfully summarizes, “is no longer founded upon the progress of 
history of post-Kantian philosophy, but on the respect for human nature, the necessity of 
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community and solidarity, the importance of an ethics of measures and limits necessary 
to counter present-day realities.”225  
 
 
Recognition, Affirmation, Singularity: the Way of the Quiet Maverick  
 
1. 
 In view of the aforesaid kynical factors, is Cassano’s temporal paradigm able to 
sustain our critical cosmopolitan purposes? Can his conception of the Mediterranean be 
considered a faithful representation of the antagonistic cosmo-local political spaces that 
we are searching? These questions cannot be addressed without identifying an 
evolutionary thread within Cassano’s philosophical production, which arguably 
underwent a quite relevant shift between the publication of Southern Thought (1996) and 
Paeninsula (1998).  
 In the early 1990s Cassano’s perspective manifests a fair degree of suspiciousness 
with regards to cosmopolitan discourses, which are merely looked at as high class modes 
of thinking representing privileged people “who are less tied to a community because 
they are conscious that they can succeed in other communities.’’226 Bouchard points out 
that in this philosophical phase Cassano’s neo-humanism is problematic as it occasionally 
grounds the Mediterranean exceptionalism on geological reasons, thus acquiring 
essentialist connotations. In some circumstances Cassano justifies the Italian vocation to 
                                                 
225 Bouchard (2008), p. 300.  
226 Cassano (2012), p. 49.  
164 
 
cultural openness through the peninsular structure characterizing Italian land.227 Some 
distance needs to be taken from this criticism, inasmuch as it illegitimately labels as 
“essentialist” all philosophical views which rely to a degree on geographical factors. 
Following Bouchard’s argument, one should condemn every sociological or 
anthropological discourse which partly explains customs and social practices through 
elements such as weather conditions, environmental features, or seasonal variations. 
Consequently, the popular saying that “people are most likely to feel happier during the 
summer” which, as shallow and superficial as it is, can hardly be considered as a 
“reifying” belief, should also be stigmatized as “essentialist”. As a matter of fact, the 
dismissal of essentialist accounts of moral values, cultures and identity does not 
necessarily entail the approval of constructivist paradigms, representing self-perception 
as an object that can be elaborated freely and independently from any external inputs. It is 
reasonable to imagine, on the contrary, that the human psyche is almost certainly 
provided with the capacity to transcend the limits imposed by the surrounding 
environment, which nonetheless can affect the moral and existential journey that each 
person undergoes. In view of these observations, Cassano’s intention can hardly be seen 
as the mere attempt to confine ideals of cultural diversity within a class of irremovable 
ontological qualities. At the same time, Bouchard’s concern that an immoderate 
insistence on the redemption of the south might convert philosophical thought into a 
“territorializing identity-politics whereby regional, sub-national belonging is promoted to 
a position of primacy in present-day European geopolitics”228 should not be indifferently 
disregarded.  
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 The identitarian aspects qualifying Cassano’s earlier texts are likely rooted within the 
epistemological assumptions he borrows from Cacciari’s negative thinking, also 
depending on the aversion exhibited with respect to Vattimo’s philosophy.229 This 
perspective appears to be smoothly alleviated in Paeninsula and the later editions of 
Southern Thought, wherein the author reevaluates more positively the cosmopolitan 
features characterizing the Italian tradition, ascribing them to a “weak identity”, a “weak 
sense of belonging”, “weak frontiers” and a “weak nationalism”: 
“Questa identità debole e paradossale, questo essere accomunati soprattutto dalla 
critica di se stessi, è la forma negativa e disfattista con cui si presenta agli italiani 
una loro potenziale qualità, l’assenza di boria patriottica, la curiosità e la 
disponibilità ad imparare dall’esperienza altrui, quello che molti hanno chiamato 
cosmopolitismo.”230 (Italics mine) 
 
(“This weak and paradoxical identity, this being gathered above all by self-
criticism, is the negative and nihilistic form with which one of their potential 
qualities reveals itself to the Italians, the absence of patriotic arrogance, the 
curiosity and willingness to learn from other people’s experience, what many 
have identified as cosmopolitanism.”) 
 
Cassano’s reassessment of weak thought allows him to widen his philosophical views and 
to engage more positively with critical cosmopolitan discourses. The Prologue to the 
2006 edition of Southern Thought alludes to a metaphorical significance of the 
Mediterranean, which in this new phase represents neither specific geographical areas nor 
privileged historical legacies, but “explicitly claims for itself the connection between a 
South, the Italian one, and the Souths of the worlds.”231 This clarification converts 
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Southern Thought into a discourse that speaks on behalf of all social groups which have 
been damaged by the western project of modernity, thus aligning to some extent with De 
Sousa Santos’ subaltern cosmopolitan idea that “whoever is a victim of local intolerance 
and discrimination needs cross-border tolerance and support; whoever lives in misery in a 
world of wealth needs cosmopolitan solidarity; whoever is a non- or second-class citizen 
of a country or the world needs an alternative conception of national and global 
citizenship.”232 This theoretical convergence furthermore reverberates within the 
importance that both authors place on the temporal component, which is equally regarded 
as crucial for the elaboration of a truly emancipatory discourse.   
 From our kynical stance, the discursive area crossing over Santos’ analysis and 
Southern Thought needs to be revised. Specifically, I am referring to the following two 
factors, neither of which resounds harmoniously within the approach to cosmopolitan 
thought adopted here: 1) the ambiguous attempt to achieve “transformative” results by 
relying on an “affirmative” temporal framework; 2) the related incapacity to convert 
“individualism” into “singularity”. A digression on these two points is needed before 
moving forward. 
 Cassano’s critical strategy does not place particular importance on redistributive 
material claims, thus taking distance from moral cosmopolitan theories such as the ones 
developed, for example, by Pogge and Beitz. As opposed to Pogge, Cassano does not 
suggest modifying international trade policies in order to allow populations in poverty to 
achieve wealthier conditions. Unlike Beitz, he does not claim that international relations 
should be rectified according to principles of domestic redistributive justice.233 Rather 
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than encouraging a fairer allocation of wealth, Southern Thought advocates the cultural 
recognition of specific minorities which for centuries have been neglected, objectified 
and also classified by means of illegitimate criteria. It is no accident that Cassano 
compares his idea of the “south” to the way in which several gender theories represent 
the “feminine”; namely, not as an imperfect or incomplete version of the masculine, but 
as “a different way of seeing that aims at protecting its own autonomy vis-à-vis the 
developed world while deconstructing its symbolic arrogance.”234 
  Nancy Fraser’s thoughtful account of recognition strategies, distinguishing 
affirmative methods from transformative approaches, is indispensable here for obtaining 
an exhaustive evaluation of the theory in question.235An ‘affirmative remedy’ for 
injustice intends to rectify social disparities without modifying the fundamental structure 
that produces them. For instance, within the political context of the United States, an 
affirmative remedy for racism can be represented by black-identity strategies, endowing 
African American citizens with more relevant social weight. On the other hand, a 
‘transformative remedy’ aspires to repair inequalities by reshaping their inner “generative 
framework”236. In the case of racism, such a method can be exemplified by political 
modes of thinking which prefer to dismantle the black-white dichotomy as well as 
ordinary conceptions of race and ethnicity.  
 Frasier rightfully points out that affirmative recognition strategies are ultimately self-
contradictory, inasmuch as they privilege one group over another, thus betraying the 
egalitarian premises from which they move. Concerning affirmative feminism, for 
instance, Frasier concludes: “Read through the lens, the cultural politics of affirming 
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women’s difference appears as an affront to the liberal welfare state’s official 
commitment to the equal moral worth of persons.”237 On the other hand, transformative 
approaches, which Frasier mainly associates with deconstructive philosophical 
maneuvers, are more self-consistent because their implementation does not betray the 
universalistic conception of recognition they presuppose.     
 Cassano’s critical purposes appear to be mostly transformative, to the extent that 
Southern Thought envisions an alternative mode of social development which should 
presumably emancipate the entire human species. The kynical values of autonomy and 
self-sufficiency that Cassano calls for, moreover, represent the intention to disengage 
from the whole moral framework sustaining the present-day economy, so as to assist the 
emergence of new and more desirable ways of life. Despite these transformative aspects, 
however, Cassano relies on a bivalent temporal paradigm which preserves the very social 
structure he aims to undermine. Because of the speed-delay dichotomy that Southern 
Thought presupposes, Cassano’s line of reasoning risks prioritizing specific identities 
over others, thus supporting group differentiations and obtaining a self-defeating 
conceptual system wherein “the reifying Atlantic North becomes, in turn, reified by the 
Global and Mediterranean Souths”238.  
 For similar reasons, Southern Thought also aligns with Santos’ conception of the 
cosmopolitan domain as a “community of victims” - to use Taraborrelli’s phrase - who 
presumably experience oppression more intensively and unfairly than other individuals. I 
am not suggesting here to minimize the amount of horrifying inequalities, discrimination 
and brutal violence that occur all over the world on a daily basis. Rather, I am dismissing 
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the affirmative perspective in which “evil” is often ascribed to specific parts of human 
communities that appear to be exceptionally sinful and malevolent. The position 
defended here, on the contrary, conceives of injustice as indifferently afflicting all 
people, also locating it within the central core of the human world, whose nuclear 
framework needs to be restructured. Following this line of reasoning, kynical “border 
thinking” does not call for a redemption of the oppressed versus the oppressors; quite 
differently, it looks at the “displaced”, the “marginalized”, and the “ostracized” as life 
spaces that most authentically represent historical and sociopolitical transitions and 
which, therefore, have the potential to provide philosophical thought with transformative 
resources. What’s missing in Southern Thought is the effort to extrapolate from these 
exiled conceptual domains a series of deconstructive maneuvers that rise above the mere 
demand of respect for existing identities, while reshaping relations of recognition and 
destabilizing group separation. Pursuing transformative purposes through an affirmative 
conceptual framework, Cassano’s theory might prove to be critically ineffective. 
 
2. 
 Moving onto our second critical point, the aforesaid lack of transformative tools 
becomes even more visible if one considers the skeptical stance that Cassano takes with 
respect to forms of social and cultural hybridization. These are substantially dismissed as 
phenomena that “often obscure the real inequalities and the conflict-ridden aspects of 
interconnectedness”239, and which do not encompass any emancipating potential. From 
the post-human cosmopolitan perspective, on the contrary, emancipation is strongly 
correlated to the intimate capacity of overcoming one-dimensional representations of the 
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persona that chauvinistic and bigoted mentalities endorse. Individuals who identify as 
black and Italian or as European and Muslim cannot be merely seen, as Cassano 
sporadically appears to claim, as outcomes of an arrogant globalism that is inclined to 
exceed all possible frontiers. Quite the opposite, the presence of the “many” within the 
“self” is what unfetters the polychrome and polyvalent essence that in all circumstances 
characterizes human life and which, because of repressive social biases, is often forced to 
remain hidden. From our cosmopolitan viewpoint, pluralism materializes first internally 
through the formation of a multisided self-perception, before coming to being. This also 
means that the cosmopolitan capacity to communicate with the diversity of many, in turn, 
presupposes the ability to speak and be at ease with oneself. 
 The theoretical weight of this topic is entirely dismissed by Southern Thought, which 
considers “isolation” and “alienation” as synonyms, and neglects the critical potential that 
spaces of loneliness generate. Kynical cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, thoroughly 
distinguishes “isolation”, forcing the individual to experience a vulnerable disconnection 
from the reality, from “solitude”, which can be described as the voluntary attempt to 
nourish and express one’s own singular and irreproducible essence. It is true that isolated 
life conditions often result in pathological forms of self-estrangement as well as in 
unemotional and anesthetized ways to relate to other people. It is also true that all forms 
of critical thinking necessarily materialize by disengaging from existing communities, 
whose roles and practices are frequently established by specific privileged groups and, 
therefore, presuppose class, race, and gender biases. Uniqueness and exceptionality, 
escaping classifications and standardizations, transpire in all cases from areas of 
“solitude”.  
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 In support of this view, the problematic condition experienced by contemporary 
Japanese youth, involving a wider sociological analysis exceeding the goals pursued here, 
is nonetheless worth recounting. In fact, it brings to light a pattern that is detectable in 
numerous western areas and is becoming increasingly evident in Italy.240 Differently from 
what many communitarians might claim, recent sociological analysis shows that 
globalizing pressures prove more destructive within societies which are robustly 
traditional and oppose those influences in excessively inflexible ways. This is what is 
happening in Japan, wherein conservative elites have responded very aggressively to 
globalization, refusing to reform the core of the employment system. Dismissing to a 
high degree the capitalistic flexibility of labor that characterizes the American-style post-
industrialization, Japanese institutions have strived to preserve a central, stable and well 
protected labor force. This maneuver, however, proved ultimately counterproductive, as it 
worsened feelings of self-estrangement among both precarious workers and unoccupied 
youth. A major responsibility in this regard rests within the one-dimensional connotations 
qualifying the Japanese society, which requires all citizens to follow a similar path and 
labels a failure whoever refuses to conform. Either because of the unwillingness to follow 
passively the social conventions or the corresponding impossibility to be integrated, 
many young boys and girls embrace the so-called hikikomori lifestyle (literally “pulling 
inward, being confined”), preferring to confine themselves for months and even years 
within the isolation of their homes. Despite the relief that television, internet and social 
media offer to these rebels, whose presence is at the moment observable not only in Japan 
but also in other western environments, psychologists converge on the hypothesis that 
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technology cannot be blamed as the root of the pathology. Rather, this root is identified 
within globalizing influences and the exceptionally conformist personality that 
characterizes the Japanese community: “withdrawees can thus be viewed as the 
disempowered victims of the elites’ hot reactions to globalization.”241 
 Cassano’s allegory of the “fundamentalism of the land”, which he considers to be as 
harmful as a limitless globalism, seems to allude to the “hot” inflexible reactions just 
described. It is no accident that Japan’s labor market closely resembles the one that has 
recently surfaced in Italy, wherein it is also extremely “difficult to move inwards from 
the margins into the core of labor force”242 and where, consequently, the hikikomori 
phenomenon might become more perceptible in the near future. What Cassano’s total 
condemnation of “isolation” neglects, however, is the possibility of a different type of 
“solitary” reaction exhibiting more creative, active and socially efficient connotations. I 
am referring to the category of individuals that social psychologists identify as “quiet 
mavericks”; namely, young non-conformists who dismiss the communitarian standards, 
while also striving to convert their marginalization into an opportunity for positively 
affecting their society. Focusing still on contemporary Japan, Toinonen, Norasakkunkit 
and Uchida locate this rebellious figure among social entrepreneurs who lead flexible 
non-profit organizations or small for-profit companies and who “instead of being openly 
confrontational with the state, local governments, and corporations, they seek to 
strategically engage such institutions, promoting their own unconventional ideas as 
innovations or solutions to social problems.”243 Working in a large variety of domains, 
from online trading to art, fashion and other types of business, these invisible dissenters 
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are able to question the status quo by developing original methods, absorbing 
international ideas of “openness, tolerance of diversity and self-actualization”244, and 
fusing local elements with global values. Although journalists and social analysts 
generally pay more attention to the loudest and most belligerent no-global movements of 
protest, these solitary insurgents, relying on “the cultural and social agility to utilize 
global influences without being defeated by conformist pressures”245, ultimately 
implement resistance in more “tactful” as well as more efficient ways. For these reasons, 
sociologists believe that, in western social environments, innovative conceptions of labor 
and alternative notions of successful careers will most likely be elaborated by this group 
of active loners, who neutralize both blind particularism and arrogant universalism by 
expressing their unique and singular personality.  
 And after all, isn’t a certain degree of solitude indispensable for acquiring freedom of 
thought? Isn’t some sort of voluntary separation crucial for developing innovative ideas? 
Isn’t true creativity somehow self-exclusive and self-ostracizing? Living in “solitude” 
without confining themselves in “isolation”, quiet mavericks combine successfully global 
themes with local molecules, also personifying Hannah Arendt’s ideal of the self-exiled 
intellectual, who does not completely disregard the reality, but nonetheless seeks to 
escape its oppressive essence.  Due to the lack of transformative components, Cassano’s 
analysis does not sufficiently value these imperceptible forms of antagonism, thus 
proving incapable to conceptualize the transition between “isolation” and “singularity” 
that our critical line of thinking is envisioning.  Let us interrogate post-1990 Italian 
Thought in other areas to see if we are able to fulfill our needs. 
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Poverty in Time, second attempt: Suspension  
 
Anthropocentrism, Sovereignty, Law: an Ontology of Formlessness 
 
1. 
If we walk the trail paved by Giorgio Agamben in the early 1990s, we will understand 
why our philosophical apprehension partly alleviates. It was during that time that 
Agamben began to work on the Homo Sacer project, prioritizing political problems over 
linguistic themes.  Agamben’s views represent the most nihilistic peak reached during the 
last forty years by Italian Cynicism, as well as the doctrine that set up the conditions for 
more positive and affirmative conceptions of the political. Despite its pessimistic façade, 
Agamben’s post-human discourse relies on a critique of history which encompasses 
powerful transformative factors; as such, it offers the postulates for a more accurate 
conceptualization of the aforesaid cosmo-local spheres of resistance. 
 In order to fully grasp the main point of Agamben’s discourse, it must be described as 
an attempt to reform Foucault’s bio-political theory and, simultaneously, as a debt owed 
to Hannah Arendt’s philosophical reflections. Inheriting Foucault’s methodology, 
Agamben also employs a biological terminology for interpreting political events, while 
conceiving of “life” as a discursive outcome of power collisions. As a disciple of 
Foucault, Agamben values genealogical types of explanation, exploring the connections 
between language, knowledge and politics in order to understand how “subjectivity” and 
“identity” result from disciplinary modes of control. What Agamben substantially rejects 
of his predecessor, is the hypothetical transition between a “sovereign” and a “bio-
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political” kind of power which, according to Foucault, took place at the end of the 
modern age. Foucault firmly distinguishes sovereign power from bio-power. Sovereign 
power discloses itself through well identifiable rulers whose main authority over the 
citizens is to take their life or let them live. Bio-power is characterized differently as a de-
personified type of power, which relies on capitalistic dynamics, is substantially devoid 
of agency, and produces subjectivity by fostering life or disallowing it to the point of 
death.246 Agamben expresses skepticism apropos this account, to the extent that it does 
not explain the connections linking sovereignty, modernity and the totalitarian 
shipwrecks that flooded the 20th century. For Agamben, deeper clarity can be obtained by 
combining the two modes of control identified by Foucault within one theoretical 
paradigm, highlighting the paradoxical way in which power has been exercised 
throughout western history.  
  In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) Agamben conceives of 
western sovereignty as a twofold mechanism which mainly confides in the authority to 
modify people’s social status at its own convenience. Taking into account the Roman 
juridical terminology, which planted seeds for the subsequent growth of European civil 
law, the author locates the essence of western politics within the paradoxical status of the 
homo sacer. This phrase denotes a category of specific citizens who were considered 
“sacred” by the law to the extent that they could be legally killed by anybody but not 
sacrificed to the Gods. In other words, the homo sacer condition exceeded both the 
juridical domain and divine law. On one hand, it did not enjoy the protection of ordinary 
provisions on homicide; on the other, it was associated with a potential death that did not 
signify any religious ritual. The real frame concealed within western manifestations of 
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sovereign power rests within the privilege to proclaim such a precarious condition of 
sacredness, coinciding with the exception to the rule: “The sovereign sphere is the sphere 
in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a 
sacrifice, and sacred life – that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life 
that has been captured in this sphere.”247  
 Derived from these premises, the influence that sovereign powers exercise over a 
community is revealed through their capacity to revoke juridical membership at any time. 
The appeal that contemporary democracies make to their constitutions, therefore, cannot 
successfully dismantle this vicious mechanism, which narrowly depends upon the 
alliance that sovereignty establishes with law. Every normative code encompasses factors 
which regulate “life” by means of a potential suspension of its legal position: “If the 
exception is the structure of sovereignty, then sovereignty is…the originary structure in 
which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it.”248 Juridical procedures 
and principles cannot help one resolve the aforementioned contradiction because they 
play a vital role within the construction of the very mechanism that one is attempting to 
undermine.  
 As we know, Agamben claims that both the paradox of sovereignty and the related 
condition of exceptional “sacredness” became more visible during the 20th century, 
mainly in consequence of the atrocities perpetrated by European totalitarianisms. 
Agamben is convinced that the massacres perpetrated under the Nazi regime in Germany 
cannot be interpreted as a historical anomaly which drastically deviates from occidental 
tradition. Quite the opposite, the suffering of the Jews revealed a contradiction that had 
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always been inscribed within western politics, and which was ultimately producing the 
most destructive outcomes. Despite this substantial continuity, Agamben aligns to a 
degree with Hannah Arendt’s view and identifies a main difference that pulls the 
contemporary age away from previous epochs. That is, the fact that the homo sacer 
condition, presumably representing the state of exception, has been in recent times 
proclaimed and applied in innumerable circumstances to the point of becoming the rule. 
It is in essence what happened at the time of Nazi Germany, when laws tragically became 
synonymous with the figure of the fürher: “The camp is the space of this absolute 
impossibility of deciding between fact and law, rule and application, exception and rule, 
which nevertheless incessantly decides between them.”249 The superimposition between 
norms and facts is what captures the real core of the contemporary epoch, when states of 
exception reproduce exponentially and uncontrollably. Most of the events taking place in 
our time - from the occurrence of ethnic conflicts in Jugoslavia to the reemergence of 
neo-fascisms in Europe, from the proliferation of refugee camps across western areas to 
the US approval of several post-9/11 policies such as the “patriot act” - should be 
illustrated in these terms. Far from disfiguring western history, all these phenomena are 
rooted within its bio-political essence, which “is at least as old as the sovereign 
exception.”250  
 Following these hypothesis, Agamben refers to the “concentration camp” as the 
theoretical paradigm that best describes the human condition within the contemporary 
age, when recurrent forms of sociopolitical displacement force the large majority of 
people to experience a constant state of vulnerability. The appeal to humanistic principles 
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can hardly lighten such a sorrowful scenario. Drawing again from Arendt’s line of 
reasoning, Agamben expresses some skepticism regarding the promotion of human 
rights, whose implementation is paradoxically dependent upon the very national powers 
which often disrespect human dignity. On this subject, Agamben’s analysis is 
provocative as much as it is lucid. The incongruity that is inscribed within the notion of 
“human rights” can be traced back to the original French code that first proclaimed them. 
It is not by accident that the 1789 Declaration refers quite vaguely to both “men” and 
citizens”. This linguistic association merely signifies the shift from a religious conception 
of juridical legitimacy, which had previously placed within God the recipient containing 
all types of justice, to the Westphalian secularized scenario: “Declarations of rights must 
therefore be viewed as the place in which the passage from divinely authorized royal 
sovereignty to national sovereignty is accomplished.”251  
 From this perspective, the notion of “human rights” loses its abstract moral character 
and no longer functions as a regulative point of reference for jurists or governmental 
policies, because it merely indicates a historical-political transition. Due to the global 
crisis generated by World War I, national institutions were no longer able to trust in the 
category of “birth country”, because millions of refugees had disseminated across 
Europe. As a consequence, the notions of ‘citizen’ and ‘human’ began to dissociate from 
one another. The proliferation of non-governmental humanitarian organizations, whose 
controversial role has been amply examined in the first chapter, can be explained as a 
further outcome of this disconnection: “The separation between humanitarianism and 
politics that we are experiencing today is the extreme phase of the separation of the rights 
of man from the rights of the citizen… we must seriously consider Arendt’s claim that 
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the fates of human rights and the nation-state are bound together such that the decline and 
crisis of the one necessarily implies the end of the other.”252 
 
2. 
 The political considerations regarding human rights expressed in Homo Sacer lead 
Agamben to take into account the philosophical problem of “anthropocentrism”, which is 
discussed explicitly in The Open: Man and Animal (2002). In this text, Agamben detects 
structural correspondences linking the aforementioned paradox of sovereignty to the 
evolution of western knowledge. In particular, Agamben locates the main discursive 
framework producing states of exception within the philosophical-scientific tradition 
which, from Aristotle to Heidegger, classified life by means of reiterated partitions such 
as animate-inanimate, organic-inorganic, etc. This harmful line of thinking is identified as 
the ‘anthropological machine’; namely, a violent apparatus which elaborates ‘humanity’ 
and ‘animality’ through a process of exclusion-inclusion and generates space between the 
two entities, while also bringing about a caesura within man himself. Such a vicious 
conceptual tool achieved its most developed phase within Heidegger’s The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics (1929) and the infamous classification according to which 
stones are presumably ‘world-less’, animals are ‘poor in world’, and men ‘world 
forming’. Heidegger’s taxonomy reverberated within the horrifying way in which the 
perception of the Jewish people was discursively elaborated under the Nazi regime by 
means of “de-nationalization” and “animalization” of the human.  
 Moving forward, The Open examines the conceptual presuppositions that sustained 
the Nazi insanity by exploring the borders which separate philosophy and biology, also 
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comparing Heidegger’s doctrines to some scientific experiments that were financed by 
Hitler’s administration. Agamben pays scrupulous attention to one specific occasion, 
when scientists kept a tick alive for eighteen years without sustenance, in a condition of 
absolute starvation and isolation. The case of the tick, reflecting the agonizing condition 
of the Muselmann, brought to light what Agamben names bare life (vita nuda); that is, a 
mode of existence which materializes within the space dividing men from beasts, and 
denotes a living being produced coercively and deprived of any juridical recognition.  
 Because the bare life condition, as previously anticipated, represents an exemplary 
model for interpreting contemporary sociopolitical phenomena, it goes without saying 
that Agamben’s perspective easily lends itself to be interpreted in catastrophic manners. 
As a matter of fact, more than one thinker referred to the Homo Sacer project in 
apocalyptical terms. On the contrary, the perspective defended here will rely on the 
kynical aspects that characterize Agamben’s post-humanism so as to rectify the 
aforementioned misreading as follows: 1) despite its cataclysmic connotations, 
Agamben’s bare life also functions as an ontological transformative tool that is 
potentially able to dismantle the violent device generating the exceptional logic of 
sovereignty. 2) Such a displacement, which is mainly pursued by Agamben through a 
deconstruction of history, exhibits strong kynical connotations. Far from endorsing 
narrowly religious perspectives, Agamben posits a Franciscan poverty in time which calls 
for a cosmo-political antagonism that thrives outside of all juridical domains. The reasons 
justifying these claims can be illustrated along the following lines.  
 Several scholars have evaluated Agamben’s doctrine as an essentially pessimistic and 
dreadful philosophical discourse.  For instance, Alain Badiou disapproves of the fragile 
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aspects characterizing the notion of bare life, which he sees as ultimately “always 
sacrificed”253. Even more disastrous are the considerations expressed by Ernesto Laclau, 
who perceives the Agambean state of exception as “the unavoidable advance towards a 
totalitarian society”254, and substantially condemns the Homo Sacer project as a form of 
mere “political nihilism”.255 Within the Italian philosophical debate, Roberto Esposito 
partly aligns with these interpretations and highlights the destructive message delivered 
by Agamben’s bio-politics, which in all cases produces thanato-political outcomes. One 
should certainly provide these exegetic suggestions with some reliability, to the extent 
that finding optimistic messages within Agamben’s texts is not a stress-free mission. And 
yet it is legitimate to wonder to what degree these hermeneutical perspectives are able to 
capture the multifaceted nature qualifying the Homo Sacer doctrine. In fact, a closer look 
at Agamben’s post-1990 work, which certainly follow from tragic postulates, reveals 
nonetheless an argument pursuing emancipatory purposes. These are explicitly confessed 
in The Open, which provides bare life with the active capacity to potentially dismantle 
the aforementioned anthropological framework:   
“To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will 
therefore mean no longer to seek new – more effective or more authentic – 
articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that – within 
man – separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the 
suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man.”256 (Italics mine) 
 
This intense passage cannot be interpreted without difficulties, because of the paradoxical 
conclusion that Agamben appears to draw from his analysis: the decrepit entity he 
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describes as an outcome of a vicious historical process, at the same time should be 
perceived as the mechanism that may very well break the exclusion-inclusion spell from 
the anthropological machine. It is an uncanny line of reasoning that leaves an open door 
for potential redemption after all. Let us then look at the aforementioned fragment from 
the perspective defended by Lorenzo Chiesa, who also remarks that “what is scarcely 
investigated, or altogether overlooked, by countless analyses of the notion of homo sacer 
is the very fact that, beginning with the introduction of the first volume of his series, 
Agamben explicitly relates such notion to the possibility of a ‘new politics.’”257 In view 
of this more hopeful perspective, what does Agamben mean by ‘Shabbat of both animal 
and man’? What does the suspension of the suspension entail?  
 The hypothesis that looks at Agamben’s Shabbat as a promotion of religious tones, 
and which is partly endorsed by Chiesa, appears to be excessively simplistic. As I have 
already clarified elsewhere258, such a perspective is one-dimensional because it does not 
take into account the relevant post-Christian and immanent components that qualify 
contemporary Italian Theory. Research shows that, particularly after 1990, Italian 
philosophers have displayed in numerous circumstances the propensity to explain 
religious concepts in worldly terms, also relying significantly on Agamben’s thought so 
as to nourish this political-theological inclination.259 The tension that materializes in 
between Agamben’s ascetic atmospheres and the lay personality characterizing Italian 
Theory will not easily find relief if not considered as a kynical phenomenon. I will return 
again to this topic shortly. For now I will clarify that, distant from advocating narrowly 
transcendent motives, what Agamben prioritizes in order to accomplish moral and social 
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progress is the necessity to carry out specific ontological shifts: “Ontology, or first 
philosophy, is not an innocuous academic discipline, but in every sense the fundamental 
operation in which anthropogenesis, the becoming human of the living being, is 
realized.”260  
 More specifically, Agamben’s discourse calls for the necessity to elaborate an 
ontology that dismisses the taxonomic divisions perpetrated for centuries within western 
knowledge, and which describes ‘life’ in more fluid terms. In this regard, it may be 
demonstrated that The Open exhibits a substantial continuity with previous texts. 
Although in the beginning of the 1990s the idea of bare life had not fully revealed itself, 
The Coming Community (1993) had grounded moral activity on an ontological account 
characterizing human existence as substantially amorphous and undetermined. It is no 
accident that, precisely in a chapter called ‘Ethics’, Agamben explains the moral subject 
as pure potentiality; that is, as an entity to which neither specific properties nor 
teleological purposes can be ascribed. Without such an ontological postulate – Agamben 
points out – human behavior would be explainable as a series of mere mechanical 
operations and, consequently, no ethics could be developed:  
This is why the only ethical experience (which, as such, cannot be a task or a 
subjective decision) is the experience of being (one’s own) potentiality, of being 
(one’s own) possibility – exposing, that is, in every form one’s own 
amorphousness and in every act one’s own inactuality.261 
 
In The Open Agamben’s ontology of formlessness takes a considerable step forward 
towards the realization of an authentic post-human perspective.262 The aforementioned 
principle of “potentiality” is employed in this text in order to destabilize the human-
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animal dichotomy, which is regarded as the root of all discordant oppositions. The 
ultimate goal is likely to prevent obsessive identity attachments from forming so as to 
turn away any kind of social, ethnic or cultural stigmatization. An ethical analysis that 
does not prioritize such ontological transformation, and which refuses to delve into the 
bare ‘emptiness’ that Agamben conjures up, is bound to perpetuate the same circular 
mechanism that it aims to break. It is for this reason that ethical notions such as ‘right’ 
and ‘value’ are considered as secondary: “It is more urgent to work on these divisions, to 
ask in what way – within man – has man been separated from non-man, and the animal 
from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues, on so called human rights 
and values.”263 
 Recalling Nancy Frasier’s terminology, one should look at the suspension of the 
suspension for what it really is: a “transformative” remedy through which Agamben steps 
away from the un-decidable mechanisms that for centuries have distressed western 
politics and history by transforming the conceptual structure which generates them. 
Despite its destructive façade, Agamben’s discourse encompasses components that 
visibly restructure relations of recognition and destabilize group differentiation. From this 
transformative perspective, the ultimate significance of the Shabbat rests within the 
comparison that The Coming Community establishes between the notion of a “whatever 
singularity” and the trespassed of the Limbo. In this mythical dimension souls are neither 
blessed nor damned, but thanks to such an uncertain self-perception they represent a 
fertile terrain for the rise of new and more desirable modes of social life. Whether or not 
this type of “naked” singularity has the capacity to offer a solid ground for the 
theorization of the cosmo-local spaces of resistance that we have been looking for will be 
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evaluated by taking into account Agamben’s critique of history. This is regarded in The 
Open as one of the most fundamental theoretical moves to carry out in order to 
accomplish the ontological adjustments that Homo Sacer summons.  
 
 
     Franciscan Cynicism: Towards a Transformative Cosmopolitics 
 
1. 
Let us go back to the strange case of the starving tick, described by Agamben through the 
eyes of the scientist who carried out the experiment: 
“He gives no explanation of this peculiar fact, and limits himself to supposing that 
in that “period of waiting” the tick lies in “a sleep-like state similar to the one we 
experience every night.” He then draws the conclusion that “without a living 
subject, time cannot exist” […] what sense does it make to speak of “waiting” 
without time and without world?”264 (italics mine) 
 
In addition to the “poverty in world” that Heidegger ascribed to non-human animals, this 
passage characterizes the tick as a dispossession of time, providing the “suspension of the 
suspension” with a significance which is primarily historical. As a matter of fact, in The 
Open the question of “time” identifies a leading thread crossing the entire text. 
Agamben’s argument moves from a description of a thirteenth century Hebrew Bible 
which contains miniatures representing the history of humanity. One of the images in 
particular captures the author’s attention, because it portrays the end of time and the 
banquet of the last day. In this picture, the righteous individuals carry animal heads, 
signifying a post-temporal reconciliation between man and nature and recalling the 
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philosophical conception of history as a narrowly human form of knowledge. Agamben is 
convinced that the conclusion of history, which in recent times has been generally 
associated with a cataclysmic anarcho-capitalistic domination of the world, might 
nonetheless lead the anthropocentric logic that afflicts the West to dissolution. As a 
result, this could also facilitate the rise of new non-divisive forms of political interaction. 
This is why, in The Open, the author partly converges with Kojève’s opinion that “The 
disappearance of Man at the end of History is not a cosmic catastrophe…”, but, more 
positively, “the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions.”265  
 Following Kojève, Agamben believes that the end of history will not take place in the 
remote future, but to some extent has already occurred during the 20th century. Indeed, 
phenomena such as the increasing expansion of the economy, the consequent crisis of 
governmental powers, and the dissemination of the “American way of life”, which 
Kojève considers as a post-historical “eternal present of all humanity”266, are bringing 
time to its final stage. Because of the significant side-effects that globalization has 
generated - i.e. substantial depoliticization of consciences, shortfall of spiritual purposes, 
cultural uniformity, etc. - such a scenario is not appraised by Agamben in purely 
optimistic terms. And nonetheless, Agamben believes that Kojève’s perspective is 
partially accurate and that the end of history is something that should not only be 
accepted, but also theoretically welcomed in order to displace effectively the exclusive-
inclusive factors that torment the western world:  
Today, at a distance of nearly seventy years, it is clear for anyone who is not in 
absolutely bad faith that there are no longer historical tasks that can be taken on 
by, or even simply assigned to, men…man has now reached his historical telos 
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and, for a humanity that has become animal again, there is nothing left but the 
depoliticization of human societies…”267 ( italics mine) 
 
Filtering this fragment through our previous considerations, it is clear that the 
theorization of a ‘humanity that has become animal again’, which should be read as a 
Russellian definite description replacing bare life, cannot sustain transformative 
processes if not accompanied by the conclusion of history. What does this all mean? In 
what sense would the end of history help us dismantle the exceptional logic of 
sovereignty? 
 It is important to clarify that Agamben does not envision a conclusion of temporality 
as such, but rather calls for a messianic reformation of the western conception of time. 
Far from coinciding with the definitive dissolution of history, temporal messianism 
disrupts ordinary chronological models by intermittently conflating all temporal planes 
together; it is “the time of the end…the time that contracts itself and begins to end…the 
time that remains between time and its end.”268 Agamben, that is, relocates time within a 
suspended dimension wherein ‘origin and ‘end’, ‘beginning’ and ‘conclusion’ 
occasionally tend to overlap. This model moves away from the one-dimensional 
representation on which western common sense generally relies. Temporal messianism, 
signifying neither a progressive accumulation of instants nor a linear series of actions or 
achievements, spasmodically pulls together sequential openings and closures, thus 
undermining both the capitalistic maximization of production and the technocratic forms 
of control that the Occident has expressed ever since the modern age. From this stance, it 
is easier to identify the semantic correlation that Agamben establishes between 
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ontological formlessness, temporal suspension and Shabbat. Because of a deficiency of 
qualitative and also quantitative attributes, messianic time is hardly conceivable in purely 
rational terms; nevertheless, one can perceive it as an existential experience on the day of 
Saturday (Shabbat), which interrupts work activities while putting on hold the ordinary 
gestures that people mechanically repeat during the week. 
 Unlike Cassano’s doctrine of slowness, which aims at rectifying the western temporal 
flow without completely dismantling the framework that regulates it, Agamben summons 
an alternative temporal dimension wherein more radical sociopolitical shifts are set free. 
What Agamben describes is a temporal experience that is able to disentangle the un-
decidable riddle of sovereignty by suspending the juridical framework that sustains it. 
Messianic life, enabling human beings to “carry out good works independently from the 
law”269, completely disengages from both existing power relations and legal 
preconditions, thus generating, in Chiesa’s terms, “a new kind of sovereignty 
diametrically opposed to the sovereignty exercised by the anomic form of law.”270 
Agamben’s poverty in time, therefore, ultimately stands for a transformative bio-political 
discourse that adopts neither dialectic nor affirmative strategies, but which triggers the 
emergence of alternative forms of political autonomy through both the deactivation of 
applicable normative provisions and the creation of extra-normative modes of action and 
interaction.  
 The kynical spirit that this discourse personifies comes assertively to the foreground 
in one of Agamben’s most revealing texts. The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and 
Form of Life (2013), to which I am alluding, provides a detailed historical-philosophical 
                                                 
269 Ibid. p. 160. 
270 Lorenzo Chiesa (2009), Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology, in Chiesa & Toscano (2009) p. 160. 
189 
 
reconstruction of the phenomenon of western monasticism, focusing in particular on the 
Franciscan order. The book takes into account the spiritual movements of the 13th century 
and discusses the living style of the Franciscan friars by examining meticulously their 
rules, ascetic rituals and daily practices. Why would a philosophical project that explores 
the conceptual borders separating “community”, “sovereignty”, and “law”, give 
preferentiality to such an uncanny topic? What does the theme of monasticism have to do 
with issues pertaining to globalization, capitalism or sociopolitical transformation? These 
perplexities can only be soothed if supported by our kynical hypothesis, which is 
confirmed by the very first pages of the text, describing the ancient monastic orders in 
narrowly earthly terms. Far from placing importance on transcendent entities or 
theoretical issues regarding the nature of divinity, these religious groups looked at daily 
life as their main concern:  
“…in any case what they state and claim does not actually concern theological or 
dogmatic questions, articles of faith, or problems of scriptural interpretation. 
Instead, what is at stake is life and the way of living…The claim of poverty, 
which is present in all movements and which in itself is clearly not new, is only 
one aspect of this way or form of life…”271  
 
Diogenes’ insubordinate demeanor surfaces even more forcefully from the absolute 
primacy that the Franciscan rule placed within “the actual exercise of the virtues”272, 
which is in all circumstances more valuable than doctrinal abstractions or the “profession 
of vows”.273 Moving from the association that the Franciscan literature introduces 
between “rule” and “form of life”, Agamben’s bio-political cynicism prioritizes the living 
incarnation of ethical values over any written text. In particular, Agamben refers to the 
                                                 
271 Agamben (2013), p. 92. 
272 Ibid. p.107. 
273 Ibid. 
190 
 
Franciscan example as an effort to elaborate a set of principles that are able to adhere 
spontaneously to all their concrete implementations, and which fill up the void separating 
the universality of the norm from the singularity of each living being. The ideal of 
poverty is praised in order to reduce such a distance. Relying on the cathartic power that 
self-dispossessing modes of thinking convey, Franciscanism indicates the way to 
emancipate oneself from all types of property so as to step out of the sphere of law. 
Paradoxically, the Franciscan rule epitomizes a normative code that dismisses in toto its 
formal structure, and which finds in the kynical actuality of “true life” the one and only 
way to be illustrated.  
 
2. 
 In view of these considerations, Agamben’s appeal to what is probably the most 
kynical phenomenon characterizing Italian history suggests in all probability the effort to 
redirect Italian Thought towards an alternative direction. Of primary importance is the 
retrieval of critical tools which in some ways undermine the greedy logic of appropriation 
and materialistic accrual that the West pursued for centuries. Agamben looks at 
Franciscanism as a revolutionary phenomenon that had pointed to a different path, which 
was irresponsibly ignored during the subsequent epochs by European rulers and people. It 
goes without saying that the praise of poverty in question has little to do with the 
invocation of an eternal life or the mere celebration of the Christian monastic tradition. 
Rather, it indicates an antagonistic instrument which has the capacity to undermine 
consumerist moral frameworks, also weakening the alliance that capitalistic systems have 
established with juridical apparatuses: 
191 
 
“In one case as in the other, what remained untouched was perhaps the most 
precious legacy of Franciscanism, to which the West must return ever anew to 
contend with it as its undeferrable task: how to think a form-of-life, a human life 
entirely removed from the grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of the world 
that would never be substantiated into an appropriation. That is to say again: to 
think life as that which is never given as property but only as common use.”274  
 
Bearing in mind this significant paragraph, Lorenzo Chiesa’s suggestion to look at the 
homo sacer as a political hero who carries out a “silent form of resistance”275 should 
definitely be welcomed. However, what Chiesa does not clarify is that the real essence 
concealed by this rebellious asceticism cannot be justified through the unworldly domain 
of “faith” because, quite differently, it is rooted within the kynical atmosphere which has 
animated Italian philosophy during the last forty years. Agamben’s bio-political 
cynicism, materializing as “an individual and solitary flight from the world”276, then 
gives origin to “a model of total communitarian life”277 which challenges existing 
capitalistic and juridical establishments. 
 All this symbolically merges within Saint Francis’ legendary ability to speak with 
birds and wolves, also mirroring his unconditional love for all other living creatures. 
Suspended between bios and zoe, the Franciscans created an alternative ground for the 
rise of a post-human “coming community” dismissing the particularity of social-juridical 
conventions and ultimately identifying with the wholeness of the cosmos. The cosmo-
political connotations that characterize Agamben’s discourse, which have been neglected 
by numerous scholars, partly follow from the Arendtian presuppositions that inspire the 
Homo Sacer doctrine. Because in our time all individuals are potentially homini sacri, 
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Agamben certainly retrieves Arendt’s idea of the Holocaust as “a civilizational 
breakdown with global meaning”278, while converting the figure of the Muselmann into 
an exiled political rebel. Moreover, the bare communities he envisions display Arendtian 
characteristics to the extent that they are substantially devoid of specific identities, and 
yet still rely on concrete bonds as “preconditions of meaningful public life”279, urging 
political theory to “think and act within the limits”280. In line with Arendt’s view, 
Agamben would hardly endorse “megalomaniac”281 cosmopolitan objectives such as the 
removal of all territorial borders or the idea of a world citizenship. It is no accident that in 
recent times he expressed a fair amount of skepticism with regard to the Ius Soli decree 
discussed within the Italian parliament. 
 Arguably, Agamben’s kynical departure from Arendt unfolds through a radicalization 
of her unclear conception of the juridical. Despite Arendt’s reservations pertaining to the 
notion of “human rights”, which are often declared but rarely concretely enforced, she 
still acknowledges the importance of international law for protecting individuals from 
their governments and forestalling crimes against humanity. Because of this ambiguity, 
Arendt’s notion of “a right to have rights”, which emphasizes the necessity of a unified 
humanity providing the occurrence of homelessness, statelessness and political abuses 
with reasonable solutions, can be interpreted in two different ways: either as a call for 
more sensitive juridical responsibilities or as a provocative dismissal of legal norms in 
general. Rensmann favors the second interpretation, describing Arendt’s work as a 
philosophical effort which, “rather than delegating global challenges primarily to formal 
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legal principles or appealing to abstract morality”282, focuses on “situated political 
responsibility and particular politics of human dignity in order to realize, and rectify the 
universal”.283 Moving towards a similar direction, Balibar takes a step forward and 
identifies within the “right to have rights” a polemic essence which substantially makes it 
a “right to disobedience”:  
“The right to have rights is not a moral notion; it is a political one. It describes a 
process which started with resistance and ends in the actual exercise of a 
constituent power, whichever particular historical form this may take. It should 
therefore also be called a right to politics, in the broad sense, meaning that nobody 
can be properly emancipated from outside or from above, but only by his or her 
own activity.”284 
 
Agamben’s retrieval of Arendt radicalizes this interpretation. The cosmo-political 
singularities he theorizes are grounded on the abdication omnine iuri (abdication of all 
rights) which regulates the Franciscan rule and lifestyle. Relying on this postulate, 
Agamben converts Arendt’s “right to have rights” into the uncompromising “right to 
renounce all rights” that is personified spiritually, practically, and politically by the 
monastic order. This means that, in the Homo Sacer context, voluntary exile is not 
conceived of as the momentary space for intellectual reflection that Arendt envisions, but 
as the exclusive domain wherein social transformation can ultimately succeed.  
 For Agamben, the opportunity for such a cosmo-political redemption is paradoxically 
offered by the dissemination of capitalistic bio-power, which in the present epoch 
repeatedly converts rules into exceptions, thus transforming human life into an 
experience of shared self-exposure. Despite the detrimental consequences brought about 
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by globalization, this also sets up the conditions for the rise of societies with no identity 
that challenge the arrogant authority held by local dynasties, interregional aristocracies, 
and national powers:  
But this also means that the petty bourgeoisie represents an opportunity unheard 
of in the history of humanity that it must at all costs not let it slip away. Because 
if instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and 
senseless form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this 
impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and an 
individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely 
exposed singularity – if humans could, that is, not be-thus in this or that particular 
biography, but be only the thus, their singular exteriority and their face, then they 
would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions and 
without subjects, into a communication without the incommunicable.285  
 
The alliance that the neoliberal bourgeoisie establishes with western state apparatuses is 
what sustains them and corrodes them at the same time. In fact, these apparatuses 
reproduce through detection, recognition and identification procedures, whereas 
neoliberal forces tend to nullify all modes of belonging, thus giving birth to a 
proliferation of unclassifiable communities and, in turn, to an ongoing “struggle between 
the State and the non-State (humanity)”.286  
 As a temporary conclusion, it is realistic to assert that a kynical interpretation of 
Agamben’s post-1990 work provides Italian Thought with ontological and political 
resources which can be employed for obtaining a more accurate definition of the critical 
cosmo-localism conceptualized troughout this chapter. Despite the catastrophic 
appearance, Agamben’s bio-politics encompasses transformative factors which have the 
capacity to convert ‘exiled’ life-spaces and areas of dislocation into forms of collective 
antagonism. Pivotal is the value of “poverty”, which again stands for a way to engage 
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with the temporal flow and exhibits the ability to undermine the bridge linking bio-
power, consumerist moral structures and juridical apparatuses. Let us now ponder the 
potential repercussions that this analysis brings about. 
 
 
From Perpetual Peace to Perpetual Rebirth 
 
1. 
A Derridean theorist would most likely look at our second discussion on ‘poverty in time’ 
with some hesitancy. Differently from the post-human approach favored thus far, Derrida 
does not conceive of history as the outcome of the Agambean man-animal bivalence, and 
certainly does not think of it as suspended or concluded:  
 This abyssal rupture doesn’t describe two edges, a unilinear and indivisible line 
having two edges, Man and Animal in general. The multiple and heterogeneous 
border of this abyssal rupture has a history. Both macroscopic and microscopic 
and far from being closed, that history is now passing through the most unusual 
phase in which we find ourselves…287(italics mine) 
 
The association between heterogeneity and temporality, established by Derrida in many 
of his works288, reflects an attempt to construct a notion of history that relies on aspects 
of segmentation in order to dismiss self-referential components. For Derrida, time should 
be thought of as ‘out of joint’, namely as heterogeneous, irregular and asymmetrical. 
Such a philosophical move reveals an effort to deconstruct humanism by highlighting the 
plurality of living forms which Agamben’s unclothed ‘area of exception’ neglects. The 
                                                 
287 Derrida (2002), p. 399. 
288 See for instance Specters of Marx (1994) and Politics of Friendship (1994).  
196 
 
idea of “the Animal” as a universal category opposed to the “Human” cannot adequately 
explain the considerable differences keeping species and individuals apart, because it 
minimizes “the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon from 
the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee…”289 It is for this 
reason that Derrida is doubtful regarding Agamben’s view, whose shadow surfaces more 
visibly from the following passage:  
That is why I would hesitate to say that we are living through that (if one can still 
confidently call life the experience whose limits tremble at the bordercrossings 
between bios and zoē, the biological, zoological, and anthropological, as between 
life and death, life and technology, life and history, and so on). I would therefore 
hesitate just as much to say that we are living through a historical turning point.290 
 
Life cannot be constrained within bipolar stratagems and certainly cannot be enhanced by 
claiming that history has entered a limbo dimension, as the Homo Sacer hypothesis 
suggests. 
 Whether or not Derrida’s heterogeneity is more beneficial for our critical purposes 
than the principle of suspension formerly discussed is hard to tell; both deconstructive 
strategies arguably provide cosmopolitan theory with functional tools. The problem could 
be rephrased by asking whether narrating history from a plurality of different viewpoints 
would be more beneficial than putting history on hold. One could argue that recounting 
and teaching WWII in a French high school from multiple national, regional, and even 
local perspectives would provide future generations with a more vivid awareness of the 
suffering and traumas experienced by a diversity of people; even more so when reading, 
for instance, Russian, Japanese and American history manuals in their original language. 
It is possible that this approach would ultimately weaken both nationalistic and 
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chauvinistic feelings, thus facilitating socio-cultural dialogue and reinforcing values of 
tolerance. 
 Despite these potential benefits, however, the Derridean pluralism of perspectives 
would hardly allow us to recount a history that is not perceived as the victory of few 
protagonists over the anonymity of large masses. Historical events would still 
circumscribe a narrative space where “illustrious” names show off their brave deeds and 
accomplishments, forcing the rest of the passersby to accept a role of mute spectators.  
History, that is, would still be transmitted through the celebration of the heroes of the past 
and would continue to be used for discrediting specific minorities or social groups, thus 
perpetuating unequal as well as hierarchical social arrangements. Only a history with no 
names and no characters - which is prima facie a paradox - would provide ordinary 
individuals with both a voice and a relevant chronological role. This epistemological 
method, however, would arguably produce results that are as indeterminate as the 
Agambean temporal contractions, which encompass stronger antagonistic components to 
the extent that give subordinate human beings the chance to affect the evolution of 
events. 
  On the other hand, the temporal contractions extrapolated from Italian Theory may 
appear reckless. Minimizing the importance of history for the construction of shared 
communitarian feelings, this strategy might bring about the definitive breakdown of 
‘identity’ as such, sporadically endorsing a stronger individualism and potentially leading 
many communities to an inescapable collapse. And nonetheless it could prove to be a 
good strategy for telling which societies are based on the sincere agreement of moral 
values and ideas, and which ones ground themselves on meaningless myths resurfacing 
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from the past. What this line of reasoning is pointing to is not a total dismissal of 
historical knowledge per se, which to a degree provides human beings with self-
understanding and critical tools. Rather, the attack is carried out on the illegitimate way 
in which long-gone irrelevant events are occasionally used for defending political views 
and self-determination claims. Past traumas and shared states of suffering are without a 
doubt crucial for the initial development of a social organism, but might hold back the 
community once it fully comes to being. For this reason, collective traumatic memories 
ultimately need to be released and liberated so as to give way to new purposes, ideals and 
modes of solidarity that are more suitable to the current situation. In so doing, old 
degraded communities spontaneously dissolve, giving way to new and more desirable 
social groups. However hazardous this path seems to be, it is a risk worth taking.  
 Following this argumentative trail, the cosmo-political perspective represented here 
reclaims values of political autonomy, while conceiving of sovereignty not in terms of 
mere self-preservation, but as a dynamic capacity to undergo and alternatively survive 
processes of dissolution and renewal. The notion of “coming community” that is at stake 
points neither to an idealistically unified global scenario nor to a vague community of the 
future. Rather, it denotes a living social body that is willing to sacrifice what it currently 
is in order to become what it is not yet and which, for this reason, experiences reiterated 
states of evaporation and reincarnation. From this stance, every affirmative bio-political 
discourse presupposes the nihilistic path walked thus far.  
 For these reasons, the kynical “poverty in time” identified within Italian philosophy 
acquires a concrete bio-political significance through the notion of permanent “rebirth”. 
The values of self-dispossession that have animated this entire discourse reverberate 
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within a post-human notion of motherhood which, as Esposito thoughtfully points out, is 
called to disregard the semantic association between “pregnancy” and “ownership” 
perceived by common sense. Identifying the creature with the creator’s property, 
traditional conceptions of maternity generate biological correlations which link “nativity” 
and “nation”, “citizen” and “motherland”, thus endorsing ethnic and racial political 
discourses. On the contrary, the original generation of life must be conceived of as an act 
of self-deprivation “that decenters and overturns it into its opposite: in an originary 
in/origin that, far from belonging solely to itself, splits from itself, divides into its own 
other, and thus in the other from its own (nell’altro da ogni proprio).”291 If interpreted 
from a post-human perspective, the category of “birth” can hardly be utilized for 
promoting regressive or essentialist conceptions of the social:  
“Rather than enclosing the extraneousness within the same biological or political 
body (and also canceling it), birth now puts (rovescia) what is within the maternal 
womb outside. It doesn’t incorporate but excorporates, exteriorizes and bends 
outside (estroflette). It doesn’t assume or impose but exposes someone (male or 
female) to the event of the existence. Therefore it cannot be used, in either a real 
sense or a metaphoric sense, as protective apparatus for the self-protection of life. 
”292  
 
Moving away from Kant’s humanistic idea of Perpetual Peace, envisioning a stable 
global order which would ultimately rely on the expansion of the markets and the 
authority of international law, the position defended here relies on “perpetual rebirth”.  
This phrase represents a fundamental ring within a dynamic cosmo-local theoretical 
framework which contemplates values of independence as well as cultural openness and 
sociopolitical contagion. It also advocates the necessity to carry out extra-legal 
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maneuvers in order to effectively rectify the damages produced by post-1990 
neoliberalism.   
 
 
2. 
 In view of this argumentative thread and of the Franciscan post-humanism endorsed 
here, these theoretical efforts should pursue two main directions: 1) a stronger emphasis 
on the value of self-reliance which the original Franciscan rule, praising “charity” and 
“begging” as moral ideals, underestimates. This flaw can be rectified by combining 
Italian Cynicism with some of the claims recently advanced within certain areas of the 
Global Justice Movement; 2) Agamben’s decisionist293 account of the juridical appears to 
be excessively simplistic, to the extent that the interaction between legal spheres and 
extralegal forces can hardly be explained as a mutually exclusive mechanism. The 
transition between socio-legal apparatuses and utopian extra-legal types of community, in 
particular, cannot take place all at once but through a series of steps which progressively 
liberate ‘life’ from normative constraints. For this reason, an alternative and more 
desirable conception of the juridical needs to be elaborated in order to lead existing legal 
structures to dissolution. A discussion of these two conclusive points will be illustrated as 
follows. 
 The earliest Franciscan code distinguishes “property” from “use”; as opposed to the 
former, the latter is in line with natural law which imposes individuals to preserve their 
own existence but does not prescribe them to have any possessions. Towards the end of 
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the 13th century an intense dispute about this subject emerged between Conventuals and 
Spirituals. Conventuals conceived of the renunciation of ownership as the true essence of 
the Franciscan message, while Spirituals insisted on the necessity to practically embrace 
“poverty” as a lifestyle. Agamben highlights the limits circumscribing this controversy, 
which ultimately was not able to generate a solid theory of “use”. According to 
Agamben, more fruitful results could have been obtained by making an appeal to Saint 
Paul’s teachings and particularly to the Pauline letters, wherein “using the world as not 
using it or not abusing it defined the Christian’s form of life.”294 The reference to Saint 
Paul, whom The Time That Remains (2005) had chosen as the author’s main 
philosophical interlocutor, is not fortuitous; it evokes once again the conceptual relation 
linking alternative conceptions of time and the moral ideal of self-sufficiency previously 
brought to light. It is no accident that recent research looks at Saint Paul’s invitation to be 
“autarkes in all circumstances, in plenty as in want”295, as one of the most evident proofs 
of the influence that Greek Cynicism exercised on the early Christian Fathers. These 
historical and theoretical connections deserve a deeper analysis.   
 Regardless, it may be demonstrated that exploring the way in which the concept of 
self-sufficiency relates to the temporal flow can help one obtain a more lucid definition of 
the border separating “property” from “use”. It is evident that an account explaining 
“time” in terms of abrupt contractions of openings and closures, which locate the highest 
value of every human experience within the evanescence of the moment, can hardly 
sustain a notion of social life that is grounded on “property”. In view of the appreciation 
for the present that this perspective entails, “property” can be described as the anxiety of 
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the past and the future, while “use” will be defined as “poor” by essence, as it focuses 
primarily on transitory instants. A rich and stingy person who is devoured by the fear to 
lose the fortune earlier accumulated does not “use”. Poorer people who pursue opulence 
out of the apprehension of being ostracized from society do not use either; in so doing, 
they perpetuate the same sickness. What must be exorcised is not wealth per se, but the 
pathological attachment to temporal dimensions which are alternative to the current one 
and force the human psyche to suffer a constant state of panic. A genuine “use” 
presupposes mental indifference with respect to the temporal flow, as well as total faith in 
one’s own self-reliance. In this way, life is perceived as ephemeral and unrepeatable, 
providing individuals with the capacity to adapt to any series of events. In view of these 
considerations, a convenient way to rectify our Franciscan perspective could be to 
employ Italian Cynicism as a theoretical support for non-institutional cosmo-political 
subjectivities which oppose the neoliberal agenda and also defend values of political and 
economic independence.  
 Some of these claims have recently been advanced in several areas of the Global 
Justice Movement (GJM). Inheriting a number of ideas from the new social movements 
of the 1970s, the GJM formed at the end of the 1990s as a reaction to a series of 
transnational policies - the so called “structural adjustment policies” (SAP) - which had 
been previously established by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
Through a series of maneuvers including austerity strategies, reduction of social 
expenditures, liberalization of prices, and removal of state subsidies, the SAPS aimed at 
both deregulating trade and enhancing competitiveness. These measures, which were 
often approved without the endorsement of the trade unions and instantly exacerbated 
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social inequalities, received immediate criticism by numerous activists and intellectuals. 
A first reaction, in this regard, took place in Mexico with the 1994 surfacing of the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation, which originated from the preexisting indigenous 
movement, but mainly aimed to oppose the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) that the Mexican government was ratifying in cooperation with United States 
and Canada. A major victory was obtained a few years later by no-global activists against 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that was endorsed by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The approval of this treaty, enabling governments to accelerate 
trade settlements and authorizing multinational corporations to sue politicians whenever 
they would obstruct their plans, was successfully hindered through a well coordinated 
strategy of dissent.296 
 All these concerns found their ultimate expression in the occasion of the 1999 
ministerial conference organized by the WTO in Seattle, where approximately thirty 
thousand activists were able to prevent representatives from entering the meeting. 
Although previous protests had facilitated the emergence of a large-scale type of political 
activism, for the first time people realized that “global civil society had a major, direct 
impact on the conduct and outcome of an official summit.”297 This is the main reason 
why the events of Seattle are commonly seen as the official birth of the GJM, which 
became more concrete two years later with the creation of the World Social Forum 
(WSF) and the global days of action, receiving millions of supporters. Since then, 
thousands of no global organizations proliferated all around the world, including “civil 
society organizations, transnational advocacy networks, unions, religious groups, and 
                                                 
296 Moghadam (2013), p. 179. 
297 Mario Pianta and Raffaele Marchetti (2007), The Global Justice Movements: the Transnational Dimension, in 
Della Porta ed. by (2007) p. 37. 
204 
 
individual activists opposed to neoliberalism and war.”298 Some of the main objectives 
that no-global activism pursues involve alleviation of debt and poverty in third-world 
areas, penalization of financial speculations, fair regulation of trade and labor, ecological 
issues, and transformation of international governmental institutions. 
 It is reasonable to hypothesize that the post-human cynicism elaborated here has the 
capacity to provide some of these cosmo-political voices with theoretical support; even 
more so if one considers that, along with France, Italy harbors the highest number of no-
global forums in the world299. However, a few aspects need to be clarified in order to 
evaluate to what extent such a combination of ideas would be realistic. First, it must be 
acknowledged that, despite the honorable claims and intentions generally chased by no-
global organizations, in numerous occasions GJM gatherings resulted in violent and 
bloody outcomes which are hardly beneficial. These destructive effects can partly be 
explained by the lack of coordination and democratic structure that characterize many of 
these groups300. At the same time, they might also be due to the excessively resentful 
tones promoted within some spheres of the movement, wherein an immoderately polemic 
rhetoric leads one to adopt methods which are merely oppositional and contrastive. A 
look at the main four tendencies denoting the different attitudes that the “movement of 
the movement” exhibits with respect to globalization will help us clarify our ideas in this 
regard301:  1) a supportive wing, which consists of a few NGOs and mostly aligns with 
the belief that contemporary globalization represents the one and only way to prosperity, 
that public debt depends entirely upon governmental corruption and that all types of 
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transnational capital flows are ultimately beneficial; 2) a reformist inclination, which 
does not aim to dismantle globalization but rather to correct the injustices and inequalities 
that it generated. Far from invoking a radically new global order, reformists strive to 
alleviate the excesses produced by the internationalization of the economy through re-
regulation and redistribution procedures such as debt reduction or transnational 
investment taxation; 3) an isolationist tendency, including groups such as Focus on the 
Global South, Global Exchange, and 50 years is Enough302, which call for a total 
dismantlement of globalization and defend values of economic and political subsidiarity. 
Isolationists believe that all transnational capital flows are detrimental and that a return to 
an economy administrated locally and nationally is the only option. Representatives of 
this view are generally not interested in building cross-border networks303 and claim that 
policies should be elaborated in all circumstances according to principles of self-
sufficiency; 4) an alternative faction, embracing organizations such as Zapatistas, 
Adbusters and Reclaim the Streets304, which do not necessarily seek to overthrow 
capitalism as much as they aim at developing unconventional and more desirable ways of 
life. Those who align with this school of thought place a primary importance on cultural 
and environmental themes. Additionally, they refuse “the existing institutions and centres 
of global powers”305, and “concentrate on building separate, alternative arrangements and 
mechanisms whose viability is important in environmental and community issues.”306 
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 Disapproving of the perspectives represented by supporters and reformists, who for 
the most part neglect authentically transformative purposes, the cosmo-political view 
defended here identifies a complementary area in between the isolationist and the 
alternative orientations. More specifically, it retrieves the claims pertaining to a self-
sufficient and subsidiary type of economy advanced by the isolationists, while also 
valuing the international mentality exhibited by the alternatives. Considering that 
present-day de-territorialized media repeatedly generate connections between events 
which occur far away from one another, the attainment of a subsidiary and locally 
organized type of economy requires a significant degree of intercultural awareness, 
ideological exchange and transnational cooperation. This cannot be obtained by means of 
a merely separatist demeanor. Dismissing in toto large-scale networks, the purely 
isolationist perspective promotes a rhetoric that is merely oppositional and, at the same 
time, risks endorsing the regressive view according to which cultural protectionism and 
anti-immigration claims need to be defended in order to undermine economic 
exploitation. In so doing, it might ultimately prove both ineffective and violent. Quite 
differently, the kynical post-human view relies on the alternatives’ conviction that “the 
resistance will be as transnational as capital”307, also pursuing silent forms of dissent that 
replace self-assertive strategies with ideals of creativity, uniqueness and exceptionality. 
As a “quiet maverick”, this cosmo-political subjectivity dismisses excessively forceful 
tones and engages in awareness raising campaigns as well as in actions of negotiations 
both with powers and institutions. It also utilizes the transnational platform so as to create 
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autonomous forms of association and coexistence that challenge existing community 
frameworks. 
 
 
3.  
As a further rectification of our Franciscan Cynicism, it was said that Agamben’s 
decisionist account of the juridical appears to be excessively simplistic. A consistent 
explanation of the legal framework that assisted the Nazi establishment, for instance, 
cannot simply rely on the Schmittian perspective to which the Homo Sacer theory refers. 
For Roberto Esposito, what sustained the regime was not a reiterated extralegal type of 
decision, but a twofold combination of juris-naturalism and normativism308 which 
merged with one another, achieving their most radical and destructive potential. Such a 
conceptual fusion allowed biological discourses to rule over normative procedures, while 
also providing laws with the ultimate authority to decide for all forms of life: “Biology 
and law, life and norm hold each other in a doubly linked presupposition. If the norm 
presupposes the facticity of life as its privileged content, life for its part presupposes the 
caesura of the norm as its preventive definition.”309  
 The hypothesis that ‘norm’ and ‘life’ cannot be merely seen as mutually exclusive, as 
Esposito observes, is furthermore corroborated by the jurisgenerative factor identified by 
Sheila Benhabib. According to her analysis, the force of law cannot be simply described 
as an instrument of domination, to the extent that normative concepts and practices in 
                                                 
308 Hans Kelsen is credited as the creator of this doctrine, which establishes a close correspondence between ‘right’ 
and ‘norm’ and conceives of law as a tool that can be employed for enforcing order through justice. The 
normativistic theory classifies rules as ‘juridical’ when they depend formally upon other norms which are more 
substantial and hierarchically superior. 
309 Esposito (2008), pp. 183-184. 
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some circumstances display the capacity to enhance both personal and social awareness. 
In turn, extralegal pressures are occasionally able to redirect the message towards the 
opposite destination by influencing concrete decisions taken by magistrates and law-
makers: “Law can also structure an extralegal normative universe by developing new 
vocabularies for public claim making, by encouraging new forms of subjectivity to 
engage with the public sphere, and by interjecting existing relations of power with 
anticipations of justice to come. Law anticipates forms of justice in the future.”310  
 In view of these considerations, the transition between established juridical structures 
and extralegal modes of cooperation invoked by Agamben cannot be abruptly obtained 
without also causing outcomes that are both useless and destructive. Quite differently, 
this shift needs to be carried out through a series of normative alterations which will 
gradually lead juridical apparatuses to a final dismantlement. Therefore, the cosmo-
political dissolution-rebirth fluctuation previously posited must now be transferred onto 
the domain of law so as to ensure that social processes evolve without violent 
repercussions.  
 For this purpose, Benhabib’s jurisgenerative approach is certainly beneficial. First, 
she highlights the necessity to switch from international law to cosmopolitan principles, 
which are not restricted to the scope of mere treaties between states but also aim at 
protecting individual safety. Second, because of the jurisgenerative factor, Benhabib’s 
cosmopolitan norms spontaneously elicit interpretive and vernacularizing reactions which 
allow concrete social bodies to appropriate and tailor them according to specific 
historical-cultural characteristics. Take for instance the “equality before the law” 
universal principle, which acquires different forms depending upon the area wherein it is 
                                                 
310 Bebhabib (2009), p. 226. 
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enforced. Canada, Israel, and India think of it as compatible with privileges enjoyed by 
specific castes or minorities, which would be highly unacceptable in the United States. 
Quite differently, in contexts such as France and Germany the principle is mainly 
associated with gender issues. Benhabib refers to each of these normative 
implementations as a democratic iteration; this phrase does not indicate a purely 
technical maneuver, but a process involving concrete social struggles that sustain and 
take control of it: “The neglect of social movements and actors of social transformation 
and jurisgenerative politics in recent theorizing has led to a naïve faith in legal experts, 
international lawyers, and judges as agents of democratic change. They may be that as 
well, but surely democratization without political actors who seek to empower 
themselves by creating new subjectivities in the public sphere, new vocabularies of claim 
making, and new forms of togetherness is neither conceivable nor desirable.”311 
 Benhabib’s jurisgenerative component is an extremely valuable resource that 
cosmopolitan theory should certainly retain. However, because of the post-human 
premises that assist our discourse, the kynical perspective locates the cosmopolitan 
essence reproduced by the abovementioned iterative device not necessarily within the 
common reference that all particular implementations make to the same universal 
principle – i.e. “equality before the law”, “freedom of thought”, “freedom of association”, 
etc.  Rather, the cosmopolitan core is associated with the willingness that a supposed 
juridical apparatus exhibits to sacrifice and dissolve itself in order to give birth to a 
newborn and more convenient system of rules. Far from coinciding with its 
comprehensive capacity, the cosmopolitan potential that qualifies a normative framework 
is measured in terms of what Simondon would define as its meta-stability. Namely, the 
                                                 
311 Ibid. p. 222. 
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aptitude of the system to preserve throughout time its own flexibility, adaptability and 
translatability into different forms: “The tendency to eternity becomes therefore the 
consciousness of the relative: this latter is no longer the will to stop becoming or to 
render absolute an origin and to privilege a normative structure, but the knowledge of the 
meta-stability of the norms.”312 It is evident, from this stance, that in order to obtain a 
satisfactory proximity between ‘norm’ and ‘life’, every juridical code needs to encompass 
a nihilistic factor that predisposes it to “its prefigured destruction as a system and its 
possible translation in another system…”313 
 As an exemplification of this type of normative meta-stability, one could mention the 
regulation of secession processes, which rarely appears within existing constitutions and 
is now more than ever of primary importance. Since the fall of the Yugoslavian state, 
involving ethnic cleansing and brutalities of all kinds, the European continent witnessed 
the surfacing of a plethora of separatist movements which risk perpetuating civil wars 
and fratricide violence. This scenario must be prevented at all costs, particularly if one 
considers how in recent times some of these movements do not necessarily rely on ethnic, 
racial or tribal factors, but rather manifest a fair degree of social-cultural openness. 
Political analysts remind us that the three most successful European separatist factions - 
i.e. the Catalan separatist party (CiU), the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the New 
Flemish Alliance (N-VA) - have little to do with identitarian claims and, interestingly, 
classify themselves as supporters of the European Union. This is predominantly true as 
far as the cases of Flanders and Scotland are concerned, neither of which grounds its 
potential autonomy on specific historical reasons. As a matter of fact, Flanders acquired 
                                                 
312 G. Simondon, L’evoluzione psichica e collettiva, quoted in Esposito (2008), p. 188. 
313 Ibid.  
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political self-awareness after the formation of the Belgian nation-state, whereas Scotland 
justifies its autonomist demands through arguments regarding wealth equality, ecologic 
issues, and social justice. The paradoxical “independence in Europe” motto representing 
these tendencies can neither be associated to nationalistic types of projects nor to “a last 
desperate attempt to leap aboard the sinking ship of statehood”314. Quite differently, it 
appears to stand for an effort to combine values of local self-reliance with political 
unification purposes of a supranational scope.  
 In view of the fact that international law generally struggles with recognizing local 
self-determination outside colonial contexts, secessionist procedures must first be 
regulated at a national level through proper constitutional adjustments. It is reasonable to 
hypothesize, as several political analysts do315, that a constitutionalization of the right to 
secede would hardly facilitate a general collapse of states and communities and that, on 
the contrary, would be more likely to dishearten extremist aspirations. A confirmation for 
this conjecture rests on the fact that whenever governmental institutions were open to 
negotiate with local representatives, autonomist groups replaced radical purposes with 
more moderate claims. In 1995 the Canadian government allowed Quebecois separatists 
to express their voice and requests through a referendum. Surprisingly, the majority of 
the votes revealed a need to obtain more political autonomy, while remaining part of the 
Canadian nation-state. Similar outcomes emerged more recently in England, whose ruling 
powers repeatedly disapproved of a hypothetical divorce from Scotland but have made 
themselves available for cooperating with Scottish delegates. Following the Canadian 
antecedent, the 2012 Edinburgh agreement approved by the British government 
                                                 
314 Stephen Tierney (2005), Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-state National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to 
the Nation-State, quoted in Connoly (2013), p. 101. 
315 In addition to Connoly (2013), I am also referring to Archibugi (2008), chapter 9, and Weinstock (2001). 
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authorized the popular vote to be expressed, also envisioning a possible situation in 
which “Scotland would obtain virtually complete internal autonomy (including full fiscal 
powers) but would remain part of the United Kingdom for external purposes, such as 
defense and foreign affairs.”316 The referendum took place on September 14, 2014, 
exposing a 44.7% of pro-independence votes and a 55.3% representing the will to 
maintain political unity.  
 Differently from the strategies adopted by Canada and Scotland, Spanish institutions 
have thus far dismissed any type of consultation with the Catalan independence party, 
claiming that secessionist discourses are not considered by the constitution. Expectedly, 
violence occurred on October 1, 2017, when police forces were employed in order to 
block a referendum that had been authorized by the Catalan parliament. This kind of 
centralized repression will most likely boost up autonomist ambitions, whereas normative 
flexibility and a more open dialogue would perhaps alleviate the Catalans’ desire to 
leave. In so doing, local regions would acquire maximum self-sufficiency, without 
necessarily jeopardizing a general convergence of political intentions.  
 It is obvious that the European institutions, which hold the responsibility to recognize 
newborn societies from the outside, play an important role in these evolutionary 
processes. As Connoly thoughtfully suggests, the opportunity for regions to engage in 
paradiplomacy might prove to be a farsighted normative maneuver. Allowing local 
delegates to sit at the continental round-table, such an operation would also permit them 
to pursue local interests further than the national borders. Catalona and Flanders have 
been able to thrive in this sense, showing that a regionalized conception of Europe, which 
was portrayed within the Maastricht treaties but was never concretely pursued, could 
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successfully materialize317. By and large, whether this “separatism in integration” wave 
can be viewed as a symptom of the rising cosmo-local subjectivities conceptualized here 
is a debatable hypothesis that will optimistically produce desirable outcomes. The 
Scottish situation318 appears to be the most promising in this regard. Dismissing cultural 
and linguistic justifications, the SNP in fact defends its European status with the 
fundamental intention to escape the neo-liberal framework imposed by the 1980s 
Thatcherism. One only hopes that these types of phenomena will ultimately assist the 
promotion of self-determination views which disregard narrow-minded biases and 
reinforce ideals of liberty, hospitality and respect, facilitating a cosmopolitan awakening 
that overflows the European horizons. In this way, displaced emotions and exiled feelings 
will perhaps be able to reconcile with the harmony of the whole, thus eliciting an 
experience of truth that does not unfold as a greedy conquest of the totality, but as the 
perception of one’s own inner essence. At that point it will be clear for all that genuine 
forms of togetherness are rooted in the steadiness of solitude, that a sincere sense of 
identity is ultimately grounded on the plasticity of the shapeless, and that it is realistically 
possible to perceive oneself as local or national in the heart and as a citizen of the world 
in the mind.  
 
 
 
                                                 
317 Ibid. pp. 80-82. 
318 Whose exhaustive account would certainly require further considerations that exceed the scope of this work…  
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